| Preface |
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vii | |
| Game Theory in Economics |
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viii | |
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1 Normal and Extensive Form Games |
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1 | (18) |
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1 | (7) |
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1.2 Iterated Deletion of Dominated Strategies |
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8 | (2) |
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10 | (6) |
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1.3.1 The Reduced Normal Form |
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14 | (2) |
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16 | (3) |
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2 A First Look at Equilibrium |
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19 | (42) |
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19 | (6) |
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2.1.1 Why Study Nash Equilibrium? |
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23 | (2) |
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2.2 Credible Threats and Backward Induction |
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25 | (4) |
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2.2.1 Backward Induction and Iterated Weak Dominance |
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28 | (1) |
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29 | (5) |
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34 | (12) |
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2.4.1 Mixed Strategies and Security Levels |
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34 | (2) |
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2.4.2 Domination and Optimality |
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36 | (4) |
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2.4.3 Equilibrium in Mixed Strategies |
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40 | (4) |
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2.4.4 Behavior Strategies |
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44 | (2) |
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2.5 Dealing with Multiplicity |
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46 | (6) |
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47 | (3) |
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50 | (2) |
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52 | (9) |
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61 | (38) |
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3.1 An Introductory Example |
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61 | (1) |
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62 | (4) |
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3.3 Auctions and Related Games |
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66 | (14) |
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3.4 Games of Incomplete Information |
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80 | (5) |
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3.5 Higher Order Beliefs and Global Games |
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85 | (7) |
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92 | (7) |
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4 Nash Equilibrium: Existence and Foundations |
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99 | (22) |
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99 | (4) |
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4.2 Learning/Evolutionary Foundations |
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103 | (10) |
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4.2.1 Social Learning (Evolutionary Game Theory) |
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104 | (7) |
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4.2.2 Individual learning |
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111 | (2) |
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113 | (8) |
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5 Nash Equilibrium Refinements in Dynamic Games |
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121 | (24) |
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5.1 Sequential Rationality |
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121 | (7) |
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5.2 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium |
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128 | (5) |
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5.3 Sequential Equilibrium |
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133 | (4) |
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137 | (8) |
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145 | (22) |
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145 | (4) |
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149 | (9) |
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150 | (1) |
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6.2.2 Incomplete Information |
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150 | (5) |
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6.2.3 Refining to Separation |
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155 | (1) |
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155 | (3) |
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158 | (9) |
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167 | (52) |
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167 | (15) |
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167 | (1) |
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167 | (4) |
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171 | (2) |
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173 | (8) |
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7.1.5 Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria |
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181 | (1) |
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7.2 Short-Lived Players and Modeling Competitive Agents |
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182 | (6) |
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188 | (6) |
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188 | (3) |
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7.3.2 Collusion Under Demand Uncertainty |
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191 | (3) |
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7.4 Enforceability, Decomposability, and a Folk Theorem |
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194 | (6) |
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7.5 Imperfect Public Monitoring |
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200 | (8) |
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7.5.1 Efficiency Wages II |
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200 | (2) |
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7.5.2 Public Perfect Equilibria |
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202 | (1) |
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203 | (5) |
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208 | (11) |
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8 Topics in Dynamic Games |
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219 | (24) |
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8.1 Dynamic Games and Markov Perfect Equilibria |
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219 | (6) |
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8.2 Disappearance of Monopoly Power and the Coase Conjecture |
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225 | (5) |
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8.2.1 One and Two Period Example |
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225 | (2) |
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227 | (3) |
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230 | (7) |
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230 | (3) |
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233 | (2) |
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8.3.3 Infinite Horizon with Behavioral Types |
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235 | (2) |
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237 | (6) |
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243 | (20) |
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9.1 Axiomatic Nash Bargaining |
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243 | (2) |
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243 | (1) |
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244 | (1) |
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9.2 Rubinstein (1982) Bargaining |
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245 | (5) |
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9.2.1 The Stationary Equilibrium |
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247 | (1) |
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247 | (2) |
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249 | (1) |
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250 | (5) |
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250 | (2) |
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252 | (3) |
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9.4 Exogenous Risk of Breakdown |
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255 | (1) |
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256 | (7) |
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10 Introduction to Mechanism Design |
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263 | (16) |
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10.1 A Simple Screening Example |
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263 | (4) |
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10.2 A Less Simple Screening Example |
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267 | (5) |
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10.3 The Take-It-or-Leave-It Mechanism |
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272 | (1) |
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273 | (3) |
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276 | (3) |
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11 Dominant Strategy Mechanism Design |
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279 | (12) |
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11.1 Social Choice and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem |
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279 | (3) |
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11.2 Dominant Strategy Implementation and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem |
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282 | (5) |
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11.3 Efficiency in Quasilinear Environments |
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287 | (2) |
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289 | (2) |
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12 Bayesian Mechanism Design |
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291 | (24) |
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12.1 The Bayesian Revelation Principle |
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291 | (2) |
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12.2 Efficiency in Quasilinear Environments |
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293 | (3) |
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12.3 Incomplete Information Bargaining |
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296 | (9) |
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12.3.1 The Impossibility of Ex Post Efficient Trade |
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296 | (4) |
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12.3.2 Maximizing Ex Ante Gains From Trade |
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300 | (5) |
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12.4 Independent Private Values Auctions |
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305 | (5) |
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310 | (5) |
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315 | (14) |
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315 | (1) |
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315 | (2) |
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13.3 Unobservable Effort (Moral Hazard) |
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317 | (5) |
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13.4 Unobserved Cost of Effort (Adverse Selection) |
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322 | (2) |
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324 | (4) |
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328 | (1) |
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329 | (8) |
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14.1 Proof of Theorem 2.4.1 |
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329 | (3) |
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14.2 Trembling Hand Perfection |
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332 | (3) |
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14.2.1 Existence and Characterization |
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332 | (2) |
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14.2.2 Extensive Form Trembling Hand Perfection |
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334 | (1) |
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14.3 Completion of Proof of Theorem 12.3.1 |
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335 | (1) |
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336 | (1) |
| References |
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337 | (10) |
| Index |
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347 | |
Lisainfo e-raamatute kohta