Muutke küpsiste eelistusi

E-raamat: Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers: How the Separation of Powers Affects Party Organization and Behavior

(University of Minnesota), (University of California, San Diego)
  • Formaat: EPUB+DRM
  • Ilmumisaeg: 17-May-2010
  • Kirjastus: Cambridge University Press
  • Keel: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780511848445
  • Formaat - EPUB+DRM
  • Hind: 30,86 €*
  • * hind on lõplik, st. muud allahindlused enam ei rakendu
  • Lisa ostukorvi
  • Lisa soovinimekirja
  • See e-raamat on mõeldud ainult isiklikuks kasutamiseks. E-raamatuid ei saa tagastada.
  • Formaat: EPUB+DRM
  • Ilmumisaeg: 17-May-2010
  • Kirjastus: Cambridge University Press
  • Keel: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780511848445

DRM piirangud

  • Kopeerimine (copy/paste):

    ei ole lubatud

  • Printimine:

    ei ole lubatud

  • Kasutamine:

    Digitaalõiguste kaitse (DRM)
    Kirjastus on väljastanud selle e-raamatu krüpteeritud kujul, mis tähendab, et selle lugemiseks peate installeerima spetsiaalse tarkvara. Samuti peate looma endale  Adobe ID Rohkem infot siin. E-raamatut saab lugeda 1 kasutaja ning alla laadida kuni 6'de seadmesse (kõik autoriseeritud sama Adobe ID-ga).

    Vajalik tarkvara
    Mobiilsetes seadmetes (telefon või tahvelarvuti) lugemiseks peate installeerima selle tasuta rakenduse: PocketBook Reader (iOS / Android)

    PC või Mac seadmes lugemiseks peate installima Adobe Digital Editionsi (Seeon tasuta rakendus spetsiaalselt e-raamatute lugemiseks. Seda ei tohi segamini ajada Adober Reader'iga, mis tõenäoliselt on juba teie arvutisse installeeritud )

    Seda e-raamatut ei saa lugeda Amazon Kindle's. 

"Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers is an overdue and pioneering book by two excellent political scientists. Political scientists have not paid enough attention to the ways in which parties differ in presidential compared to parliamentary systems. David Samuels and Matthew Shugart fill this important gap in the literature and show that parties behave and organize in systematically different ways in presidential compared to parliamentary democracies. Their mix of quantitative data and case studies is fruitful and compelling." - Scott Mainwaring, University of Notre Dame

"This is a terrific book by two leading scholars of parties and elections. It is especially rich empirically. The authors mix analysis of comprehensive data from across all democracies with a variety of case studies and extensive examples. They describe compelling and underrecog-nized links between formal constitutional structure and the goals of party leaders. Those goals of party leaders, the authors argue, get complicated under presidential systems, and they are different from the goals of party leaders in parliamentary systems. Put together, the quantitative analysis and case studies make the overall case in this book hard to refute." - Kenneth Kollman, University of Michigan

"This book sets out, in very clear and cogent terms, why anyone who is interested in understanding party competition needs to put constitutional distinctions between presidential and parliamentary government at center stage in their analysis." - Michael Laver, New York University

"Samuels and Shugart's book constitutes a giant step forward in exploring how institutional rules shape the internal power dynamics of political parties. Going beyond sociological or political-economic conditions of party organization, this book demonstrates that institutions have a major impact on how politicians coordinate their efforts to win and exercise political power through political parties. I have no doubt that this book will be an agenda setter, triggering a train of new comparative research on the political process inside political parties." - Herbert Kitschelt, Duke University

Muu info

David J. Samuels and Matthew S. Shugart provide the first systematic analysis of how democratic constitutional design shapes party politics.
Preface and Acknowledgments ix
1 Introduction
1(21)
Democracies with Elected Presidents Are Now in the Majority
4(3)
The Comparative Study of Political Parties and the Missing Variable of Regime-Type
7(5)
Clues from Existing Research
12(2)
"Presidentialized" versus "Parliamentarized" Parties
14(4)
Outline of the Book
18(4)
2 Political Parties in the Neo-Madisonian Theoretical Framework
22(40)
Democratic Regimes and the Neo-Madisonian Framework
25(9)
Parties in the Neo-Madisonian Framework
34(2)
Situating Parties within the Separation of Powers
36(3)
President-Party Relationships under Semi-Presidentialism
39(7)
Party Dilemmas under the Separation of Powers
46(7)
Conclusion
53(2)
Appendix 2A Cohabitation in Semi-Presidential Systems - Cases and Data
55(7)
3 Insiders and Outsiders: Madison's Dilemma and Leadership Selection
62(32)
Defining Insiders and Outsiders
65(3)
Insiders versus Outsiders: Hypotheses
68(4)
Career Paths of Insiders and Outsiders
72(11)
Limits of Presidentialization in Hybrid Regimes
83(7)
Conclusion
90(1)
Appendix 3A Constructing the Database on Leaders' Career Paths
91(3)
4 Constitutional Design and Intraparty Leadership Accountability
94(29)
Firing Party Agents under Parliamentarism
95(3)
Firing Prime Ministers under Semi-Presidentialism
98(10)
Firing a Directly Elected President
108(12)
Conclusion
120(3)
5 Electoral Separation of Purpose within Political Parties
123(39)
Electoral Separation of Purpose: The Physical Separation of Votes
126(2)
Sources of Variation in Electoral Separation of Purpose
128(2)
Measuring Electoral Separation of Purpose
130(2)
Illustrative Examples of Electoral Separation of Purpose
132(10)
The Global Extent of Electoral Separation of Purpose
142(8)
Conclusion
150(2)
Appendix 5A Sources for District-Level Electoral Data
152(7)
Appendix 5B Countries and Elections Included
159(3)
6 The Impact of Constitutional Change on Party Organization and Behavior
162(31)
Constitutional Reforms and Expectations for Party Adaptation
164(6)
Presidentialized Parties in France
170(9)
Presidentialized Parties in Israel
179(11)
Conclusion
190(3)
7 Parties' "Presidential Dilemmas" in Brazil and Mexico
193(25)
Presidential Dilemmas in Brazilian Parties
194(10)
Presidential Dilemmas in Mexican Parties
204(11)
Conclusion
215(3)
8 Presidents, Prime Ministers, and Mandate Representation
218(31)
Parties, Presidents, and Political Representation
222(9)
Policy-Switching or Mandate Representation: A Global Exploration
231(16)
Conclusion
247(2)
9 Conclusion
249(16)
Semi-Presidentialism Is More Presidential Than Parliamentary
255(2)
Pure Types and Hybrids: Implications of Trends in Constitutional Design
257(5)
The Research Agenda
262(3)
References 265(24)
Index 289
David J. Samuels is the Benjamin E. Lippincott Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota. He is the author of Ambition, Federalism, and Legislative Politics in Brazil (Cambridge University Press, 2003) and the co-editor of Decentralization and Democracy in Latin America (2004). He has published articles in the American Political Science Review, the Journal of Politics, Comparative Politics, Comparative Political Studies, Legislative Studies Quarterly, and the British Journal of Political Science. Matthew S. Shugart is Professor at the Department of Political Science and the School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego. Among his books are Seats and Votes (with Rein Taagepera, 1989), Presidents and Assemblies (with John Carey, Cambridge University Press, 1992), Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America (co-edited with Scott Mainwaring, Cambridge University Press, 1997), Executive Decree Authority (co-edited with John Carey, Cambridge University Press, 1998), and Mixed-Member Electoral Systems (co-edited with Martin Wattenberg, 2001). His articles have appeared in numerous journals, including the American Journal of Political Science, the American Political Science Review, the British Journal of Political Science, and Electoral Studies.