Muutke küpsiste eelistusi

E-raamat: Putting Jurisprudence Back Into Economics: What is Really Wrong With Today's Neoclassical Theory

5.00/5 (2 hinnangut Goodreads-ist)
  • Formaat: PDF+DRM
  • Ilmumisaeg: 24-Jun-2021
  • Kirjastus: Springer Nature Switzerland AG
  • Keel: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9783030760960
Teised raamatud teemal:
  • Formaat - PDF+DRM
  • Hind: 110,53 €*
  • * hind on lõplik, st. muud allahindlused enam ei rakendu
  • Lisa ostukorvi
  • Lisa soovinimekirja
  • See e-raamat on mõeldud ainult isiklikuks kasutamiseks. E-raamatuid ei saa tagastada.
Putting Jurisprudence Back Into Economics: What is Really Wrong With Today's Neoclassical TheorySuurem pilt
  • Formaat: PDF+DRM
  • Ilmumisaeg: 24-Jun-2021
  • Kirjastus: Springer Nature Switzerland AG
  • Keel: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9783030760960
Teised raamatud teemal:

DRM piirangud

  • Kopeerimine (copy/paste):

    ei ole lubatud

  • Printimine:

    ei ole lubatud

  • Kasutamine:

    Digitaalõiguste kaitse (DRM)
    Kirjastus on väljastanud selle e-raamatu krüpteeritud kujul, mis tähendab, et selle lugemiseks peate installeerima spetsiaalse tarkvara. Samuti peate looma endale  Adobe ID Rohkem infot siin. E-raamatut saab lugeda 1 kasutaja ning alla laadida kuni 6'de seadmesse (kõik autoriseeritud sama Adobe ID-ga).

    Vajalik tarkvara
    Mobiilsetes seadmetes (telefon või tahvelarvuti) lugemiseks peate installeerima selle tasuta rakenduse: PocketBook Reader (iOS / Android)

    PC või Mac seadmes lugemiseks peate installima Adobe Digital Editionsi (Seeon tasuta rakendus spetsiaalselt e-raamatute lugemiseks. Seda ei tohi segamini ajada Adober Reader'iga, mis tõenäoliselt on juba teie arvutisse installeeritud )

    Seda e-raamatut ei saa lugeda Amazon Kindle's. 

This book presents an integrated jurisprudential critique of neoclassical microeconomic theory. It explains what is ‘really wrong’ with the theory both descriptively, as well as normatively. The criticism presented is based on questions of jurisprudence, and on neoclassical theory’s sins of omission and commission concerning the underlying system of property and contract. On the positive side - while the presentation is almost entirely non-mathematical - the book contains the first mathematical treatment of the fundamental theorem about property and contract in jurisprudence that underlies a market economy.

The book follows the tradition of John Stuart Mill as the last major political economist who considered the study of property rights as an integral part of economic theory. The conceptual criticisms presented in this book focus on the descriptive and normative misconceptions about property and contracts that are deeply embedded ideology in neoclassical economics, not to mention in the broader society. The book recognizes that the idealized microeconomic theory is not descriptive of reality and focuses its criticism on conceptual mistakes in the theory, which are even clearer due to the idealized nature of the theory. 

Therefore, the book is a must-read for scholars, researchers, and students interested in a better understanding of jurisprudence in economics, neoclassical microeconomic theory, and political economy in general. 
1 Introduction to the Jurisprudence of Property and Contract
1(26)
1.1 Introduction
1(2)
1.2 The Conventional Neglect of the Question of Appropriation
3(2)
1.3 The Fundamental Myth
5(2)
1.4 The `Invisible Hand' in the Property System
7(2)
1.5 Normative Theory of Appropriation and Transfers of Property
9(4)
1.5.1 Applying the Juridical Principle of Imputation to All Intentional Human Activities
9(2)
1.5.2 Rights-Based Normative Economics
11(2)
1.6 The Fundamental Theorem for the Property Mechanism
13(2)
1.7 Description of Production in the Employment System
15(8)
1.7.1 The Facts of the Case
15(4)
1.7.2 How Does the Description of Employment Square with the Fundamental Theorem?
19(4)
References
23(4)
2 Mathematical Introduction to the Jurisprudence of Property and Contract
27(36)
2.1 From Numbers to Vectors of Numbers
27(1)
2.2 Graphs
28(4)
2.3 The Contractual Mechanism
32(1)
2.4 Analysis of Breaches and Externalities
33(2)
2.5 "Appropriation Is the Boundary of Contract"
35(1)
2.6 Responsible Actions and Factual Transfers
36(2)
2.7 Fundamental Theorem of Property Theory
38(1)
2.8 Intuitive Summary of Basic Ideas: A Water Meter Example
38(1)
2.9 Intuitive Summary of Basic Ideas: Accounting Examples
39(2)
2.10 Application to the Human Rental Firm
41(4)
2.11 Appendix: The Mathematical Development Using General Vectors
45(16)
2.11.1 Node and Arc Assignments
45(1)
2.11.2 Divergence Operator
46(1)
2.11.3 Cuts
46(1)
2.11.4 The Covering Relation
47(1)
2.11.5 The Contractual Mechanism
48(1)
2.11.6 Analysis of Breaches and Externalities
49(3)
2.11.7 An Exchange Example
52(2)
2.11.8 Appropriation Is the Boundary of Contract
54(1)
2.11.9 Responsible Actions and Factual Transfers
54(2)
2.11.10 Fundamental Theorem of Property Theory
56(1)
2.11.11 Application to the Human Rental Firm
57(2)
2.11.12 The Equivalence Between the Two Mathematical Formulations
59(2)
References
61(2)
3 The Property Fallacy in Capital Theory and Corporate Finance Theory
63(14)
3.1 The Appropriation of Produced Assets and Liabilities
63(3)
3.2 The Property Fallacy in Capital Theory
66(5)
3.3 The Property Fallacy in Corporate Finance Theory
71(1)
3.4 Property Interpretation of the Book-Plus-Profits Formula
72(1)
3.5 Future Whole Products as "Goodwill"
73(2)
References
75(2)
4 The Arrow-Debreu Model
77(12)
4.1 Introduction
77(1)
4.2 The Modeling Error in the Arrow-Debreu Model
78(1)
4.3 Separating Corporations from Firms Utilizing Production Sets
79(4)
4.4 Production as Arbitrage Between Input and Output Markets
83(1)
4.5 Endgames to Defend the AD Model
84(3)
4.5.1 Defining Away the Problem with Owner-Specified Outputs
84(1)
4.5.2 Hidden-Factor Ploys
85(2)
References
87(2)
5 Marginal Productivity Theory
89(30)
5.1 What Is the Frame of Discussion?
89(1)
5.2 Heterodox Criticism of MP Theory
90(2)
5.3 Isn't the Distribution of Wealth and Income the `Real' Problem?
92(3)
5.4 The Fork in the Road for the `Labor Theory'
95(1)
5.5 The Question of Appropriation Again
96(1)
5.6 The Pons Asinorum of Property Theory
97(3)
5.7 The Descriptive Question of Appropriation
100(1)
5.8 The Normative Question of Appropriation
101(1)
5.9 The Juridical Principle of Imputation
102(4)
5.10 On the Theory of Marginal Productivity
106(6)
5.10.1 Tne Metaphor: Treating the Productive Services of Things Like the Responsible Actions of Persons
106(3)
5.10.2 The Mistake: No Division of Actual Property Rights to the Product
109(2)
5.10.3 The Miracle: Each Factor's Immaculate Production of Its Marginal Product
111(1)
5.11 Conclusions About MP Theory
112(2)
5.12 Mathematical Appendix on Vectorial MP Theory
114(2)
References
116(3)
6 Marxism as the Ultimate `Capitalist Tool'
119(12)
6.1 Introduction
119(1)
6.2 Marx's Labor Theory of Value
120(2)
6.3 Marx and Marxism's Huge Favors for the Human Rental System
122(6)
6.3.1 Huge Favor (1) "Capitalism Is Based on Private Property Rights"
122(1)
6.3.2 Huge Favor (2) "The Basic Question Is: Consent Versus Coercion"
123(1)
6.3.3 Huge Favor (3) "Value Theory Is the Intellectual Battleground to Analyze Capitalism"
124(1)
6.3.4 Huge Favor (4) "Inalienable Rights!? Nonsense on Stilts!"
124(1)
6.3.5 Huge Favor (5) "Democracy Is Only Relevant in The Public Sphere; Capitalist Enterprises Are Private"
125(2)
6.3.6 Huge Favor (6) Marxism as the Leftwing Ideology of One-Party Autocracy
127(1)
References
128(3)
7 The Logical Fallacy in Cost-Benefit Analysis and Law & Economics
131(10)
7.1 Introduction
131(2)
7.2 The Same-Yardstick Fallacy and Definitional Statements
133(1)
7.3 An Example of the Fallacy in the Law & Economics Literature
134(2)
7.4 The Analysis with a Non-Involved Numeraire
136(3)
References
139(2)
8 Jurisprudence and the Corporate Governance Debate
141(12)
8.1 Introduction
141(1)
8.2 Two Types of Rights: Property Rights and Personal Rights
142(1)
8.3 Corporations and Cooperatives
143(2)
8.4 Stakeholder Governance
145(2)
8.5 What About Shareholder Democracy?
147(2)
8.6 Concluding Remarks
149(2)
References
151(2)
9 Invalidity of Personhood Alienation Contracts
153(24)
9.1 Introduction to Rights-Based Normative Economics
153(1)
9.2 Examples of Injustice as Non-Correspondence
154(1)
9.3 Example 1: The Coverture Marriage Contract
155(2)
9.4 Example 2: The Voluntary Slavery or Perpetual Servitude Contract
157(3)
9.5 Example 3: Pactum Subjectionis
160(2)
9.6 De Facto Inalienability
162(2)
9.7 Employment Contract as the Human Rental Contract
164(1)
9.8 Example 4: The Human Rental Contract
165(3)
9.9 Frank Knight as an `Exceptional' Classical Liberal Thinker
168(2)
9.10 Classical Liberal Jurisprudence and the Abolition of Certain Voluntary Contracts
170(2)
9.11 The Democratic Alternative
172(1)
9.12 Concluding Remarks on the Inalienability of Responsible Agency
173(2)
References
175(2)
10 Concluding Remarks About Jurisprudence and Neoclassical Economics
177(6)
10.1 What Is Really Wrong Descriptively?
177(2)
10.2 What Is Really Wrong Normatively?
179(3)
References
182(1)
Index 183
David Ellerman is an Associate Researcher at the Faculty of Social Science, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. In 2003 he retired to academia after 10 years at the World Bank where he was the economic advisor and speech-writer for the Chief Economist Joseph Stiglitz.  In his prior university teaching, Ellerman taught over a twenty-year period in the Boston area in five disciplines: economics, mathematics, computer science, operations research, and accounting. He was educated at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (USA), and at Boston University where he has two masters degrees, one in philosophy and one in economics, and a doctorate in mathematics. Ellerman has published seven previous books and many articles in scholarly journals in economics, logic, mathematics, physics, philosophy, and law.
Lisainfo e-raamatute kohta Lisainfo e-raamatute kohta
Püsilink: https://www.kriso.ee/db/97830307609602e.html
Märksõnad: