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E-raamat: Suppose and Tell: The Semantics and Heuristics of Conditionals

(University of Oxford)
  • Formaat: 288 pages
  • Ilmumisaeg: 02-Jul-2020
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • Keel: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780192604774
  • Formaat - EPUB+DRM
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  • Formaat: 288 pages
  • Ilmumisaeg: 02-Jul-2020
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • Keel: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780192604774

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What does 'if' mean?

It is one of the most commonly used words in the English language, in itself a sign to the importance of conditional thinking to human cognitive life. We make conditional statements, ask conditional questions, and issue conditional orders. We need to think and talk conditionally for many purposes, from everyday decision-making to mathematical proof. Yet the meaning of conditionals has been debated for thousands of years.

Suppose and Tell brings together ideas from philosophy, linguistics, and psychology to present a controversial new approach to understanding conditionals. It argues that in using 'if' we rely on psychological heuristics, methods which are fast and frugal and mostly, but not always, reliable. As a result philosophers and linguists have been led astray in theorizing about conditionals through trusting faulty data generated by such methods and prematurely rejecting simple theories on the basis of merely apparent counterexamples. This book shows how one such simple theory of conditionals can explain the data, and draws wider implications for the nature of meaning and its non-transparency to native speakers, vagueness in thought and language, and the need for semantics to attend to the unreliable heuristics underlying our judgments.

Arvustused

this is a powerful book, rich with ideas and sophisticated arguments . . . Philosophers and linguists interested in conditionals are encouragedunconditionallyto form their own opinion about the arguments that this book provides; it is a rewarding read. * Malte Willer, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews *

Part I If
1 The Value of Conditionals
3(12)
1.1 Introduction
3(4)
1.2 Conditionals and generalizations
7(3)
1.3 Conditionals across contexts
10(5)
2 The Suppositional Rule
15(16)
2.1 Supposing and imagining
15(2)
2.2 Ways of assessing conditionals
17(9)
2.3 Suppositions and updating
26(5)
3 Consequences of the Suppositional Rule
31(37)
3.1 From conditional probabilities to conditional proof
31(6)
3.2 Deductive paradoxes for the Suppositional Rule
37(5)
3.3 Probabilistic paradox for the Suppositional Rule
42(3)
3.4 The Suppositional Rule for complex attitudes
45(8)
3.5 The inconsistency of the Suppositional Rule for complex attitudes
53(4)
3.6 Plain counterlogicals
57(3)
3.7 Inconsistent linguistic practices
60(3)
3.8 Appendix: tolerance principles as fallible heuristics
63(5)
4 Heuristics within Heuristics
68(21)
4.1 Heuristics for applying the Suppositional Rule
68(2)
4.2 The Divide-and-Rule strategy
70(8)
4.3 Conditionals within conditionals
78(1)
4.4 Embedding in the consequent
78(6)
4.5 Embedding in the antecedent
84(5)
5 Conditional Testimony
89(14)
5.1 Pooling testimony: variations on a case
89(9)
5.2 Testimony: generalizing the case
98(5)
6 The Role of Conditional Propositions
103(20)
6.1 Underpinned propositions
103(5)
6.2 Overpinned propositions
108(2)
6.3 Illusions of truth-value
110(2)
6.4 The practice of using plain conditionals
112(4)
6.5 Semantic equivalence and cognitive equivalence
116(5)
6.6 Synonymy and vagueness
121(2)
7 More Challenges
123(14)
7.1 Dorothy Edgington and the Queen
123(3)
7.2 Conditional commands and questions
126(6)
7.3 Interactions with epistemic modals
132(5)
8 Interactions between Plain Conditionals and Quantifiers
137(24)
8.1 Universal instantiation by conditionals
137(2)
8.2 Gappy conditionals
139(3)
8.3 Applying the Suppositional Rule to generalizations
142(4)
8.4 Quantifying conditionals
146(6)
8.5 More quantified conditionals
152(9)
Part II Would If
9 Conditionals and Abduction
161(6)
10 The Interaction of `If' and `Would': Semantics and Logic
167(22)
10.1 Conditionals with and without `would'
167(1)
10.2 The semantics of `would'
168(6)
10.3 The logic of `would if'
174(15)
11 The Interaction of `If' and `Would': Heuristics
189(25)
11.1 An analogy between `would' and `if'
189(1)
11.2 Does `would' single out a unique world?
190(5)
11.3 Negating `would'
195(5)
11.4 A suppositional heuristic for `would'
200(7)
11.5 Heuristics for `would' in practice
207(5)
11.6 Prediction and imagination
212(2)
12 Is `Would If' Hyperintensional?
214(8)
12.1 Intensional and hyperintensional semantics
214(3)
12.2 Fine's examples
217(5)
13 More on the Interaction of `Would' with Context
222(7)
13.1 Reverse Sobel sequences
222(1)
13.2 Epistemic and pragmatic effects
223(6)
14 Thought Experiments and `Would'
229(13)
14.1 Thought experiments and counterfactuals
229(2)
14.2 Interrelations between necessity and `would'
231(3)
14.3 The problem of deviant realizations
234(3)
14.4 The interaction of `would if' with quantifiers
237(5)
15 Worlds and Meaning
242(22)
15.1 Worlds as parameters of evaluation
242(3)
15.2 Worlds and epistemic possibility
245(6)
15.3 Epistemic readings of `would'
251(2)
15.4 Objective modality
253(3)
15.5 Counterpossibles
256(3)
15.6 Comparison with quantifiers
259(3)
15.7 Philosophical repercussions
262(2)
16 Conclusion: Semantics, Heuristics, Pragmatics
264(3)
References 267(6)
Index 273
Timothy Williamson is Wykeham Professor of Logic at the University of Oxford and Whitney Griswold Visiting Professor at Yale University. He has also taught at MIT, Princeton, Edinburgh, Trinity College Dublin, Chinese University of Hong Kong, and elsewhere. He works on logic, philosophy of language, epistemology, metaphysics, and metaphilosophy. His books include Doing Philosophy, Tetralogue, Modal Logic as Metaphysics, and The Philosophy of Philosophy. He is a Fellow of the British Academy, Foreign Honorary Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and Member of the Academia Europaea.