Foreword |
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xxiii | |
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Physical Security:SCADA and the Critical Infrastraucture'S Biggest Vulnerability |
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1 | (60) |
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2 | (40) |
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3 | (1) |
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Check All Locks for Proper Operation |
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4 | (1) |
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A Little More about Locks and Lock Picking |
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5 | (7) |
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The Elephant Burial Ground |
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12 | (6) |
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Dumpster Diving Still Works |
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18 | (2) |
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20 | (2) |
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Shredder Technology Has Changed |
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22 | (1) |
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Keep an Eye on Corporate or Agency Phonebooks |
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23 | (1) |
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24 | (1) |
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Building Operations---Cleaning Crew Awareness |
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25 | (3) |
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Spot-Checking Those Drop Ceilings |
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28 | (1) |
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Checking For Key Stroke Readers |
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28 | (3) |
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Checking Those Phone Closets |
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31 | (1) |
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Removing a Few Door Signs |
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32 | (1) |
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33 | (1) |
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34 | (3) |
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37 | (3) |
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Internal Auditors Are Your Friends |
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40 | (1) |
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Always Be Slightly Suspicious |
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40 | (1) |
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Getting Every Employee Involved |
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41 | (1) |
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42 | (1) |
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42 | (3) |
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Frequently Asked Questions (and Special Interviews) |
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45 | (16) |
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Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition |
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61 | (34) |
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62 | (1) |
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62 | (28) |
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SCADA Systems and Components |
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65 | (1) |
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Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) |
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65 | (1) |
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Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) |
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65 | (1) |
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65 | (1) |
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65 | (1) |
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Human Machnie Interface (HMI) |
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66 | (1) |
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Distributed Control Systems (DCS) |
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66 | (1) |
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67 | (1) |
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67 | (1) |
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Common SCADA Architectures |
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68 | (2) |
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SCADA Communications Protocols |
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70 | (1) |
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How Serious Are the Security Issues of SCADA? |
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71 | (4) |
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Determining the Risks in Your SCADA System |
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75 | (1) |
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Risk Mitigation for SCADA |
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76 | (3) |
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Firewall Considerations for SCADA |
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78 | |
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Negative and Positive Security Models in Firewalls |
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79 | (1) |
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Multi-Network Connectivity |
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79 | (1) |
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Reactive and Proactive Solutions |
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80 | (2) |
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Firewall Inspection Methods |
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82 | (1) |
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82 | (1) |
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The Stateful Packet Filter |
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83 | (1) |
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The Circuit-Level Gateway |
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84 | (1) |
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Application-Level Gateway (Proxy) |
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85 | (2) |
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Intrusion Prevention Gateway |
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87 | (1) |
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88 | (1) |
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Unified threat Management (UTM) |
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89 | (1) |
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90 | (1) |
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90 | (3) |
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Frequently Asked Questions |
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93 | (2) |
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SCADA Secutiry Asssment Methodology |
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95 | (42) |
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96 | (1) |
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Why Do Assessments on scada Systems? |
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96 | (1) |
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Assessments Are the Right Thing to DO |
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97 | (1) |
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Assessmentsa Are Required |
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97 | (1) |
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Information Protection Requirements |
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97 | (3) |
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National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Guidance |
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98 | (1) |
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North Amirrican Electric Reliabillity Council (NERC) Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Standards |
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99 | (1) |
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Water Infrastructure Security Enhancement (WISE) |
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99 | (1) |
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The Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 |
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99 | (1) |
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An Approach to SCADA Information Security Assessments |
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100 | (2) |
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102 | (4) |
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Vetting the Assessment Request |
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102 | (1) |
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Gaining Buy-In from Management and Technical Personnel |
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102 | (1) |
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103 | (1) |
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103 | (1) |
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Researching the Organization |
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104 | (1) |
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Researching Regulatory and Policy Requirements |
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105 | (1) |
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Determining if this Is a Baseline Assessment or a Repeat Assessment |
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106 | (1) |
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Making a Go/No-Go Decision |
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106 | (1) |
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Pre-Assessment Activities |
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106 | (16) |
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Determining the Organization Mission |
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107 | (1) |
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Identifying Critical Inforamtion |
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107 | (1) |
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Example: Information Criticality |
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108 | (1) |
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108 | (1) |
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108 | (1) |
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Critical Information for OOPS |
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109 | (1) |
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109 | (1) |
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Example Continued: OOPS Impact |
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110 | (1) |
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The Information Criticality Matrix |
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110 | (1) |
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Using the Impact Definitions |
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111 | (1) |
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Organizationl Criticality |
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111 | (1) |
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Example Continued: OOPS OICM |
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112 | (1) |
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Identifying Critical Systems/Networks |
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113 | (1) |
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113 | (3) |
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Defining Security Objectives |
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116 | (1) |
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Determing Logical and Physical Boundaries |
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117 | (1) |
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117 | (1) |
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117 | (1) |
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Determining the Rules of Engagement, Customer Concerns, and Customer Constraints |
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117 | (1) |
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118 | (1) |
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118 | (1) |
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Testing Machine Addressing |
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118 | (1) |
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Time Frames for Scanning and Interviews |
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119 | (1) |
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119 | (1) |
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Scanning Tools and Exclusions |
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119 | (1) |
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119 | (1) |
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120 | (1) |
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120 | (1) |
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Writing the Assessment Plan |
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120 | (1) |
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Components of the Assessment Plan |
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120 | (2) |
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On-Site Assessment Activities |
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122 | (5) |
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Conducting the Organization Assessment |
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122 | (1) |
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123 | (1) |
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123 | (1) |
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124 | (1) |
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124 | (1) |
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Conducting the Technical Assessment |
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125 | (1) |
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Vulnerability Identification Activities |
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125 | (2) |
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127 | (1) |
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127 | (1) |
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Post Assessment Activities |
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127 | (2) |
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127 | (1) |
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128 | (1) |
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129 | (1) |
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130 | (1) |
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131 | (3) |
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Frequently Asked Questions |
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134 | (3) |
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Developing an Effective Security Awareness Program |
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137 | (34) |
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138 | (2) |
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Why an Information Security Awareness Program Is Important |
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140 | (3) |
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We Fail to Recruit Our Employees into the Company's Security Program |
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141 | (1) |
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We Need to Take the Issue Seriously |
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142 | (1) |
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How to Design an Effective Information Security Awareness Program |
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143 | (12) |
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148 | (2) |
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Two Important Keys to Implementing an Effective Progam |
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150 | (2) |
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152 | (2) |
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154 | (1) |
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How to Implement an information Security Awareness Program |
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155 | (7) |
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What We Have Here Is A Failure to Communicate |
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157 | (1) |
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Communicate, Communicate, Communicate! |
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157 | (1) |
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157 | (1) |
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Manager's Quick Reference Guide |
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158 | (1) |
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Let's Talk about Alliances |
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159 | (1) |
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159 | (1) |
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159 | (1) |
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159 | (1) |
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160 | (1) |
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Training and Communications |
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160 | (1) |
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160 | (1) |
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Information Security Consultants |
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161 | (1) |
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How Do You Keep Your Program a Successful Component of Your Company's Mindset? |
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162 | (1) |
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How to Measure Your Program |
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163 | (4) |
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167 | (1) |
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167 | (4) |
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Working with Law Enforcement On SCADA Incidents |
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171 | (18) |
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172 | (1) |
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172 | (3) |
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Secure Network Management |
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175 | (6) |
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Securing Wide Area Network Perimeter |
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175 | (1) |
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176 | (1) |
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Performing Network Backup and Recovery |
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176 | (1) |
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Transmittng LEGACY Non-Routable Protocol Securely |
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176 | (2) |
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Dial-Up Access to the Remote Terminal Units (RTU) |
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178 | (1) |
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Vendor Support : Dial -Up Modem/VPN Access |
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178 | (1) |
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IT Controlled Communication Gear |
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178 | (1) |
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179 | (1) |
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179 | (1) |
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Poorly Configured Firewalls |
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180 | (1) |
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180 | (1) |
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181 | (1) |
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Conduct Routine Assessments |
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182 | (1) |
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Examples of Common Attack Techniques |
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182 | (2) |
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Man-In-The-Middle Attacks (MITM) |
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182 | (1) |
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183 | (1) |
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184 | (1) |
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185 | (2) |
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Frequently Asked Questions |
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187 | (2) |
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Locked but Not Secure: An Overview of Conventional and High Security Locks |
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189 | (42) |
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191 | (1) |
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Conventional Pin Tumbler Locks |
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192 | (9) |
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The Origins of the Modern Pin Tumbler Lock |
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194 | (2) |
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A Review: The Essentials of Pin Tumbler Lock Design |
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196 | (1) |
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Security Enhancements for Conventional Locks |
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197 | (1) |
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0197 | (1) |
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198 | (1) |
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Keyways and Related Designs |
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199 | (1) |
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199 | (1) |
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200 | (1) |
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Standards for Conventional and high Security locks |
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201 | (10) |
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Transforming a Conventional Cylinder to High Security |
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202 | (2) |
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Deficiencies in the UL 437 Standard |
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204 | (1) |
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Failure to Specify Real World Testing |
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204 | (1) |
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Pick and Impressioning Resistance |
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205 | (1) |
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206 | (1) |
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206 | (1) |
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Issues Not Addressed by UL 437 |
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206 | (1) |
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207 | (1) |
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208 | (1) |
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208 | (1) |
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Mechanical Bypass of Locking Mechanisms |
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209 | (1) |
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BHMA/ANSI Standards: 156:50 and 156.30 |
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210 | (1) |
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210 | (1) |
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High Security Locks and the BHMA/ANSI Standard |
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210 | (1) |
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211 | (4) |
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BHMA/ANSI 156.30 High Security Standard |
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212 | (1) |
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213 | (1) |
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213 | (1) |
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Surreptitious Entry Resistance |
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214 | (1) |
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Deficienceis in the 156.30 Standard |
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214 | (1) |
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Security Vulnerabilities of Conventional Locks: Why High Security Locks Are Supposed to Offer More Protection Against Methods of Entry |
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215 | (9) |
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Conventional Pin Tumbler Locks: Security Vulnerbilities and Their Compromise |
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216 | (2) |
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218 | (1) |
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Key Control and Key Security |
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218 | (1) |
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218 | (1) |
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The Concept of Key Control As IT Applies to Security |
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219 | (1) |
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The Importance of Key Control and Key Security |
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219 | (2) |
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Replication, Duplication, and Simulation of Keys and Key Blanks |
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221 | (1) |
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Gathering Intellingence About a System from, Its Keys |
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221 | (1) |
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Covert Entry Techniqes: Manipulation of Internal Locking Components |
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222 | (1) |
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223 | (1) |
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223 | (1) |
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223 | (1) |
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223 | (1) |
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223 | (1) |
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High Security of High Insecurity: Real World Attacks |
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224 | (2) |
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226 | (1) |
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226 | (2) |
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Frequently Asked Questions |
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228 | (3) |
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Bomb Threat Planning: Things Have Changed |
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231 | (22) |
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232 | (1) |
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The Day Our World Changed |
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233 | (1) |
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Insider Information: Where do These Guys Get This Stuff? |
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234 | (2) |
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236 | (1) |
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237 | (2) |
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237 | (1) |
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238 | (1) |
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239 | (1) |
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239 | (1) |
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What Should I Be Looking For? |
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239 | (5) |
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240 | (1) |
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240 | (1) |
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240 | (1) |
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241 | (3) |
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242 | |
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244 | (1) |
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Recommendations for Target Hardening |
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245 | (1) |
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245 | (1) |
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246 | (1) |
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246 | (1) |
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246 | (1) |
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246 | (1) |
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247 | (2) |
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249 | (2) |
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251 | (2) |
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Biometric Authentications For SCADA Security |
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253 | (26) |
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254 | (1) |
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Understanding Biometric Systems and How They Are Best Used for SCADA Security |
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255 | (6) |
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Footprints to DNA Readings |
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255 | (1) |
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Human Mesurements Can Slow Machines |
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255 | (1) |
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Biometric System Imperfections Are at Odds with Perceptions |
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256 | (1) |
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What is Biomertric Authentication? |
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256 | (1) |
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Multiple Factor Authentication |
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257 | (1) |
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What Parts of You can Be Measured for Security Purposes? |
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257 | (1) |
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Common Measurements for Current Biometric Authentication |
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257 | (1) |
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How Does Biometric Comparison Work? |
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258 | (2) |
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Where are Biometrics Used in SCADA Systems? |
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260 | (1) |
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Choosing the Best Form of Measurement for Your System |
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261 | (5) |
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Biometric Measurements Trigger Recognition |
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261 | (1) |
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Biometric Measurements useful in SCADA Security processes |
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262 | (2) |
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Identify Your System Priorities Before Choosing a Biometric Application |
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264 | (2) |
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Where are Biometric Authentication Regimes Vulnerable? |
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266 | (6) |
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Tricking the Biometric Capture Device |
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266 | (2) |
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Electronic Manipulation of the Authentication Process |
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268 | (1) |
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Identity Theft with Biometric Files: Capturing Your Essence |
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269 | (1) |
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270 | (1) |
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How Can We Replace That Finger? |
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270 | (1) |
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Measuring Minutia Can Be Safer Than Storing a Whole Biometric Photograph |
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271 | (1) |
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Anticipating Legal and Policy Changes That Will Affect Biometrics |
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272 | (2) |
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274 | (1) |
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274 | (2) |
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Frequently Asked Questions |
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276 | (3) |
Appendix |
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279 | (40) |
Index |
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319 | |