Avoiding a nuclear war, or ending one if avoidance fails, is an important but relatively unexplored aspect of nuclear doctrine. Dr. Abt examines the feasibility of antagonists' agreeing to exclude their open cities from nuclear targeting and to replace strategic bombardment with retaliatory invasion to create less of a hair[ 1]trigger deterrent. Critical net assessments by U.S. strategists and the effects of such a strategy on the Soviet Union and on U.S. allies are considered, along with problems implementation might pose. The author contends that both deterrence and the potential for limiting damage are strengthened by pre-war plans for a nuclear ceasefire and stalemate short of holocaust.
Avoiding a nuclear war, or ending one if avoidance fails, is an important but relatively unexplored aspect of nuclear doctrine. Dr. Abt examines the feasibility of antagonists' agreeing to exclude their open cities from nuclear targeting and to replace strategic bombardment with retaliatory invasion to create less of a hairtrigger deterrent.
A Nuclear War Scenario Without Controlled Termination 2 A Termination Strategy: Retaliatory Invasion And Cities Targeting Exclusion (Riacte) .3 Concepts Of Nuclear War Strategy 4 Principles For Effective Nuclear War Termination 5 Military Elements In Termination Strategy 6 Political Elements Affecting Termination Strategy 7 Responses Of Allied And Adversary Nations To The Termination Strategy 8 Current Plans And Capabilities For Nuclear War Termination 9 Scripts And Scenarios For The Strategy 10 Critical Reactions To The Strategy 11 A Nuclear War Scenario With Controlled Termination
Dr. Clark C. Abt is founder and president of Abt Associates Inc., a private social and economic policy research firm in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
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