Preface |
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xiii | |
Authors |
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xv | |
1 Introduction to Security Threats |
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1 | (2) |
2 The 2014-2015 Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield Break-In Case Study |
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3 | (18) |
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4 | (1) |
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Step 2: Picking the Right Target and Spear Phishing Them |
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4 | (1) |
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5 | (1) |
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5 | (1) |
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Step 3: Initial System Entry |
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5 | (1) |
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Next Steps to Establish an Undetectable Anonymous Persistent Presence |
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6 | (1) |
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Password Decryption Process and Equipment |
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6 | (1) |
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6 | (1) |
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6 | (2) |
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Tools Used by Hackers to Acquire Valid Entry Credentials and Tools Used by Security Personnel to Detect Activity and Malware and Protect the Stored Data |
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8 | (13) |
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Tool 1: Initial Spear-Phishing Entry Leading to the ScanBox Keystroke Logger |
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8 | (4) |
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Tool 2: Setting Up an Anonymous Path Using Tor |
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12 | (4) |
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Tool 3: CrowdStrike Identified Hacker Clusters, China Chopper Web-Shell Controller |
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16 | (12) |
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CrowdStrike's Identified Hacking Clusters |
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16 | (1) |
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China Chopper Web Shell Controller |
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17 | (1) |
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Types of Common Monitoring Software Employed |
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18 | (1) |
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Looking for Derusbi Parsing Software |
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18 | (1) |
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RSA's ECAT Scanning Software |
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19 | (1) |
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19 | (2) |
3 Anonymous Persistent Threats |
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21 | (4) |
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Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) Identified Shell Crew |
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21 | (2) |
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Kaspersky Lab Has Identified a Recent Attack Group That Identifies Its Tools as Careto: The Mask |
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23 | (1) |
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24 | (1) |
4 Creating Secure Code |
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25 | (10) |
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First Principle of Code Protection: Code Isolation and Confinement |
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25 | (1) |
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Code Isolation Techniques |
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26 | (2) |
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Implementation of the Four Code-Confinement Methods |
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28 | (2) |
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28 | (1) |
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28 | (1) |
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28 | (1) |
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29 | (1) |
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Linux's Ptrace Monitor and Systrace Routines |
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29 | (1) |
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Employing Applications Such as Ostia or NACI |
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30 | (1) |
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Isolation of Virtual Machines |
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30 | (1) |
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31 | (1) |
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Threats to Computer Virtualization |
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31 | (4) |
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32 | (1) |
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32 | (1) |
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32 | (3) |
5 Providing a Secure Architecture |
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35 | (6) |
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Providing a Secure Architecture |
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35 | (3) |
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Isolation and Least Privilege |
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35 | (1) |
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36 | (1) |
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37 | (1) |
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Browser Isolation and Least Privilege |
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38 | (1) |
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38 | (1) |
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Spear Phishing and Behavioral Attacks |
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39 | (1) |
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Spoofing, Digital Misrepresentation, and Mobile Security |
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39 | (2) |
6 The Hacker Strategy: Expanded |
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41 | (10) |
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Lab Analysis and Learning Vulnerabilities |
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41 | (5) |
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41 | (5) |
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42 | (1) |
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43 | (1) |
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43 | (1) |
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Exfiltrate Data and Conscript |
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43 | (1) |
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Overall: Cloak the Source |
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43 | (1) |
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44 | (1) |
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44 | (1) |
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44 | (2) |
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46 | (1) |
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Basic Control of Hijacking Attacks |
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46 | (1) |
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47 | (2) |
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48 | (1) |
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Advanced Hijacking Attacks: Heap Spraying |
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48 | (1) |
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The Final Solution to Hacking Attacks |
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49 | (2) |
7 Malware, Viruses, Worms, Bugs, and Botnets |
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51 | (30) |
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51 | (1) |
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Botnets: Process and Components and History |
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52 | (1) |
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52 | (1) |
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A More Detailed Examination of Malware, Viruses, Trojans, and Bots/Botnets |
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53 | (5) |
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54 | (1) |
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Some Examples of Historical Worm Attacks |
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54 | (2) |
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54 | (1) |
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Code Red I and Code Red II Worms |
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54 | (1) |
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55 | (1) |
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55 | (1) |
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55 | (1) |
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55 | (1) |
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55 | (1) |
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56 | (1) |
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Storm Worm and Storm Botnet |
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56 | (1) |
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56 | (2) |
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57 | (1) |
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58 | (1) |
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58 | (4) |
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58 | (1) |
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59 | (1) |
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60 | (1) |
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60 | (4) |
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61 | (1) |
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62 | (1) |
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62 | (1) |
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62 | (2) |
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Sneakiness and Side-Channel Attacks |
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64 | (5) |
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65 | (1) |
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65 | (1) |
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65 | (2) |
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Side Channels in Web Surfing |
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67 | (1) |
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Exploiting Side Channels for Stealth Scanning |
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67 | (1) |
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68 | (1) |
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69 | (1) |
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Detecting Attacks and Removal Systems |
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70 | (1) |
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Intrusion Detection Systems |
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70 | (1) |
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Host-Based and Network-Based Intrusion Detection Systems |
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70 | (4) |
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Network-Based Intrusion Detection Systems |
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70 | (1) |
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Host-Based Intrusion Detection Systems |
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71 | (1) |
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Honeypot Traps out in the Network |
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71 | (1) |
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Passive and Reactive Systems |
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72 | (1) |
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Statistical Anomaly and Signature-Based IDSs |
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72 | (1) |
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Comparison with Firewalls |
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72 | (1) |
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Detection Evasion Techniques |
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72 | (2) |
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74 | (1) |
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Detecting Attacks and Attackers with Examples |
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74 | (2) |
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74 | (1) |
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The Problem of Detecting Attacks |
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74 | (1) |
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74 | (1) |
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What Is Another Method to Detect This Attack? |
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75 | (1) |
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75 | (1) |
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75 | (1) |
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Detecting Successful Attacks |
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76 | (1) |
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Detection versus Blocking |
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76 | (2) |
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76 | (1) |
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76 | (1) |
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77 | (1) |
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78 | (1) |
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Specification-Based Detection |
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78 | (1) |
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78 | (1) |
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78 | (3) |
8 Cryptography and the RSA Algorithm |
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81 | (8) |
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Data Encryption Standard and Advanced Encryption Standard |
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82 | (3) |
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85 | (1) |
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Modern Approaches for Breaking Encryption |
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85 | (1) |
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Current Cryptography Concepts |
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85 | (1) |
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More Cryptography, Private-Key, Public-Key Encryption, RSA Algorithm Details |
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86 | (3) |
9 Browser Security and Cross-Site Scripting |
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89 | (8) |
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90 | (1) |
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91 | (1) |
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91 | (1) |
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92 | (1) |
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Hypertext Transfer Protocol |
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92 | (1) |
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93 | (1) |
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93 | (1) |
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94 | (1) |
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94 | (1) |
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95 | (1) |
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95 | (2) |
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96 | (1) |
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96 | (1) |
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Cross-Origin Resource Sharing |
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96 | (1) |
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96 | (1) |
10 Banking Security, Zeus, and SpyEye |
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97 | (8) |
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99 | (1) |
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Risk Management Process for Banks |
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99 | (1) |
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100 | (2) |
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Online Fraud and the Impacts of Zeus and SpyEye Attacks |
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102 | (3) |
11 Web Application Security |
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105 | (4) |
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105 | (2) |
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More Examples of Injection-Based Attacks |
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107 | (2) |
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A Review of the ScanBox Software |
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107 | (2) |
12 Session Management, User Authentication, and Web Application Security |
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109 | (8) |
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Session Management and User Authentication |
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109 | (2) |
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109 | (1) |
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110 | (1) |
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110 | (1) |
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111 | (1) |
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111 | (10) |
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Structured Query Language Injection |
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112 | (1) |
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An SQL Injection Example: The CardSystems Solutions Attack |
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112 | (1) |
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Cross-Site Request Forgery |
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112 | (2) |
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114 | (8) |
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Example of an XSS Attack on PayPal |
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114 | (1) |
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Session Management and User Authentication Conclusion |
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114 | (3) |
13 Web Security, DNS Security, and the Internet |
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117 | (4) |
14 Network Security and Defenses |
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121 | (12) |
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122 | (6) |
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122 | (1) |
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Address Resolution Protocol |
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123 | (1) |
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124 | (1) |
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125 | (1) |
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User Datagram Protocol (UDP) |
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125 | (1) |
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Blind TCP Session Hijacking |
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125 | (2) |
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127 | (1) |
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127 | (1) |
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127 | (1) |
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127 | (1) |
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Internet Control Message Protocol |
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127 | (1) |
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Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks |
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127 | (1) |
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Cryptographic Network Protection |
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128 | (1) |
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Internet Protocol Security |
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128 | (1) |
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128 | (1) |
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Physical/Link-Layer Threats: Eavesdropping |
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128 | (1) |
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Physical/Link-Layer Threats: Spoofing |
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128 | (1) |
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129 | (1) |
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Layer 4 TCP and UDP Threats |
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129 | (3) |
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130 | (1) |
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Domain Name System Threats |
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131 | (1) |
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132 | (1) |
15 Network Security Protocols and Defensive Mechanisms |
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133 | (14) |
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Network Security Protocols |
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133 | (2) |
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IP Security (IPSec) Protocol |
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134 | (1) |
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134 | (1) |
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134 | (1) |
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Layer 2: Link-Layer Connectivity of Wireless |
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135 | (2) |
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TCP/IP Basic Layer 2-3 Security Problems |
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135 | (2) |
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Defense Mechanisms That Can Be Employed |
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136 | (1) |
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136 | (1) |
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Several Different Protocols Then Apply to These Modes |
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136 | (1) |
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136 | (1) |
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Filtering Network Traffic at the IP Level |
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137 | (2) |
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138 | (1) |
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Firewall Stateful Packet Filtering |
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139 | (1) |
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Other Protocols of Concern |
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139 | (1) |
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139 | (2) |
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141 | (1) |
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141 | (1) |
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142 | (1) |
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Intrusion Detection Systems |
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142 | (1) |
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Two Critical Infrastructure Protocols: BGP and DNS |
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142 | (1) |
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Infrastructure Protocols for DNS and DNSSEC |
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143 | (1) |
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Network Control Firewalls |
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144 | (1) |
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Security Principle Reference Monitors |
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145 | (2) |
16 Denial-of-Service Attacks |
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147 | (4) |
17 Mobile Platform Security |
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151 | (14) |
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Comparison of Mobile Platforms |
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151 | (2) |
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Apple iOS Operating System |
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152 | (1) |
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152 | (1) |
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152 | (1) |
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153 | (1) |
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153 | (1) |
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Development of iOS Applications |
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153 | (1) |
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153 | (1) |
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Android Mobile Smartphone |
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154 | (1) |
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154 | (1) |
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155 | (1) |
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155 | (2) |
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156 | (1) |
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156 | (1) |
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157 | (1) |
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Apple iOS versus Android Operating System Comparisons |
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158 | (1) |
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Windows Mobile Models 7 and 8 Devices |
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158 | (2) |
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Windows Phone OS 7.0 Security Model |
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159 | (1) |
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.NET Code Access Security That Can Be Exploited on Windows Phones |
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160 | (3) |
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161 | (2) |
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163 | (1) |
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Attack Vectors for Mobile Devices |
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164 | (1) |
18 Cellular Access Security: 4G LTE, Mobile WiMAX, 5G, and MIMOs |
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165 | (22) |
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First-Generation Cellular Network |
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165 | (1) |
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Security Issues and Drawbacks |
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166 | (1) |
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Second-Generation Cellular Network |
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166 | (1) |
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Security Issues and Drawbacks |
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166 | (1) |
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Third-Generation Cellular Network |
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167 | (2) |
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Security Issues and Drawbacks |
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168 | (1) |
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169 | (1) |
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169 | (3) |
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Goals and Objectives in Security |
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169 | (1) |
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Boundaries and Limitations in Security |
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169 | (1) |
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170 | (1) |
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Types of Security Attacks |
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171 | (1) |
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172 | (1) |
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4G Security (LTE and WiMAX) |
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172 | (1) |
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172 | (1) |
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173 | (1) |
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Evolution of Mobile WiMAX |
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173 | (1) |
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Mobile WiMAX Architecture |
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174 | (1) |
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WiMAX Security, Threats, and Solutions |
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175 | (1) |
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176 | (1) |
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176 | (1) |
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176 | (1) |
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4G LTE Security, Threats, and Solutions |
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177 | (1) |
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178 | (1) |
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179 | (4) |
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180 | (1) |
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181 | (2) |
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183 | (1) |
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183 | (4) |
19 Wireless LAN Security |
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187 | (16) |
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Regulatory WLAN Security Standards |
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187 | (3) |
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188 | (1) |
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189 | (1) |
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189 | (1) |
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189 | (1) |
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189 | (1) |
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189 | (1) |
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189 | (1) |
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Wire Lined to Wireless Transition |
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190 | (1) |
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190 | (1) |
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Corporate Background of Wireless Networks |
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190 | (1) |
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Wireless Network Security Methods |
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191 | (1) |
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CIA Triangle of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability |
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191 | (2) |
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192 | (1) |
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Security Tokens and Software Tokens |
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192 | (1) |
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Wireless Security History, Standards, and Developments |
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193 | (4) |
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193 | (1) |
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194 | (1) |
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Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) |
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194 | (1) |
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Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) |
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194 | (1) |
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Lightweight Extensible Authentication Protocol (LEAP) |
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194 | (1) |
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Protected Extensible Authentication Protocol (PEAP) |
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194 | (1) |
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Wireless Transport Layer Security (WTLS) |
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195 | (1) |
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Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS) |
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195 | (1) |
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195 | (2) |
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Other Security Considerations |
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197 | (1) |
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Threats of Wireless Networks |
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198 | (3) |
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199 | (1) |
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199 | (2) |
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201 | (2) |
20 The Stuxnet Worm and the Vulnerability of the U.S. Electric Power Grid |
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203 | (18) |
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More Details of the Stuxnet Worm Used for Cyber Warfare |
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205 | (3) |
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205 | (3) |
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207 | (1) |
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Path 2: Via Network Shares |
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207 | (1) |
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Path 3: Via the MS10-061 Print Spooler 0-Day Vulnerability |
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208 | (1) |
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Path 4: Via the MS08-067 SMB Vulnerability |
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208 | (1) |
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Path 5: Via Step? Projects |
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208 | (1) |
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208 | (1) |
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Cyber Terrorism after Stuxnet |
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209 | (1) |
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209 | (1) |
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Response and Industrial Control Security |
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210 | (1) |
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The Vulnerable U.S. Electronic Power Grid |
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211 | (1) |
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Components and Operating Elements of the U.S. Electric Power Grid |
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212 | (2) |
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Irreplaceable Large Power Transformers and Our Smart Grid Risk |
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214 | (1) |
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215 | (1) |
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Programmable Logic Controllers |
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216 | (1) |
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216 | (1) |
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Distribution Transformers and Controllers |
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216 | (1) |
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Local PLC Inner-Loop Controller |
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217 | (1) |
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218 | (1) |
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219 | (2) |
21 Cyber Warfare |
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221 | (4) |
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223 | (1) |
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223 | (1) |
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224 | (1) |
22 Conclusion |
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225 | (2) |
Bibliography |
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227 | (8) |
Appendix |
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235 | (10) |
Index |
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245 | |