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xi | |
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xiii | |
Preface |
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xv | |
Acknowledgments |
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xxi | |
Timeline of Key Events |
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xxiii | |
Dramatis Personae |
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xxv | |
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1 Introduction: The Great War |
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1 | (24) |
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1.1 History, War, and Political Science |
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6 | (3) |
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1.2 Theory and Simplicity |
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9 | (2) |
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1.3 War (and What It's Good For) |
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11 | (3) |
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1.4 The International System |
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14 | (7) |
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21 | (4) |
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2 The Theory of War I: Commitment Problems |
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25 | (26) |
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2.1 A Brief Introduction to Game Theory |
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26 | (14) |
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28 | (4) |
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32 | (8) |
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2.2 Commitment Problems and War |
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40 | (9) |
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49 | (2) |
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3 Armed Continent: The Anglo-German Naval Race |
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51 | (20) |
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3.1 Britain, Germany, and Dreadnoughts |
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52 | (3) |
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3.2 Explaining Arms Races |
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55 | (8) |
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58 | (3) |
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3.2.2 Was the Naval Race Futile? |
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61 | (2) |
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3.3 Equilibrium, Strategy, and Tragedy |
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63 | (3) |
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3.4 Arms Races and International Politics |
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66 | (2) |
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68 | (3) |
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4 Leaping into the Dark: Europe Goes to War |
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71 | (29) |
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4.1 The July Crisis and the Great War |
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72 | (5) |
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4.2 Explaining War Outbreak and Expansion |
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77 | (16) |
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79 | (10) |
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89 | (4) |
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93 | (2) |
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95 | (1) |
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96 | (2) |
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4.6 Exercises: System Effects |
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98 | (2) |
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5 The Theory of War II: Information Problems |
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100 | (33) |
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5.1 Uncertainty and Bayesian Games |
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101 | (19) |
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5.1.1 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium |
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107 | (7) |
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5.1.2 Information Problems and War |
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114 | (6) |
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5.2 Why Did France and Germany Hesitate? |
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120 | (8) |
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128 | (2) |
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5.4 Exercises: The UN and Public Opinion |
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130 | (3) |
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6 A Scrap of Paper: Belgium, France, and British Entry |
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133 | (30) |
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6.1 The Defense of Belgium |
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134 | (5) |
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6.2 Explaining British Entry |
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139 | (16) |
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141 | (11) |
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6.2.2 Was It Law or Self-Interest? |
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152 | (3) |
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6.3 What Is the Balance of Power? |
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155 | (4) |
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6.4 Reassurance and International Politics |
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159 | (2) |
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161 | (2) |
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7 Troubled Partnerships: Coalitions at War |
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163 | (28) |
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7.1 Cooperation in Rival Coalitions |
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164 | (6) |
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7.2 Explaining Wartime Cooperation |
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170 | (11) |
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7.2.1 Solving the Puzzle: The Entente |
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173 | (4) |
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7.2.2 Solving the Puzzle: The Central Powers |
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177 | (4) |
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7.3 On Solving Collective Action Problems |
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181 | (4) |
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7.4 Coalitions and International Politics I |
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185 | (4) |
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189 | (2) |
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8 The Best-Laid Plans: Attrition's Static Horror |
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191 | (35) |
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8.1 From Maneuver to Attrition |
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192 | (6) |
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198 | (15) |
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8.2.1 Solving the Puzzle: The Frontiers |
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199 | (9) |
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8.2.2 Solving the Puzzle: After the Marne |
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208 | (5) |
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8.3 Attrition and Maneuver in the East |
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213 | (3) |
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8.4 Military Strategy and International Politics |
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216 | (4) |
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220 | (2) |
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8.6 Exercises: Armaments and Military Secrecy |
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222 | (4) |
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9 Choosing Sides: Building Military Coalitions |
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226 | (26) |
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9.1 Italy and the Ottoman Empire Join the War |
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227 | (4) |
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9.2 Explaining Coalition Building |
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231 | (13) |
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233 | (7) |
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9.2.2 Did Italy Break Faith? |
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240 | (4) |
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244 | (3) |
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9.4 Coalitions and International Politics II |
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247 | (3) |
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250 | (2) |
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10 Coordinating Caution: Naval War in the North Sea |
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252 | (34) |
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10.1 Limited War in the North Sea |
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254 | (5) |
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10.2 Explaining Limits on War |
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259 | (16) |
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10.2.1 Solving the Puzzle |
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261 | (11) |
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10.2.2 Did the Dreadnoughts Matter? |
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272 | (3) |
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275 | (3) |
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10.4 Coordination and International Politics |
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278 | (6) |
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284 | (2) |
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11 The Theory of War III: Commitment and War Termination |
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286 | (34) |
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11.1 "Real" and "Absolute" War |
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288 | (5) |
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11.2 Solving Commitment Problems |
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293 | (16) |
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11.2.1 Subgame Perfect Equilibrium |
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293 | (7) |
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11.2.2 Commitment Problems and Subgame Perfection |
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300 | (9) |
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11.3 Restraint in the Trenches |
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309 | (2) |
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11.4 Commitment Problems and Civil War |
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311 | (3) |
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314 | (1) |
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11.6 Exercises: Interdependence and War |
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315 | (5) |
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12 The Theory of War IV: Information and War Termination |
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320 | (31) |
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12.1 The Puzzle of Persuasion |
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322 | (1) |
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12.2 Solving Information Problems |
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323 | (18) |
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12.2.1 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium |
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324 | (8) |
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12.2.2 Information Problems and Bayesian Perfection |
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332 | (9) |
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12.3 Fighting, Learning, Bargaining |
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341 | (3) |
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344 | (2) |
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12.5 Exercises: Communication and Bluffing |
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346 | (5) |
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13 Too Proud to Fight? U-boats and American Neutrality |
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351 | (32) |
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13.1 Deterrence and the Submarine War |
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353 | (7) |
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13.2 Explaining American Intervention |
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360 | (16) |
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13.2.1 Solving the Puzzle |
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361 | (13) |
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13.2.2 Why "Associated," Not "Allied"? |
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374 | (2) |
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376 | (2) |
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13.4 National Leaders and International Politics |
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378 | (2) |
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380 | (3) |
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14 The End of the Beginning: Victory, Defeat, and Peace |
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383 | (25) |
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14.1 Ending with a Whimper |
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384 | (6) |
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14.2 Explaining War Termination |
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390 | (9) |
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14.2.1 Solving the Puzzle |
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392 | (5) |
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14.2.2 What Happened to the "Knockout"? |
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397 | (2) |
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399 | (3) |
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14.4 The Politics of Peace |
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402 | (4) |
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406 | (2) |
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15 Conclusion: History and the Present |
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408 | (7) |
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15.1 Contemporary International Relations |
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409 | (2) |
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15.2 The Great War and Political Science |
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411 | (4) |
Bibliography |
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415 | (18) |
Index |
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433 | |