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ix | |
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xi | |
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xiii | |
Preface |
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xvii | |
Acknowledgments |
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xix | |
Author |
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xxi | |
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1 | (14) |
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1.1 Background and Motivations |
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1 | (6) |
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1.1.1 Business, Technology, and Risk Development |
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2 | (2) |
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1.1.2 Common Knowledge, Standards, and Practices |
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4 | (2) |
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1.1.3 Profession, Organizational Role, and Function |
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6 | (1) |
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7 | (1) |
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8 | (1) |
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8 | (1) |
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1.5 Organization of Subsequent Chapters |
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9 | (6) |
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10 | (5) |
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2 Knowledge, Issues, and Dilemmas |
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15 | (52) |
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15 | (1) |
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15 | (3) |
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2.3 Principles and Approaches |
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18 | (23) |
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2.3.1 Security: As Strong as the Weakest Link |
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19 | (1) |
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19 | (1) |
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2.3.2.1 Use of Security Technology |
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20 | (2) |
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2.3.2.2 Baseline Security |
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22 | (3) |
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2.3.3 No Perfect Security |
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25 | (1) |
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2.3.4 Information Security Is Information Risk Management |
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26 | (1) |
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2.3.4.1 Risk, Risk Assessment, and Risk Management |
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27 | (6) |
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2.3.4.2 Problems of Risk-Based Approach |
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33 | (5) |
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38 | (1) |
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2.3.6 IT Security Governance |
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39 | (2) |
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2.4 Information Security Risk Management Strategy |
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41 | (3) |
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2.4.1 Protect-Detect-React (PDR) |
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42 | (1) |
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2.4.2 Detect-React-Protect (DRP) |
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42 | (2) |
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2.4.3 Need for Strategic Thinking |
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44 | (1) |
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2.5 Information Security Program |
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44 | (11) |
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2.5.1 Organization and People |
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45 | (1) |
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2.5.2 Risk Assessment and Management |
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46 | (1) |
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46 | (3) |
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49 | (1) |
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49 | (1) |
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2.5.6 Operational Security |
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50 | (1) |
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2.5.7 Performance Measurements |
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51 | (4) |
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55 | (2) |
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2.7 Current Research and Social Perspectives |
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57 | (2) |
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59 | (8) |
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61 | (6) |
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3 Practice, Issues, and Dilemmas |
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67 | (66) |
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3.1 Information Risk Management (IRM) Practices |
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67 | (26) |
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3.1.1 Organization and Management Commitments |
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68 | (1) |
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3.1.1.1 Stakeholder Support for IRM Program |
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69 | (2) |
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3.1.2 Culture of Compliance and Control-Oriented Risk Management |
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71 | (1) |
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3.1.3 Theory of Action and Theory in Use |
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72 | (4) |
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3.1.4 Risk of Habituation |
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76 | (1) |
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3.1.5 Information Risk Management Organization |
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77 | (1) |
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3.1.5.1 Systems of Knowledge Power |
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78 | (3) |
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3.1.6 Responding to Security Incidents |
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81 | (1) |
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3.1.6.1 Incident 1 SNMP Vulnerability |
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81 | (1) |
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3.1.6.2 Incident 2 SPAM Mail |
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82 | (1) |
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3.1.7 Uncertainties in Information Security Risk Analysis and Management |
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83 | (5) |
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3.1.8 Causal Analysis of Information Security Systems |
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88 | (4) |
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3.1.9 Summary of Issues and Dilemmas |
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92 | (1) |
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3.2 Social-Technical Approach |
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93 | (40) |
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94 | (1) |
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3.2.1.1 Addressing Theories of Actions of IRMs and Other Managers |
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95 | (2) |
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3.2.1.2 Addressing Auditors' Theories of Actions |
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97 | (4) |
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3.2.1.3 Competency and Trust |
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101 | (3) |
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3.2.1.4 Five-Level Action Map (FLAM) |
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104 | (1) |
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3.2.1.5 Combining Social and Technical Aspects of Information Security Risk Management Systems |
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105 | (2) |
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3.2.1.6 Communicating Information Security Risk Status |
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107 | (3) |
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3.2.1.7 Limitations of New IRM Systems |
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110 | (1) |
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3.2.1.8 Learning through Model A Approach |
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111 | (2) |
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113 | (1) |
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3.2.2.1 IRM Organization Model |
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113 | (3) |
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3.2.2.2 Learning through the Model B Approach |
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116 | (1) |
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3.2.2.3 Learning from SQL Slammer, Blaster, and SARS Incidents |
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117 | (6) |
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3.2.2.4 Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Planning |
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123 | (1) |
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3.2.3 Summary of Issues and Dilemmas and Research Outcome |
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124 | (2) |
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126 | (7) |
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133 | (48) |
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4.1 Piezoelectric Metaphor |
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133 | (4) |
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4.2 BETA's Approach to Emerging Risks and Attacks |
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137 | (6) |
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4.3 Learning from Tsunami Incident |
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143 | (2) |
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4.4 Revealing Uncertainties and Making Risks Visible |
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145 | (3) |
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4.5 Responsive, Reactive, and Proactive Strategies |
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148 | (3) |
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4.6 Criticality Alignment |
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151 | (3) |
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4.7 Testing Responsive Approach at GAMMA |
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154 | (2) |
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4.8 Learning from Antinny Worm Case Study |
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156 | (4) |
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4.9 Refining Responsive Approach |
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160 | (12) |
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160 | (3) |
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4.9.2 Scenario Planning and Development |
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163 | (6) |
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4.9.3 Responsiveness Requirements and Action Strategies |
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169 | (1) |
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4.9.3.1 Information Security Policies |
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169 | (2) |
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4.9.3.2 Information Security Program |
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171 | (1) |
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4.9.3.3 Readiness Assurance |
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171 | (1) |
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172 | (9) |
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176 | (5) |
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5 Conclusions and Implications |
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181 | (14) |
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181 | (3) |
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5.2 Conclusions about Each Research Question |
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184 | (4) |
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5.3 Implications for Theory |
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188 | (1) |
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5.4 Implications for Policy and Practice |
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189 | (3) |
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5.5 Suggestions for Further Research |
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192 | (3) |
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194 | (1) |
Appendix A Action Research Cycles |
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195 | (4) |
Appendix B Dialectic Model of Systems Inquiry (DMSI) |
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199 | (6) |
Appendix C Framework for Information Risk Management |
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205 | (8) |
References |
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213 | (18) |
Index |
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231 | |