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  • Formaat: 236 pages
  • Ilmumisaeg: 08-Oct-2010
  • Kirjastus: National Academies Press
  • Keel: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780309162920

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Select Agents are defined in regulations through a list of names of particularly dangerous known bacteria, viruses, toxins, and fungi. However, natural variation and intentional genetic modification blur the boundaries of any discrete Select Agent list based on names. Access to technologies that can generate or 'synthesize' any DNA sequence is expanding, making it easier and less expensive for researchers, industry scientists, and amateur users to create organisms without needing to obtain samples of existing stocks or cultures. This has led to growing concerns that these DNA synthesis technologies might be used to synthesize Select Agents, modify such agents by introducing small changes to the genetic sequence, or create entirely new pathogens. Amid these concerns, the National Institutes of Health requested that the Research Council investigate the science and technology needed to replace the current Select Agent list with an oversight system that predicts if a DNA sequence could be used to produce an organism that should be regulated as a Select Agent.





A DNA sequence-based system to better define when a pathogen or toxin is subject to Select Agent regulations could be developed. This could be coupled with a 'yellow flag' system that would recognize requests to synthesize suspicious sequences and serve as a reference to anyone with relevant questions, allowing for appropriate follow-up.





Sequence-Based Classification of Select Agents finds that replacing the current list of Select Agents with a system that could predict if fragments of DNA sequences could be used to produce novel pathogens with Select Agent characteristics is not feasible. However, it emphasized that for the foreseeable future, any threat from synthetic biology and synthetic genomics is far more likely to come from assembling known Select Agents, or modifications of them, rather than construction of previously unknown agents. Therefore, the book recommends modernizing the regulations to define Select Agents in terms of their gene sequences, not by their names, and called this 'sequence-based classification.'

Table of Contents



Front Matter Summary 1 The Select Agent Regulations 2 Challenges of Predicting Pathogenicity from Sequence 3 A Proposal for Consideration: Sequence-Based Classification of Select Agents 4 Committee Findings and Conclusions References Appendix A: Statement of Task Appendix B: Committee Member and Staff Biographies Appendix C: HHS and USDA Select Agents and Toxins Appendix D: 2009 Workshop Agenda Appendix E: Applicability of the Select Agent Regulations to Issues of Synthetic Genomics Appendix F: Summary of Relevant Legislation, Regulation, and Guidance Appendix G: Influenza A and SARS-CoV Appendix H: Virus-Host Interactions Appendix I: Botulinum Neurotoxin, B. Anthracis and Variola Virus Appendix J: Pathogenicity Acquisition Appendix K: Interactions of Infectious Agents with the Host Appendix L: Near-Term Milestones for Consideration Appendix M: Executive Order: Optimizing the Security of Biological Select Agents and Toxins in the United States
Summary 1(8)
1 The Select Agent Regulations
9(28)
Charge to the Committee
9(2)
Organization of the Report
11(1)
Context of the Select Agent Regulations
11(10)
Biological Weapons
13(1)
Biosafety (and Categorization of Microorganisms)
14(4)
Biosecurity and the Select Agent Regulations
18(3)
Current Status of the Select Agent Program
21(9)
The Select Agent Program---Beyond Biosafety
21(2)
The Select Agent Regulations---Focus on Known Biothreat Agents
23(2)
Unclear Boundaries
25(1)
Gene Synthesis Industry
26(2)
Impact of Select Agent Regulations on Research
28(2)
Criteria for Select Agent Designation
30(7)
Non-Biological Criteria
33(2)
Biological Criteria
35(2)
2 Challenges of Predicting Pathogenicity from Sequence
37(36)
Introduction
37(1)
The Art of Sequence-Based Prediction
38(9)
Predicting Biological Function from Sequence
40(2)
Protein Structure Prediction
42(3)
Gene Regulation
45(2)
The Nature of Infectious Disease and the Art of Predicting Pathogenicity
47(16)
What Is the Origin of Bacterial Pathogenicity? What Makes a Pathogen?
50(5)
The Evolution of Bacterial Host Specificity
55(2)
The Parallels in the Evolution of Pathogenicity in the Large Viruses
57(2)
Evolution of Plant Pathogens in Human-Managed Ecosystems
59(1)
Interactions of Infectious Agents with the Host
60(3)
The Special Case of Synthetic Biology
63(6)
Top-Down Approach
65(3)
Bottom-Up Approach
68(1)
Synthetic Biology---Summary
69(1)
What Can Currently Be Predicted from Sequence about the Identification of Pathogenic Microorganisms, Including Select Agents?
69(4)
3 A Proposal for Consideration: Sequence-Based Classification of Select Agents
73(34)
Novel Agents: Synthetic Genomics and the Select Agent Regulations
75(6)
Classification Is Distinct from Prediction
81(4)
Synthetic Genome Classification under the Current Select Agent Regulations
85(3)
Classification Depends on Both Gene Content and Genetic Distance
88(1)
Using "Parts Lists" to Define Gene Content
88(2)
Sequence Analysis of Individual "Parts,"
90(3)
Methods for Sequence Subfamily Classification
93(3)
Outline of a Possible System for Profile-Based Classification of Select Agents
96(3)
Considerations for Implementation of a Profile-Based Classification System
99(2)
Role of Prediction and Classification in Biosafety
101(1)
Raising a Yellow Flag for "Sequences of Concern,"
102(2)
Should Such a System Be Built?
104(3)
4 Committee Findings and Conclusions
107(22)
Findings and Conclusions
107(10)
The Yellow Flag System
117(1)
Near-Term Milestones for Sequence-Based Classification
118(3)
Long-Term Milestones for Genome Sequence-Based Select Agent Regulations
121(5)
Conclusion
126(3)
REFERENCES
129(6)
APPENDIXES
A Statement of Task
135(2)
B Committee and Staff Biographies
137(8)
C HHS and USDA Select Agents and Toxins
145(2)
D 2009 Workshop Agenda
147(4)
E Applicability of the Select Agent Regulations to Issues of Synthetic Genomics
151(6)
F Summary of Relevant Legislation, Regulation, and Guidance
157(4)
G Influenza A and SARS-CoV
161(2)
H Virus-Host Interactions
163(2)
I Botulinum Neurotoxin, B. anthracis, and Variola Virus
165(16)
J Pathogenicity Acquisition
181(12)
K Interactions of Infectious Agents with the Host
193(14)
L Near-Term Milestones for Consideration
207(8)
M Executive Order: Optimizing the Security of biological Select Agents and Toxins in the United States
215