Insurgency has been the most prevalent form of conflict in the modern world since the end of the Second World War. Accordingly, it has posed a major challenge to conventional armed forces, all of whom have had to evolve counter-insurgency methods in response. The volume brings together classic articles on the counter-insurgency experience since 1945.
Contents: Series preface; Introduction. Part I The British Experience: British intelligence in the Palestine campaign 1945-47, David A. Charters; 'Jungle bashing' in Malaya: towards a formal tactical doctrine, Raffi Gregorian; CLARET operations and confrontation, 1964-66, Raffi Gregorian; Intelligence and counter-insurgency in Kenya, 1952-56, Randall Heather; Intelligence and counter-insurgency operations: some reflections on the British experience, Keith Jeffrey; The British army and counter-guerrilla warfare in transition, 1944-52, Tim Jones; The British army and counter-guerrilla warfare in Greece, 1945-49, Tim Jones; The British army in Northern Ireland 1969-1972: from policing to counter-terror, Caroline Kennedy-Pipe and Colin McInnes; Minimum force, British counter-insurgency and the Mau Mau rebellion, John Newsinger; From counter-insurgency to internal security: Northern Ireland 1969-1992, John Newsinger ; British counter-insurgency in Kenya, 1952-56: extension of internal security policy or prelude to decolonisation?, David A. Percox; 'Lacking intelligence': some reflections on recent approaches to British counter-insurgency, 1900-1960, Richard Popplewell; Insurgency and decolonisation during the Malayan emergency, A.J. Stockwell. Part II The United States Experience: Illustrations of 'learning' in counter-insurgency, Christopher C. Harmon; Foreign internal defense and the Hukbalahap: a model counter-insurgency, Wray R. Johnson and Paul J. Dimech; American strategic culture in small wars, Carnes Lord; Ruminations of a pachyderm or what I learned in the counter-insurgency business, John D. Waghelstein. Part III The Soviet and Russian Experience: The Soviet Union and Muslim guerrilla wars, 1920-1981: lessons for Afghanistan, Alexandre Bennigsen; Marxist counterinsurgencies, Rod Paschall (1986); Kabul to Grozny: a critique of Soviet (Russian) counter-insurgency doctrine, Carl van Dyke; Name index.
Ian Beckett is Professor of History at the University of Northampton, UK. A Fellow of the Royal Historical Society, he is also Chairman of the Army Records Society. Previously, he was Major-General Matthew C Horner Chair in Military Theory at the US Marine Corps University, Quantico, Virginia.
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