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E-raamat: Noneist Explorations I: The Sylvan Jungle - Volume 2

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  • Sari: Synthese Library 415
  • Ilmumisaeg: 22-Oct-2019
  • Kirjastus: Springer Nature Switzerland AG
  • Keel: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9783030263096
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  • Formaat: PDF+DRM
  • Sari: Synthese Library 415
  • Ilmumisaeg: 22-Oct-2019
  • Kirjastus: Springer Nature Switzerland AG
  • Keel: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9783030263096

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This second volume continues Richard Routleys explorations of an improved Meinongian account of non-referring and intensional discourse (including joint work with Val Routley, later Val Plumwood). It focuses on the essays 2 through 7 of the original monograph, Exploring Meinongs Jungle and Beyond, following on from the material of the first volume and explores its implications of the Noneist position. It begins with a further development of noneism in the direction of an ontologically neutral chronological logic and associated metaphysical issues concerning existence and change.



What follows includes: a detailed response to Quines On What There Is; a defense against further objections to noneism; a detailed account of Meinongs own position; arguments in favour of noneism from common-sense; and a noneist analysis of fictional discourse.



We present these essays separately and provide additional scholarly commentaries from a range of philosophers including Fred Kroon, Maria Elisabeth Reicher-Marek and a previously unpublished commentary on noneism by J.J.C. Smart.
Editors' Preface v
Contributors xi
Introduction: Some Personal Reflections -- Priest xiii
Original Material xix
First Edition Front Matter [ Abridged] xxiii
Acknowledgements xxiii
Chapter 2 Exploring Meinong's jungle and beyond. II. Existence and identity when times change
1(66)
§ 1 Existence is existence now
1(4)
§ 2 Enlarging on some of the chronological inadequacies of classical logic and its metaphysical basis, the Reference Theory
5(6)
§ 3 Change and identity over time; Heracleitean and Parmenidean problems for chronological logics
11(7)
§ 4 Developing a nonmetrical neutral chronological logic
18(30)
§ 5 Further corollaries of noneism for the philosophy of time
48(19)
1 Reality questions: the reality of time?
48(2)
2 Against the subjectivity of time: initial points
50(1)
3 The future is not real
51(2)
4 Alleged relativistic difficulties about the present time and as to tense
53(3)
5 Time, change and alternative worlds
56(1)
6 Limitations on statements about the future, especially as to naming objects and making predictions?
57(4)
7 Fatalism and alternative futures
61(6)
Chapter 3 On what there isn't
67(20)
Chapter 4 Further objections to the theory of items disarmed
87(78)
§ 1 The theory of objects is inconsistent, absurd; Carnap's objections, and Hinton's case against Meinongianism
88(7)
§ 2 The attack on nonexistent objects, and alleged puzzles about what such objects could be
95(2)
§ 3 The accusation of platonism; being, types of existence, and the condition on existence
97(8)
§ 4 Subsistence objections
105(4)
§ 5 The defects of nonentities; the problem of relations, and indeterminacy
109(3)
§ 6 Nonentities are mere shadows, facades, verbal simulacra; appeal to the formal mode
112(4)
§ 7 Tooley's objection that the claim that there are nonexistent objects answering to objects of thought leads to contradictions
116(3)
§ 8 Williams' argument that fatal difficulties beset Meinongian pure objects
119(4)
§ 9 Further objections based on quantification and on features of truth-definitions
123(2)
§ 10 Findlay's objection that nonentities are lawless, chaotic, unscientific
125(2)
§ 11 Grossmann's case against Meinong's theory of objects
127(13)
§ 12 Mish'alani's criticism of Meinongian theories
140(4)
§ 13 A theory of impossible objects is bound to be inconsistent: and objections based on rival theories of descriptions
144(6)
§ 14 Identity again: Lambert's challenge and how Quine hits back
150(5)
§ 15 Further objections based on theories of descriptions
155(5)
§ 16 The charge that a theory of items is unnecessary: the inadequacy of rival referential programmes
160(5)
Chapter 5 Three Meinongs
165(38)
§ 1 The mythological Meinong again, and further Oxford and North American misrepresentation
165(9)
§ 2 The Characterisation Postulate further considered, and some drawbacks of the consistent position
174(4)
§ 3 Interlude on the historical Meinong: evidence that Meinong intended his theory to be a consistent one, and some counter-evidence
178(5)
§ 4 The paraconsistent position, and forms of the Characterisation Postulate in the case of abstract objects
183(4)
§ 5 The bottom order Characterisation Postulate again, and triviality arguments
187(5)
§ 6 Characterising predicates and elementary and atomic proposi-tional functions, and the arguments for consistency and nontri-viality of theory
192(11)
Chapter 6 The theory of objects as commonsense
203(22)
§ 1 Nonreductionism and the Idiosyncratic Platitude
204(4)
§ 2 The structure of commonsense theories and commonsense philosophy
208(4)
§ 3 Axioms of commonsense, and major theses
212(4)
§ 4 No limitation theses, sorts of Characterisation Postulates, and proofs of commonsense
216(9)
1 No limitation (or Freedom) theses
216(3)
2 Characterisation (or Assumption) Postulates
219(6)
Chapter 7 The problems of fiction and fictions
225(88)
§ 1 Fiction, and some of its distinctive semantical features
228(10)
§ 2 Statemental logics of fiction: initial inadequacies in orthodoxy again
238(6)
§ 3 The main philosophical inheritance: paraphrastic and elliptical theories of fiction
244(13)
§ 4 Redesigning elliptical theories, as contextual theories
257(6)
§ 5 Elaborating contextual, and naive, theories to meet objections; and rejection of pure contextual theories
263(7)
§ 6 Integration of contextual and ordinary naive theories within the theory of items
270(6)
§ 7 Residual difficulties with the qualified naive theory: relational puzzles and fictional paradoxes
276(17)
1 Relational puzzles
276(14)
2 Fictional paradoxes and their dissolution
290(3)
§ 8 The objects of fiction: fictions and their syntax, semantics and problematics
293(7)
1 Common quantificational and second-order logics of fiction
293(2)
2 Avoiding reduced existence commitments and essentialist puzzles
295(2)
3 Transworld identity explained
297(2)
4 Duplicate objects characterised
299(1)
§ 9 Synopsis and clarification of the integrated theory: s-predicates and further elaboration
300(3)
§ 10 The extent of fiction, imagination and the like
303(10)
1 "Fictions" in the philosophical sense
304(1)
2 Imaginary objects, their features and their variety: initial theory
304(2)
3 Works of the fine arts and crafts, and their objects
306(2)
4 Types of media and literary fiction
308(2)
5 Fictional objects versus theoretical objects, and the mistake of fictionalism
310(1)
6 The incompleteness and "fictionality" of the theory of fictions advanced
311(2)
Bibliography 313(28)
Supplementary Essays 341(2)
A critique of Meinongian semantics -- Smart 343(10)
Routley's theory of fictions -- Reicher 353(30)
Routley's second thoughts -- Kroon 383(22)
Index 405
Richard Routley/Sylvan (1935-1996), a New Zealand born philosopher, who was a research fellow at the Australian National University at the time of his death, rose to prominence for his work in the development of Relevance Logic, Deep Ecology and a revised and improved Meinongian ontology known as noneism.  An iconoclastic figure in Australian philosophy, Routley/Sylvans legacy thrives in the views of students and colleagues worldwide.



Dominic Hyde is an Honorary Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at The University of Queensland whose works include: Vagueness, Logic and Ontology (2008), and Eco-Logical Lives: the philosophical lives of Richard Routley/Sylvan and Val Routley/Plumwood (2014). He works in non-classical logic and environmental philosophy and in environmental conservation.