| Preface |
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| Summary Contents |
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xv | |
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xxiii | |
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1 | (22) |
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1.1 The Nature of the Problem |
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1 | (1) |
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1.2 The Scheme of the Book |
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2 | (1) |
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1.3 The Distractions of Terminology |
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3 | (3) |
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1.3.1 `Intellectual property', `intellectual property right' and `refusal to license' |
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4 | (1) |
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1.3.2 `Regulator' and `regulation' |
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5 | (1) |
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1.3.3 `Competition', `antitrust', `abuse of market power' and `monopolisation' |
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5 | (1) |
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1.4 Two Bad Ideas Converge |
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6 | (1) |
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1.5 The Ideal Competition Regime |
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6 | (4) |
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1.6 Rhetorical Dead Ends and Red Herrings |
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10 | (10) |
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1.6.1 Ownership carries with it the right to exclude others from the thing owned |
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10 | (2) |
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1.6.2 What the State has expressly granted it shall not take back by stealth |
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12 | (1) |
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1.6.3 Intellectual property owners must be free to choose their licensees |
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13 | (2) |
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1.6.4 Coerced licensing is confiscation |
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15 | (1) |
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1.6.5 Regulatory intervention is justified only in the case of marginal or weak intellectual property rights |
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16 | (1) |
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1.6.6 Under-regulation is always and everywhere better than over-regulation |
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17 | (1) |
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1.6.7 The need for competition scrutiny diminishes when there is a parallel regulatory regime and intellectual property provides such a regime |
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18 | (1) |
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1.6.8 Compulsory licensing discourages investment in innovation and creativity |
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18 | (2) |
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1.7 The Incomplete Globalisation of Competition Policy |
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20 | (3) |
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2 The Uneasy Cohabitation of Law and Economics in Competition Regimes |
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23 | (12) |
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2.1 Empiricism versus Formalism |
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23 | (1) |
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2.2 The Uneven Reception of Economics across Jurisdictions |
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24 | (3) |
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2.2.1 The rule of reason and economics in United States case law |
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24 | (1) |
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2.2.2 The delayed take-up of economics in Europe |
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25 | (1) |
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2.2.3 Economics legislatively mandated or excluded: Canada, Australia and New Zealand |
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26 | (1) |
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2.3 The Inherent Indeterminism of Economics |
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27 | (2) |
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2.4 Judicial Exits from Indeterminate Economics |
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29 | (2) |
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2.4.1 Deference to the regulator |
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29 | (1) |
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2.4.2 Manipulating the onus and standard of proof |
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30 | (1) |
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2.4.3 Deference to business autonomy or expertise |
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30 | (1) |
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2.5 Modes of Absorbing Economics |
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31 | (1) |
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2.6 Choosing Between the False Positive and the False Negative |
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32 | (3) |
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3 Fault Lines in Competition Policy |
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35 | (41) |
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3.1 A Taxonomy of Competition Rules |
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35 | (1) |
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3.2 Disentangling Fact and Law in Competition Cases |
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36 | (4) |
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3.2.1 Rules or prophecies? |
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37 | (1) |
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3.2.2 Proof and presumption in competition cases |
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37 | (3) |
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3.3 The Role of Markets in the Refusal to License Debate |
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40 | (12) |
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3.3.1 Defining markets and delimiting rights are not the same thing |
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41 | (1) |
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3.3.2 Substitutability and intellectual property |
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41 | (1) |
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3.3.3 How many markets? How many rights? |
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42 | (5) |
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3.3.4 Special rules for special markets? |
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47 | (3) |
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3.3.5 Standard setting and standard capture |
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50 | (1) |
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3.3.6 Mandated interoperability |
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51 | (1) |
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3.4 Efficiency and Consumers: Centre Stage or at the Margins? |
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52 | (5) |
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3.4.1 Efficiency: goal or fall-back defence? |
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53 | (1) |
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3.4.2 The three faces of efficiency |
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53 | (1) |
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3.4.3 Whose welfare matters? |
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54 | (3) |
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3.5 Probability, Intent and Outcome |
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57 | (1) |
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3.6 The Uncertain Role of Barriers to Entry in Competition Analysis |
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58 | (3) |
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3.6.1 Measurement or categorisation |
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59 | (1) |
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3.6.2 Structural versus strategic barriers |
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60 | (1) |
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3.7 The Ever-receding Perfect Remedy |
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61 | (15) |
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3.7.1 Remedial objectives in competition cases |
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62 | (1) |
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3.7.2 Structural remedies: nuclear deterrent or conventional weapon? |
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62 | (4) |
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3.7.3 Judicial recoil from the role of quasi regulator |
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66 | (1) |
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3.7.4 Pricing coerced access |
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67 | (2) |
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3.7.5 Court-created supervisory structures: assisting whom---court or regulator? |
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69 | (1) |
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3.7.6 Retrospective assessment of efficacy |
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70 | (1) |
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3.7.7 Reasoning backward from remedy to breach |
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71 | (3) |
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3.7.8 Multi-purpose monetary remedies |
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74 | (2) |
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4 Intellectual Property and Competition Policy: Constructing the Interface |
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76 | (46) |
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4.1 Privilege, Punishment and Neutrality |
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76 | (1) |
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4.2 Winners and Losers in the Intellectual Property Game |
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77 | (2) |
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4.2.1 Innovators, creators and owners |
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77 | (1) |
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4.2.2 Competitors as innovators |
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78 | (1) |
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4.2.3 Users and consumers |
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78 | (1) |
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4.2.4 Dispersed contributors to innovative efficiency |
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79 | (1) |
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4.3 The Magic of Names: `Property', `Regulation' and `Monopoly' |
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79 | (6) |
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4.3.1 Property's necessary ambiguities |
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80 | (2) |
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4.3.2 Is intellectual property really the same as other property and does it matter? |
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82 | (1) |
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4.3.3 Property versus regulation: a false polarity |
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83 | (1) |
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4.3.4 Legal versus economic monopolies |
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84 | (1) |
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4.4 Slicing the Intellectual Property Pie |
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85 | (7) |
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4.4.1 The juristic form of the right |
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85 | (3) |
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4.4.2 Matching rule to rationale |
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88 | (2) |
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4.4.3 Different jurisdictions slice the pie differently |
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90 | (1) |
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4.4.4 Paracopyright and privatised regulation |
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91 | (1) |
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4.5 Intellectual Property's Lopsided Relationship with Competition Policy |
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92 | (9) |
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4.5.1 Intellectual property's internal competition controls |
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92 | (4) |
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4.5.2 Ranking rights in terms of utility and vulnerability |
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96 | (1) |
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97 | (1) |
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4.5.4 Intellectual property and barriers to entry |
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98 | (3) |
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4.6 The Contested Economics of Intellectual Property |
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101 | (9) |
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4.6.1 The economics of rights justification |
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101 | (1) |
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4.6.2 The economics of rights expansion |
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102 | (3) |
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4.6.3 Cheering on the expansion |
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105 | (3) |
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4.6.4 Worried bystanders and prophets of doom |
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108 | (2) |
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4.7 The Erosion of Intellectual Property's Own Limiting Mechanisms |
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110 | (7) |
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4.7.1 Towards the fully protectable idea |
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111 | (1) |
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4.7.2 Cutting the link between signifier and reputation |
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112 | (1) |
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4.7.3 Effort and investment protected per se |
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113 | (2) |
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4.7.4 Widening the copyright infringement net |
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115 | (1) |
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4.7.5 Restricting follow-on innovation and creativity |
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116 | (1) |
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4.8 Pushing at the Time/Space Envelope |
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117 | (5) |
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4.8.1 Extending the term of the right |
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117 | (2) |
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4.8.2 Towards the inexhaustible right |
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119 | (2) |
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4.8.3 Exporting over-protection |
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121 | (1) |
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5 Refusals to License in the United States |
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122 | (28) |
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5.1 The Fragmentation of United States Monopolisation Law |
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122 | (1) |
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5.2 The Push-Me-Pull-You Intellectual Property-Antitrust Relationship |
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123 | (2) |
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5.3 The Interrupted Journey Towards Regulatory Neutrality |
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125 | (1) |
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5.4 The Right to Refuse and Essential Facilities in United States Antitrust Law |
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126 | (11) |
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5.4.1 Expansion and refinement of the essential facilities doctrine |
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127 | (4) |
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5.4.2 The Colgate principle |
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131 | (1) |
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5.4.3 The significance of fair dealing |
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132 | (2) |
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5.4.4 The Trinko retreat: squeezing the life out of essential facilities |
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134 | (3) |
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5.5 The Continuing Problem of Constructive Refusal and Margin Squeeze |
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137 | (1) |
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5.6 Spare Parts and After Markets: A Dead End? |
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138 | (3) |
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5.7 Variation across the Intellectual Property Spectrum: Uneven Treatment of Patents and Copyright |
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141 | (3) |
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5.8 Parallel Jurisprudence on Abuse of Rights |
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144 | (3) |
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5.9 The Uncertain Line between Action and Inaction in US Law |
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147 | (1) |
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5.10 A Summary of Judicial Responses to Refusals to License in United States Courts |
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148 | (2) |
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6 Europe's Exceptional Circumstances Test |
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150 | (31) |
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6.1 Soft and Hard Law in Europe |
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150 | (2) |
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6.2 Hallmarks of European Refusals Jurisprudence |
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152 | (7) |
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6.2.1 The nexus between market power and ownership of intellectual property right |
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152 | (1) |
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6.2.2 Close and enduring embrace of the essential facilities doctrine |
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153 | (3) |
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6.2.3 Leveraging theory and the multiple markets debate in Europe |
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156 | (1) |
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6.2.4 Entrenchment of the need for objective justification |
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157 | (2) |
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6.3 Refusals to Supply Tangibles |
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159 | (1) |
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6.4 Refusals to Supply Intangibles |
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160 | (1) |
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6.5 Refusals to License Intellectual Property |
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161 | (7) |
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6.5.1 The emergence of the concept of exceptional circumstances |
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161 | (2) |
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6.5.2 Judicial refinement of the concept of exceptionality |
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163 | (3) |
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6.5.3 National treatment of refusals to license intellectual property |
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166 | (2) |
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6.6 Oscar Bronner. Anomaly or Path Through the Woods? |
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168 | (2) |
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170 | (6) |
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6.8 Little Guidance from the Guidance |
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176 | (5) |
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7 Refusals to License in Australia and New Zealand: Parsing the Hints and Silences |
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181 | (29) |
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7.1 Convergence and its Limits |
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181 | (1) |
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7.2 Taking Advantage of Market Power |
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182 | (14) |
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7.2.1 The statutory provisions |
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182 | (1) |
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7.2.2 Australia: many roads home |
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183 | (6) |
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7.2.3 New Zealand: one test to rule them all |
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189 | (7) |
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7.3 Feeding Intellectual Property into the Legislative Mix |
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196 | (14) |
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7.3.1 The legislated line between action and inaction in relation to intellectual property in Australia and New Zealand |
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196 | (1) |
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7.3.2 Judicial hints and silences in Australia |
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197 | (8) |
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7.3.3 A New Zealand oddity: section 36(3) of the Commerce Act |
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205 | (3) |
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7.3.4 Restraint of trade and breach of confidence preserved by statute |
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208 | (2) |
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8 Canada: Legislative Solutions and Regulatory Bypasses |
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210 | (23) |
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8.1 A Three Pronged Legislative Assault |
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210 | (1) |
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8.2 Enforcement and Adjudication |
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211 | (1) |
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8.3 Section 75: Refusals to Deal |
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211 | (6) |
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8.4 Section 79: General and Specific Prohibitions |
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217 | (6) |
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8.5 Section 32: Special Remedies for Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights |
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223 | (2) |
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8.6 The Patent Assignment Cases |
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225 | (3) |
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8.7 The Competition Bureau's Enforcement Guidelines |
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228 | (3) |
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8.7.1 Intellectual Property Enforcement Guidelines (2000) |
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228 | (1) |
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8.7.2 Draft Enforcement Guidelines on Abuse of Dominance |
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229 | (2) |
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8.8 Compulsory Licensing Under Intellectual Property Statutes in Canada |
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231 | (2) |
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9 Reintegrating Law and Economics: Perfecting the Art of the Possible |
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233 | (7) |
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9.1 The Case for Neutrality Restated |
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233 | (1) |
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9.2 Intellectual Property and Competition Policy: Rebuilding the Interface |
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233 | (2) |
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9.2.1 Setting limits to competition policy |
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234 | (1) |
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9.2.2 The inadequacy of intellectual property's internal controls |
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234 | (1) |
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9.2.3 The choices for courts and regulators |
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235 | (1) |
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9.3 Failed Black-Letter Exits from the Refusal to License Impasse |
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235 | (2) |
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9.3.1 Essential facilities, the right to refuse and exceptional circumstances: non-solutions to non-problems |
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236 | (1) |
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9.3.2 The ranking of rights: unworkable and distracting |
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236 | (1) |
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9.4 The Perils of Legislative Intervention |
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237 | (1) |
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9.5 The Shifting of Competition Law's Internal Markers |
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238 | (1) |
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9.6 Reducing the Empirical Deficit |
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238 | (2) |
| Bibliography |
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240 | (17) |
| Index |
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257 | |
Lisainfo e-raamatute kohta