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E-raamat: Politics of the First World War: A Course in Game Theory and International Security

(University of Texas, Austin)
  • Formaat: EPUB+DRM
  • Ilmumisaeg: 21-Feb-2019
  • Kirjastus: Cambridge University Press
  • Keel: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781108612906
  • Formaat - EPUB+DRM
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  • Formaat: EPUB+DRM
  • Ilmumisaeg: 21-Feb-2019
  • Kirjastus: Cambridge University Press
  • Keel: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781108612906

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World War I is the perfect case study for teaching international relations. This book uses thirteen historical puzzles to provide students with a rigorous yet accessible training in game theory, with each chapter showing, through guided exercises, how game theoretical models can explain otherwise challenging strategic puzzles.

The Great War is an immense, confusing and overwhelming historical conflict - the ideal case study for teaching game theory and international relations. Using thirteen historical puzzles, from the outbreak of the war and the stability of attrition, to unrestricted submarine warfare and American entry into the war, this book provides students with a rigorous yet accessible training in game theory. Each chapter shows, through guided exercises, how game theoretical models can explain otherwise challenging strategic puzzles, shedding light on the role of individual leaders in world politics, cooperation between coalitions partners, the effectiveness of international law, the termination of conflict, and the challenges of making peace. Its analytical history of World War I also surveys cutting edge political science research on international relations and the causes of war. Written by a leading game theorist known for his expertise of the war, this textbook includes useful student features such as chapter key terms, contemporary maps, a timeline of events, a list of key characters and additional end-of-chapter game-theoretic exercises.

Arvustused

'The Politics of the First World War uses game theory to resolve some enduring puzzles of the Great War, while simultaneously using the history of the war to teach game theory and to illuminate ongoing debates about international security. Wolford's unique analytic synthesis greatly enhances our understanding and teaching of the theory and history of conflict.' Jack S. Levy, Rutgers University, New Jersey 'The Politics of the First World War offers a creative approach to learning about international relations. It provides a clear and accessible introduction to game theory and international relations theory. The book's rich history of World War I underscores that game theory can help us understand one of the most consequential events of the twentieth century.' Matthew Fuhrmann, Texas A & M University 'Scott Wolford has written an accessible and engaging introduction to game theory. Set against the backdrop of World War I, the book explains what game theory is, how it works, and how it can help us understand important puzzles in international relations - and even manages to teach some history along the way. The chapters build technical knowledge gradually as the Great War unfolds, rages, and then ends 'in a whimper'. The Politics of the First World War: A Course in Game Theory and International Security will be a very useful teaching tool for undergraduate and introductory graduate courses.' Katja B. Kleinberg, State University of New York, Binghamton 'What a fabulous book Scott Wolford has written! While there are many competing textbooks to introduce students to international relations, there was no textbook for follow-up classes. There now is. Scott Wolford has written an engrossing and compelling book that masterfully weaves the events and puzzles of the First World War with a rigorous introduction to game theory. This is a fantastic idea and he pulls it off wonderfully. Students see the interaction and exchange between history and theory-building close up, in a way that makes both exciting. This book will change how students learn and how professors teach. I will make it the core of my own intermediate class.' Henk Goemans, University of Rochester 'Scott Wolford uses an innovative puzzle-based pedagogy, and cutting-edge analytical tools, to introduce modern theories of international relations and security through the historical lens of World War I. His 'real-time' approach to teaching how leaders make decisions is simply the best I've seen, perfect for developing critical thinking and problem-solving skills in readers.' Toby J. Rider, Texas Tech University 'A masterful yet accessible study in game theory and history that will be invaluable for undergraduate and graduate students. Truly one of a kind.' Amy Yuen, Middlebury College, Vermont 'This is a superb book, a refreshing introduction to game theory, and an enlightening analysis of complex episodes in the unfolding of the First World War. A real tour de force.' Alexandre Debs, Yale University, Connecticut

Muu info

This analytical history of World War I offers a rigorous yet accessible training in game theory, and a survey of modern political science research.
List of Figures
xi
List of Maps
xiii
Preface xv
Acknowledgments xxi
Timeline of Key Events xxiii
Dramatis Personae xxv
1 Introduction: The Great War
1(24)
1.1 History, War, and Political Science
6(3)
1.2 Theory and Simplicity
9(2)
1.3 War (and What It's Good For)
11(3)
1.4 The International System
14(7)
1.5 A Plan for the Book
21(4)
2 The Theory of War I: Commitment Problems
25(26)
2.1 A Brief Introduction to Game Theory
26(14)
2.1.1 Games
28(4)
2.1.2 Nash Equilibrium
32(8)
2.2 Commitment Problems and War
40(9)
2.3 Conclusion
49(2)
3 Armed Continent: The Anglo-German Naval Race
51(20)
3.1 Britain, Germany, and Dreadnoughts
52(3)
3.2 Explaining Arms Races
55(8)
3.2.1 Solving the Puzzle
58(3)
3.2.2 Was the Naval Race Futile?
61(2)
3.3 Equilibrium, Strategy, and Tragedy
63(3)
3.4 Arms Races and International Politics
66(2)
3.5 Conclusion
68(3)
4 Leaping into the Dark: Europe Goes to War
71(29)
4.1 The July Crisis and the Great War
72(5)
4.2 Explaining War Outbreak and Expansion
77(16)
4.2.1 Solving the Puzzle
79(10)
4.2.2 Why 1914?
89(4)
4.3 Whose Fault Was It?
93(2)
4.4 On "Unwinnable" Wars
95(1)
4.5 Conclusion
96(2)
4.6 Exercises: System Effects
98(2)
5 The Theory of War II: Information Problems
100(33)
5.1 Uncertainty and Bayesian Games
101(19)
5.1.1 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
107(7)
5.1.2 Information Problems and War
114(6)
5.2 Why Did France and Germany Hesitate?
120(8)
5.3 Conclusion
128(2)
5.4 Exercises: The UN and Public Opinion
130(3)
6 A Scrap of Paper: Belgium, France, and British Entry
133(30)
6.1 The Defense of Belgium
134(5)
6.2 Explaining British Entry
139(16)
6.2.1 Solving the Puzzle
141(11)
6.2.2 Was It Law or Self-Interest?
152(3)
6.3 What Is the Balance of Power?
155(4)
6.4 Reassurance and International Politics
159(2)
6.5 Conclusion
161(2)
7 Troubled Partnerships: Coalitions at War
163(28)
7.1 Cooperation in Rival Coalitions
164(6)
7.2 Explaining Wartime Cooperation
170(11)
7.2.1 Solving the Puzzle: The Entente
173(4)
7.2.2 Solving the Puzzle: The Central Powers
177(4)
7.3 On Solving Collective Action Problems
181(4)
7.4 Coalitions and International Politics I
185(4)
7.5 Conclusion
189(2)
8 The Best-Laid Plans: Attrition's Static Horror
191(35)
8.1 From Maneuver to Attrition
192(6)
8.2 Explaining Attrition
198(15)
8.2.1 Solving the Puzzle: The Frontiers
199(9)
8.2.2 Solving the Puzzle: After the Marne
208(5)
8.3 Attrition and Maneuver in the East
213(3)
8.4 Military Strategy and International Politics
216(4)
8.5 Conclusion
220(2)
8.6 Exercises: Armaments and Military Secrecy
222(4)
9 Choosing Sides: Building Military Coalitions
226(26)
9.1 Italy and the Ottoman Empire Join the War
227(4)
9.2 Explaining Coalition Building
231(13)
9.2.1 Solving the Puzzle
233(7)
9.2.2 Did Italy Break Faith?
240(4)
9.3 The War in East Asia
244(3)
9.4 Coalitions and International Politics II
247(3)
9.5 Conclusion
250(2)
10 Coordinating Caution: Naval War in the North Sea
252(34)
10.1 Limited War in the North Sea
254(5)
10.2 Explaining Limits on War
259(16)
10.2.1 Solving the Puzzle
261(11)
10.2.2 Did the Dreadnoughts Matter?
272(3)
10.3 On Limited War
275(3)
10.4 Coordination and International Politics
278(6)
10.5 Conclusion
284(2)
11 The Theory of War III: Commitment and War Termination
286(34)
11.1 "Real" and "Absolute" War
288(5)
11.2 Solving Commitment Problems
293(16)
11.2.1 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
293(7)
11.2.2 Commitment Problems and Subgame Perfection
300(9)
11.3 Restraint in the Trenches
309(2)
11.4 Commitment Problems and Civil War
311(3)
11.5 Conclusion
314(1)
11.6 Exercises: Interdependence and War
315(5)
12 The Theory of War IV: Information and War Termination
320(31)
12.1 The Puzzle of Persuasion
322(1)
12.2 Solving Information Problems
323(18)
12.2.1 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
324(8)
12.2.2 Information Problems and Bayesian Perfection
332(9)
12.3 Fighting, Learning, Bargaining
341(3)
12.4 Conclusion
344(2)
12.5 Exercises: Communication and Bluffing
346(5)
13 Too Proud to Fight? U-boats and American Neutrality
351(32)
13.1 Deterrence and the Submarine War
353(7)
13.2 Explaining American Intervention
360(16)
13.2.1 Solving the Puzzle
361(13)
13.2.2 Why "Associated," Not "Allied"?
374(2)
13.3 War Finance
376(2)
13.4 National Leaders and International Politics
378(2)
13.5 Conclusion
380(3)
14 The End of the Beginning: Victory, Defeat, and Peace
383(25)
14.1 Ending with a Whimper
384(6)
14.2 Explaining War Termination
390(9)
14.2.1 Solving the Puzzle
392(5)
14.2.2 What Happened to the "Knockout"?
397(2)
14.3 Democracy and War
399(3)
14.4 The Politics of Peace
402(4)
14.5 Conclusion
406(2)
15 Conclusion: History and the Present
408(7)
15.1 Contemporary International Relations
409(2)
15.2 The Great War and Political Science
411(4)
Bibliography 415(18)
Index 433
Scott Wolford is Associate Professor at the University of Texas, Austin. He published his first book, The Politics of Military Coalitions (Cambridge) in 2015, and has published articles in the American Journal of Political Science, the Journal of Politics, International Organization, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, and International Studies Quarterly, among others. He is a fellow of the Frank C. Irwin Chair in Government (201118), a recipient of the Best Paper in International Relations Award from the Midwest Political Science Association (2009), and a former Associate Editor for International Studies Quarterly.