|
|
|
11 | (2) |
| Acknowledgments |
|
13 | (2) |
|
1 The Puzzle of Chinese Sanctions |
|
|
15 | (10) |
|
1.1 Arguments and implications |
|
|
17 | (3) |
|
|
|
20 | (5) |
|
|
|
25 | (26) |
|
2.1 Thinking about sanctions |
|
|
25 | (8) |
|
|
|
28 | (1) |
|
2.1.2 Constraining sanctions |
|
|
29 | (1) |
|
2.1.3 Signalling sanctions |
|
|
30 | (3) |
|
2.2 China and sanctions: existing explanations |
|
|
33 | (11) |
|
2.2.1 Explanation 1: China was not yet powerful enough |
|
|
33 | (4) |
|
2.2.2 Explanation 2: The Chinese leadership was constrained by its domestic actors |
|
|
37 | (2) |
|
2.2.3 Explanation 3: China's participation in the WTO shaped its sanctions behaviour |
|
|
39 | (2) |
|
2.2.4 Explanation 4: History and culture shaped China's sanctions behaviour |
|
|
41 | (3) |
|
|
|
44 | (7) |
|
3 When Does Talk Become Costly?: International Audience Costs and China's Sanctions Behaviour |
|
|
51 | (34) |
|
3.1 International audience costs |
|
|
53 | (18) |
|
|
|
53 | (6) |
|
3.1.2 What are `international audience costs' and why do they matter? |
|
|
59 | (4) |
|
3.1.3 Condition 1: The offender needs to be concerned about international opinion |
|
|
63 | (2) |
|
3.1.4 Condition 2: There must be at least one rhetorical actor present |
|
|
65 | (6) |
|
3.2 The effects of international audience costs on China's sanctions behaviour |
|
|
71 | (7) |
|
3.2.1 China's quest for recognition and higher international status |
|
|
71 | (4) |
|
3.2.2 Sanctions rhetoric as China's counter-stigmatisation strategy |
|
|
75 | (3) |
|
|
|
78 | (7) |
|
4 Stigmatising Sanctions and China's Counter-Stigmatisation |
|
|
85 | (52) |
|
4.1 Stigmatising sanctions and stigma management strategies |
|
|
87 | (7) |
|
4.1.1 Defining stigma and stigmatising sanctions |
|
|
87 | (1) |
|
4.1.2 Stigma management strategies and their implications |
|
|
88 | (4) |
|
4.1.3 China and stigmatising sanctions |
|
|
92 | (2) |
|
4.2 US and Europe's stigmatising sanctions against China 1949 onwards |
|
|
94 | (25) |
|
4.2.1 The inception of sanctions against China, 1949-1971 |
|
|
94 | (2) |
|
4.2.2 Motivations behind US sanctions against China |
|
|
96 | (3) |
|
4.2.3 China's response to Cold War sanctions |
|
|
99 | (5) |
|
4.2.4 China's admission to the UN |
|
|
104 | (1) |
|
4.2.5 The road to China's UN admission |
|
|
105 | (3) |
|
4.2.6 China's reaction to its UN admission |
|
|
108 | (2) |
|
4.2.7 The lifting of Cold War sanctions and beginning of US-led sanctions after the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident |
|
|
110 | (1) |
|
4.2.8 The extent of post-Tiananmen sanctions, 1989-1993 |
|
|
111 | (2) |
|
4.2.9 China's response to the Tiananmen sanctions |
|
|
113 | (3) |
|
4.2.10 Post-Tiananmen debates 1993 onwards |
|
|
116 | (3) |
|
4.3 China's counter-stigmatisation: its sanctions frame at the UNSC, 1997-2016 |
|
|
119 | (7) |
|
|
|
120 | (1) |
|
4.3.2 China's stated standards of sanctions legitimacy at the UNSC, 1997-2016 |
|
|
121 | (5) |
|
|
|
126 | (11) |
|
5 China and United Nations Security Council Sanctions |
|
|
137 | (54) |
|
5.1 China and UNSC sanctions: correlation analysis and case study selection |
|
|
138 | (11) |
|
5.1.1 Correlation analysis: methodology |
|
|
139 | (2) |
|
5.1.2 Correlation analysis: the relevance of the rhetoric-based hypothesis |
|
|
141 | (5) |
|
5.1.3 Selection of case studies |
|
|
146 | (2) |
|
5.1.4 China and sanctions: five competing hypotheses |
|
|
148 | (1) |
|
5.2 China and sanctions against the DPRK: from resistance to cooperation |
|
|
149 | (12) |
|
5.2.1 Background of UNSC sanctions against the DPRK |
|
|
149 | (2) |
|
5.2.2 Competing explanations concerning China's behaviour towards DPRK sanctions |
|
|
151 | (2) |
|
5.2.3 Playing up China's non-proliferation commitments: the US as a rhetorical actor |
|
|
153 | (7) |
|
5.2.4 Conclusion of the DPRK case |
|
|
160 | (1) |
|
5.3 China's rejection of proposed sanctions against Syria |
|
|
161 | (12) |
|
5.3.1 Background of proposed UNSC sanctions against Syria |
|
|
161 | (3) |
|
5.3.2 Competing explanations for China's behaviour towards sanctions against Syria |
|
|
164 | (2) |
|
5.3.3 Explaining China's behaviour: discourse on human rights, intervention, and the Libya effect |
|
|
166 | (6) |
|
5.3.4 Conclusion of the Syrian case |
|
|
172 | (1) |
|
5.4 China's support for sanctions against Guinea-Bissau: a failed test? |
|
|
173 | (9) |
|
5.4.1 Background of the Guinea-Bissau case |
|
|
173 | (2) |
|
5.4.2 Competing explanations for China's behaviour towards sanctions against Guinea-Bissau |
|
|
175 | (2) |
|
5.4.3 Explaining China's voting behaviour towards Guinea-Bissau sanctions: the lack of a rhetorical actor |
|
|
177 | (4) |
|
5.4.4 Conclusion of the Guinea-Bissau case |
|
|
181 | (1) |
|
|
|
182 | (9) |
|
6 China's Unilateral Sanctions: Eight Classic Cases Revisited |
|
|
191 | (32) |
|
6.1 China's use (or non-use) of unilateral sanctions in the eight classic cases |
|
|
193 | (21) |
|
6.1.1 China-France dispute over French President Nicolas Sarkozy's meeting with the Dalai Lama |
|
|
194 | (2) |
|
6.1.2 China-US dispute over arms sales to Taiwan |
|
|
196 | (1) |
|
6.1.3 China-Japan dispute over a trawler collision in mutually claimed waters |
|
|
197 | (1) |
|
6.1.4 China-Norway dispute over the Nobel Peace Prize award to Liu Xiaobo |
|
|
198 | (3) |
|
6.1.5 China-Philippines dispute over the Scarborough Shoal |
|
|
201 | (4) |
|
6.1.6 China-Vietnam dispute over an oil rig |
|
|
205 | (2) |
|
6.1.7 China-Taiwan dispute over the newly elected Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen's refusal to explicitly endorse the `1992 Consensus' |
|
|
207 | (3) |
|
6.1.8 China-South Korea dispute over the deployment of the US THAAD system |
|
|
210 | (4) |
|
6.2 Evidence from the eight classic cases: summary and interpretation |
|
|
214 | (9) |
|
7 Demystifying China's Sanctions Behaviour |
|
|
223 | (36) |
|
7.1 China's unilateral sanctions behaviour: possible explanations |
|
|
224 | (26) |
|
7.1.1 China was not yet powerful enough to employ unilateral sanctions effectively |
|
|
224 | (2) |
|
7.1.2 The Chinese leadership was constrained by its domestic actors |
|
|
226 | (3) |
|
7.1.3 China's participation in the World Trade Organization (WTO) shaped its sanctions behaviour |
|
|
229 | (3) |
|
7.1.4 History and culture shaped China's sanctions behaviour, leading Chinese leaders to prefer inducement over coercion |
|
|
232 | (3) |
|
7.1.5 China's sanctions rhetoric constrained its behaviour |
|
|
235 | (11) |
|
7.1.6 Limitations of the rhetoric-based hypothesis |
|
|
246 | (4) |
|
7.2 Lessons from the `eight classic cases' |
|
|
250 | (9) |
|
8 China's Sanctions Dilemma |
|
|
259 | (22) |
|
8.1 Policy and theoretical implications |
|
|
264 | (6) |
|
8.2 The future of China's sanctions rhetoric and behaviour |
|
|
270 | (2) |
|
8.3 Areas for further study |
|
|
272 | (9) |
| Appendix A United Nations Security Council Meeting Records: Coverage of Speeches by Chinese Representatives, 1997-2016 |
|
281 | (6) |
| Appendix B Complete List of Proposed United Nations Security Council Sanctions-Related Resolutions, 1971-2016 |
|
287 | (22) |
| Appendix C China's Material Interests with Targeted Sanctions Regimes |
|
309 | (16) |
| Bibliography |
|
325 | (42) |
| Index |
|
367 | |