Muutke küpsiste eelistusi

E-raamat: Regulating Blockchain: Techno-Social and Legal Challenges

Edited by (Postdoctoral Fellow, Humboldt University of Berlin), Edited by (Postdoctoral Fellow, Princ), Edited by (Assistant Professor of Law, HBKU College of Law & Public Policy), Edited by (Professor of global competition law and policy, UCL Laws, University College London)
  • Formaat: 464 pages
  • Ilmumisaeg: 29-Aug-2019
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • Keel: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780192579492
Teised raamatud teemal:
  • Formaat - PDF+DRM
  • Hind: 110,63 €*
  • * hind on lõplik, st. muud allahindlused enam ei rakendu
  • Lisa ostukorvi
  • Lisa soovinimekirja
  • See e-raamat on mõeldud ainult isiklikuks kasutamiseks. E-raamatuid ei saa tagastada.
Regulating Blockchain: Techno-Social and Legal ChallengesSuurem pilt
  • Formaat: 464 pages
  • Ilmumisaeg: 29-Aug-2019
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • Keel: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780192579492
Teised raamatud teemal:

DRM piirangud

  • Kopeerimine (copy/paste):

    ei ole lubatud

  • Printimine:

    ei ole lubatud

  • Kasutamine:

    Digitaalõiguste kaitse (DRM)
    Kirjastus on väljastanud selle e-raamatu krüpteeritud kujul, mis tähendab, et selle lugemiseks peate installeerima spetsiaalse tarkvara. Samuti peate looma endale  Adobe ID Rohkem infot siin. E-raamatut saab lugeda 1 kasutaja ning alla laadida kuni 6'de seadmesse (kõik autoriseeritud sama Adobe ID-ga).

    Vajalik tarkvara
    Mobiilsetes seadmetes (telefon või tahvelarvuti) lugemiseks peate installeerima selle tasuta rakenduse: PocketBook Reader (iOS / Android)

    PC või Mac seadmes lugemiseks peate installima Adobe Digital Editionsi (Seeon tasuta rakendus spetsiaalselt e-raamatute lugemiseks. Seda ei tohi segamini ajada Adober Reader'iga, mis tõenäoliselt on juba teie arvutisse installeeritud )

    Seda e-raamatut ei saa lugeda Amazon Kindle's. 

The aim of this book is to understand the technological and business potential of the blockchain technology and to reflect on its legal challenges, providing an unparalleled critical analysis of the disruptive potential of this technology for the economy and the legal system.

Less than a decade after the Financial Crisis, we are witnessing the fast emergence of a new financial order driven by three different, yet interconnected, dynamics: first, the rapid application of technology - such as big data, machine learning, and distributed computing - to banking, lending, and investing, in particular with the emergence of virtual currencies and digital finance; second, a disintermediation fuelled by the rise of peer-to-peer lending platforms and crowd investment which challenge the traditional banking model and may, over time, lead to a transformation of the way both retail and corporate customers bank; and, third, a tendency of de-bureaucratisation under which new platforms and technologies challenge established organisational patterns that regulate finance and manage the money supply.

These changes are to a significant degree driven by the development of blockchain technology. The aim of this book is to understand the technological and business potential of the blockchain technology and to reflect on its legal challenges. The book mainly focuses on the challenges blockchain technology has so far faced in its first application in the areas of virtual money and finance, as well as those that it will inevitably face (and is partially already facing, as the SEC Investigative Report of June 2017 and an ongoing SEC securities fraud investigation show) as its domain of application expands in other fields of economic activity such as smart contracts and initial coin offerings. The book provides an unparalleled critical analysis of the disruptive potential of this technology for the economy and the legal system and contributes to current thinking on the role of law in harvesting and shaping innovation.

Arvustused

The book provides an excellent survey of the legal implications of blockchain, and of the legal challenges FinTech entrepreneurs are facing when they want to develop blockchain applications. It shows that blockchain clearly is not the answer to everything, but that it can make a difference in many aspects of FinTech and beyond. * Dr. Robert Kilian, General Counsel and Chief Representative, N26 Group * Regulating Blockchain is an impressively rich and interdisciplinary collection of essays on all aspects of blockchain development, including cryptocurrencies and other forms of decentralized financial technology. Essential reading for anyone interested in the interaction of law and technology in the financial sector and the possible futures of money, banking, and credit in a globalizing world. * David Singh Grewal, Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. Author of 'Network Power: The Social Dynamics of Globalization' *

List of Contributors xv
Regulating Blockchain: Techno-Social and Legal Challenges-An Introduction 1(26)
Philipp Hacker
Ioannis Lianos
Georgios Dimitropoulos
Stefan Eich
I Introduction
1(2)
II Background: The Emergence of Blockchain Technology
3(3)
III Blockchain, Calculative Spaces, and the State
6(3)
IV The Legal Grammar of Blockchain
9(8)
A Code, law, and narratives
12(2)
B Spaces, types, and addressees of regulation
14(3)
V Outline of the Book
17(3)
VI Bibliography
20(7)
Part I Technological And Business Challenges Of Blockchain Technology
1 The Blockchain Paradox
27(16)
Paolo Tasca
Riccardo Piselli
I Introduction
27(1)
II Lessig's Four Modalities of Regulation
27(1)
III Blockchain Regulation and Its Multiple Facets
28(7)
A Blockchain code and the law
29(2)
B Blockchain code and market forces
31(2)
C Blockchain code and social forces
33(2)
D Law, market, and social forces
35(1)
IV Interoperability and Distributed Ledger Technologies
35(5)
A Interoperability at a glance
35(1)
B Blockchain non-interoperability
36(2)
C Technical and business solutions hold complex social, economic, and legal implications
38(2)
V Conclusion: The Paradox of Interoperability
40(1)
VI Bibliography
41(2)
2 Blockchains, Private Ordering, and the Future of Governance
43(15)
Jonathan Rohr
Aaron Wright
I Introduction
43(2)
II Towards Greater Room for Private Ordering: The Development of American Business Law
45(2)
III Blockchains, Private Ordering, and the Changing Landscape of Governance
47(4)
A Streamlined voting
48(1)
B From ex post monitoring and enforcement to ex ante limitations
49(1)
C Decentralized organizations
50(1)
IV Blockchain-Based Governance in a Pro-Private Ordering Legal Landscape
51(4)
A Gap filling
52(1)
B Privately ordered securities-debt, equity, or something else?
53(1)
C Market efficiency and transparency
54(1)
V Conclusion
55(1)
VI Bibliography
56(2)
3 In Code(rs) We Trust: Software Developers as Fiduciaries in Public Blockchains
58(27)
Angela Walch
I Introduction
58(2)
II Nominal Decentralization-De Facto Governance
60(4)
A Bitcoin's March 2013 hard fork
62(1)
B Ethereum's July 2016 hard fork
62(2)
III If It Looks Like a Fiduciary...
64(6)
A Providing socially desirable services that often require expertise
65(1)
B Entrusted with property or power
65(1)
C Risk to entrustors that fiduciaries may not be trustworthy
66(1)
D Difficulty or failure of entrustors to protect themselves from fiduciary risks
67(3)
IV Costs and Benefits of Fiduciary Characterization
70(1)
A Benefits
70(1)
B Costs
71(1)
V Sorting Out the Details
71(5)
A Who are the fiduciaries?
72(1)
B Who are the entrustors?
72(1)
C What are the duties owed?
73(1)
D How might fiduciary status of developers arise?
73(2)
E How would a breach of duty be identified?
75(1)
F What are the consequences of a breach of the duty?
75(1)
G Could a fiduciary standard be enforced?
76(1)
VI Ongoing Experiments in Governance and Accountability
76(1)
VII Broader Implications and Concluding Thoughts
77(1)
VIII Bibliography
78(7)
Part II Blockchain And The Future Of Money
4 Old Utopias, New Tax Havens: The Politics of Bitcoin in Historical Perspective
85(14)
Stefan Eich
I Introduction
85(1)
II Two Utopias
86(5)
III The Financial Crisis and the Birth of Bitcoin
91(2)
IV The Politics of Bitcoin
93(2)
V Conclusion
95(1)
VI Bibliography
96(3)
5 Monetary Policy in the Digital Age
99(13)
Claus D. Zimmermann
I Introduction
99(1)
II Contemporary Monetary Policy and the Impact of Virtual Currencies
99(8)
A Virtual currencies: do they amount to 'money' in an economic and/or legal sense?
99(1)
1 Economic perspective
100(1)
2 Legal perspective
101(2)
B The contemporary scope of monetary policy-tools and objectives
103(3)
C The potential of virtual currencies to affect any of the monetary aggregates
106(1)
III Regulatory Challenges for Monetary Policy Arising from Virtual Currencies
107(2)
A Risk 1: structural deflation
107(1)
B Risk 2: lacking flexibility to respond to temporary shocks to money demand
108(1)
C Risk 3: lacking capacity to function as an LOLR
109(1)
IV Conclusion
109(1)
V Bibliography
110(2)
6 Global Currencies and Domestic Regulation: Embedding through Enabling?
112(28)
Georgios Dimitropoulos
I Introduction
112(2)
II Regulatory Approaches to Cryptocurrencies
114(6)
A Cryptocurrency as global currency
114(2)
B Types of regulation
116(1)
1 The indifference approach
117(1)
2 The command-and-control approach
117(1)
3 Intermediate approaches
118(2)
III The Legal Nature of Global Currencies: Money, Commodity, Technology
120(8)
A Global currency as money
120(1)
1 A comparative perspective
120(1)
2 The CJEU judgment in the case C-264/14
122(2)
B Global currency as a commodity
124(2)
C Global currency as a technology: the dual nature of cryptocurrencies and the schizophrenic approach to regulation
126(1)
1 Regulation as technology: innovation hubs and regulatory sandboxes
126(1)
2 The concept of 'enabling law'
127(1)
IV Embedding through Enabling
128(6)
A The advantages and disadvantages of domestic embeddedness of cryptocurrencies
128(2)
B The perils of embedding through enabling
130(1)
1 More finance
131(1)
2 Clash of agencies
132(1)
C Mitigating the dangers of embedding through enabling: intermediary regulation
132(2)
V Conclusion
134(1)
VI Bibliography
135(5)
7 Corporate Governance for Complex Cryptocurrencies? A Framework for Stability and Decision Making in Blockchain-Based Organizations
140(29)
Philipp Hacker
I Introduction
140(1)
II Chaos and Complexity Theory
141(2)
A Properties of complex systems
142(1)
B Applications of complexity theory
142(1)
III Complex Cryptocurrencies and Imperfect Governance
143(5)
A The functioning of blockchain-based systems
143(1)
B Imperfect governance structures
144(1)
C Case studies
145(1)
1 The Bitcoin hard fork of 2013
145(1)
2 The Ethereum hard fork of 2016
145(1)
3 Bitcoin hard forks without end: the ongoing block size debate
146(1)
4 Lessons from the hard forks
147(1)
D Complexity and cryptocurrencies
148(1)
IV Regulating Blockchain-Based Organizations under Uncertainty
148(13)
A Mitigating uncertainty: improving governance structures in blockchain-based organizations
149(1)
1 Reasons to improve governance through legal intervention
149(1)
2 External and internal governance: from corporate to crypto
150(3)
B Implementation: the Blockchain Governance Code
153(1)
1 Preconditions for an effective Blockchain Governance Code
153(1)
2 The content of a Blockchain Governance Code
155(1)
3 From comply and explain to mandatory compliance
160(1)
C The future of blockchain governance
160(1)
V Conclusion
161(1)
VI Bibliography
162(7)
Part III Blockchain And The Future Of Banking, Finance, Insurance, And Securities Regulation
8 Banking in a Digital Fiat Currency Regime
169(12)
Rohan Grey
I Introduction
169(2)
II Modern Commercial Banking
171(3)
III Imagining Digital Fiat Currency
174(1)
IV Commercial Bank Lending under a DFC Regime
175(2)
V Criticisms and Concerns
177(1)
VI Conclusion
178(1)
VII Bibliography
178(3)
9 Regulating the Shadow Payment System: Bitcoin, Mobile Money, and Beyond
181(14)
Jonathan Greenacre
I Introduction
181(1)
II The Rise of the Shadow Payment System
182(3)
III A Functional Framework
185(3)
A Functions
185(1)
B Risks
186(1)
C Legal tools
187(1)
IV Application to Malawi
188(4)
V Conclusion
192(1)
VI Bibliography
193(2)
10 Blockchain-Based Insurance
195(18)
Michael Abramowicz
I Introduction
195(4)
II How Blockchain-Based Insurance Would Work
199(6)
A With traditional insurers
199(1)
B Without traditional insurers
200(1)
1 Pooling through smart contracts
201(1)
2 Underwriting, investment, and reinsurance
203(1)
3 Consumer information
205(1)
III The Law's Role in Blockchain-Based Insurance
205(5)
A The expense of law
206(1)
1 Compliance
206(1)
2 Adjudication
206(1)
3 Regulation
207(1)
B Legal challenges
208(1)
1 Legality
208(1)
2 Legal requirements
209(1)
3 Legal support for blockchain-based insurance
209(1)
IV Conclusion
210(1)
V Bibliography
211(2)
11 Blockchain, Securities Markets, and Central Banking
213(16)
Alexandros L. Seretakis
I Introduction
213(1)
II Demystifying Distributed Ledger Technologies
214(2)
III Distributed Ledger Technologies, Securities Markets, and Central Banking
216(5)
A Distributed ledger technologies and securities markets
217(2)
B Distributed ledger technologies and central banking
219(2)
IV The Role of Regulation
221(4)
A Regulation as an impediment to the evolution of distributed ledger technologies
221(2)
B Regulation as a catalyst to the evolution of distributed ledger technologies
223(2)
V Conclusion
225(1)
VI Bibliography
225(4)
12 The Crypto-Security: Initial Coin Offerings and EU Securities Regulation
229(20)
Philipp Hacker
Chris Thomale
I Introduction
229(1)
II EU Capital Markets Law: Blockchain Tokens as 'Transferable Securities'
230(12)
A General extent of capital market disclosure obligations
230(1)
1 Prospectus disclosure
230(1)
2 Continuous disclosure
231(1)
B Material scope: transferable security
232(1)
1 Negotiability
232(1)
2 Standardization
232(1)
3 Type-related characteristics
233(1)
C Shares et al.: the equity security
233(1)
D Bonds et al.: the debt security
234(1)
E Options and other derivatives
235(2)
F Exceptions: instruments of payment and utility claims
237(1)
1 Instruments of payment: currency tokens
237(1)
2 Instruments of consumption: utility tokens
238(3)
G Hybrid tokens
241(1)
III US Securities Regulation
242(2)
A General extent of capital market disclosure obligations
242(1)
1 Prospectus disclosure
242(1)
2 Continuous disclosure
242(1)
B Material scope: security as defined by the Howey test
242(2)
IV Comparative Observations and Recommendations
244(1)
V Bibliography
245(4)
13 Regulation of Blockchain Token Sales in the United States
249(10)
Houman B. Shadab
I Introduction
249(1)
II Whether Tokens Qualify as Regulated Investment Contracts
250(1)
III The Simple Agreement for Future Tokens
251(2)
IV Intertemporal Classification and Decentralized Token Networks
253(2)
V Conclusion
255(1)
VI Bibliography
256(3)
Part IV Beyond Finance: Blockchain As A Legal And Regulatory Challenge
14 Blockchain and Payment Systems: A Tale about Re-Intermediation
259(16)
Agnieszka Janczuk-Gorywoda
I Introduction
259(1)
II A Blockchain Primer, Once Again
260(2)
A Bitcoin's ideology and dream
260(1)
B Distributed ledger and intermediaries
261(1)
III Money and Payment Systems
262(5)
A Bitcoin as money
262(1)
B Money as a hybrid public-private institution
263(1)
C Institutional dimension of payment systems
264(2)
D Bitcoin as a payment system
266(1)
IV Virtual Currencies for Domestic Payments
267(2)
A Settlement time and use costs
267(1)
B Protection against fraud
268(1)
V Cross-Border Trade with Bitcoin?
269(3)
A International remittances
269(1)
B The problem of trust: delivery versus payment
270(1)
C Escrow accounts and ... intermediaries
271(1)
VI Conclusion
272(1)
VII Bibliography
273(2)
15 Conflicts of Laws and Codes: Defining the Boundaries of Digital Jurisdictions
275(14)
Florian Moslein
I The Nature of 'Digital Jurisdictions'
275(3)
A Smart contracts
275(1)
B Blockchain-based regulation
276(1)
C Code vs law
277(1)
II Recognition of Codes
278(3)
A The requirement of recognition
278(1)
B Legal recognition
279(1)
C Judicial recognition
280(1)
III Code Override
281(3)
A Public policy exceptions ('ordre public')
281(1)
B Legal override
282(1)
C Judicial override
283(1)
IV Conflicts of Laws and Codes vs Conflict of Laws
284(1)
V Bibliography
285(4)
16 The Judicialization of the Blockchain
289(22)
Pietro Ortolani
I Introduction
289(1)
II Placing Digital Currencies in the Context of the Nationalism/Transnationalism Tension
290(6)
A Nationalism and transnationalism as two conceptual placeholders
290(1)
B Nationalism: one standpoint, multiple reasons for action
291(1)
C Transnationalism between Utopia and pragmatism
292(2)
D The optical illusion of blockchains
294(2)
III The Effects of Blockchain Technologies on State Jurisdiction
296(7)
A A brief glimpse into the history of jurisdiction: from service to sovereignty
296(3)
B Blockchain technologies as an exogenous shock and the reaction of state justice
299(4)
IV Self-Enforcement and the End of State Monopoly over the Use of Force
303(4)
A Limitation of the possibility of state scrutiny
304(1)
B A paradigm shift: from balancing to automation
305(2)
V Conclusion
307(1)
VI Bibliography
307(4)
17 Smart Contracts: Coding the Transaction, Decoding the Legal Debates
311(18)
Roger Brownsword
I Introduction
311(1)
II The Contrast between Coherentist and Regulatory-Instrumentalist Approaches
312(2)
A Coherentism
312(1)
B Regulatory instrumentalism
313(1)
III Two Coherentist Variants: Transactionalist and Relationalist
314(2)
A Transactionalism
314(1)
B Relationalism
315(1)
IV Two Regulatory-Instrumentalist Variants: Rule-Based and Technocratic
316(2)
V Decoding the Legal Debates
318(4)
A Consumer transactions
318(2)
B Commercial transactions
320(1)
C Peer-to-peer transactions
321(1)
VI Concluding Remarks
322(2)
VII Bibliography
324(5)
Part V Connecting The Dots: Competitive Advantage And Regulation In The Era Of Blockchain
18 Blockchain Competition: Gaining Competitive Advantage in the Digital Economy-Competition Law Implications
329(98)
Ioannis Lianas
I Introduction
329(5)
II Blockchain and Digital Platforms as Alternative Organizational Narratives in the Digital Economy
334(11)
A The promise of decentralization and disintermediation
334(6)
B The new blockchain intermediaries and centralization dynamics
340(5)
III Blockchain Competition: Traditional Strategic Competitive Advantage
345(16)
A The emergence of blockchain-powered industries
345(1)
1 The remittance industry
345(1)
2 FinTech
346(1)
3 Insurance
346(1)
4 Gambling
346(1)
5 Digital content
347(1)
6 Management and decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs)
347(1)
7 The Internet of Things/Internet of Services
348(1)
8 Decentralized marketplaces
348(1)
B The blockchain profit and growth drivers: seeking strategic competitive advantage
349(1)
1 Competitive advantage in the blockchain era
349(1)
2 Competitive advantage and financial markets
359(2)
IV Blockchain Competition: Architectural Advantage
361(14)
A Architectural advantage: the concept
361(3)
B Architectural advantage through performative regulation
364(3)
C Competing over industry architecture: FinTechs and banks
367(1)
1 The FinTech revolution in the financial services industry
367(1)
2 Regulatory interventions and the quest for architectural advantage in the financial services value chain
372(3)
V Preliminary Conclusions on Blockchain Competition: From 'Winner-Takes-Most' Platform Competition Dynamics to Co-Opetition in Ecosystems?
375(5)
VI Blockchain and Competition Law: Setting the Agenda
380(23)
A The competition risks of the implementation of blockchain technology
380(1)
1 Facilitation of collusion
381(1)
2 Risks flowing from the development of oligopolistic structures
384(1)
3 Standardization issues
386(1)
4 Vertical conduct and abuse of a dominant position
388(1)
5 Mergers
390(1)
B Implications for competition analysis
391(1)
1 The scope of competition law: the concept of 'undertaking'
391(1)
2 Blockchain and collusion: an oxymoron?
394(1)
3 Reconceptualizing (market) power in blockchain competition
397(1)
4 The 'unregulatability' of the blockchain: remedies and sanctions
400(3)
VII Conclusion
403(1)
VIII Bibliography
404(23)
Index 427
Philipp Hacker, LL.M. (Yale), is a postdoctoral fellow at the law department of Humboldt University of Berlin, an A.SK Fellow at WZB Berlin Social Sciences Center and a Research Fellow at the Centre for Blockchain Technologies and at the Centre for Law, Economics and Society, both at UCL.

Ioannis Lianos holds the chair of global competition law and policy at UCL Laws. He is also Director of the Centre for Law, Economics and Society and Executive Director of the Jevons Institute of Competition Law and Economics. He was awarded a Gutenberg Research chair at the Ecole Nationale d'Administration (ENA), the elite public administration school of the French republic in November 2011 and was appointed in 2015 chief researcher at the Skolkovo Institute for Law and Development, the leading innovation law centre at the Russian Federation. He is also a visiting professor at the University of Chile in Santiago, the Centre for Industrial Property Studies (CEIPI) at the University of Strasbourg and has been an Alexander von Humboldt fellow at the WZB and Humboldt University, Berlin, as well as an Emile Noel fellow at NYU Law School and a visiting fellow at the University of California, Berkeley.

Georgios Dimitropoulos is an Assistant Professor of Law at HBKU College of Law & Public Policy. Georgios studied Law at the University of Athens, and holds an LLM from Yale Law School, and a PhD summa cum laude from the University of Heidelberg.

Stefan Eich is the Perkins-Cotsen Postdoctoral Fellow in the Princeton Society of Fellows and a Lecturer in Politics at Princeton University. Stefan's research interests are in political theory and the history of political thought.
Lisainfo e-raamatute kohta Lisainfo e-raamatute kohta
Püsilink: https://www.kriso.ee/db/97801925794922e.html
Märksõnad: