Acknowledgements |
|
xxi | |
About the Author |
|
xxiii | |
|
|
1 | (6) |
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Why Is This Book Being Written? |
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|
1 | (1) |
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Why Am I Writing This Book |
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|
2 | (1) |
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3 | (1) |
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4 | (1) |
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How This Book Is Organized |
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4 | (3) |
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7 | (4) |
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7 | (1) |
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8 | (3) |
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Software Testing and Changes in the Security Landscape |
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|
11 | (12) |
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Software Testing as a Discipline |
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|
11 | (2) |
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Security Has Become More of a Priority |
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13 | (4) |
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The Number of Computers Has Increased |
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|
14 | (1) |
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The Use of the Internet Has Increased |
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14 | (1) |
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More Activities Are Performed Online |
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15 | (2) |
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Security Efforts Have Become More Visible |
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17 | (2) |
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Introduction of the Trustworthy Computing Security Development Lifecycle |
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17 | (1) |
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The Enormous Costs of Security Exploits Recognized |
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18 | (1) |
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In-House Software Is No Longer Immune |
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19 | (1) |
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Perimeter Security Just Isn't Enough |
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19 | (2) |
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21 | (2) |
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23 | (4) |
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Security Testing Considerations |
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|
27 | (46) |
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Security Testing Versus Functional Testing |
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27 | (6) |
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28 | (1) |
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All Consumers Are Not Customers |
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|
28 | (1) |
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The Intent of Security Testing Versus Functional Testing |
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29 | (1) |
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``Positive'' Versus ``Negative'' Testing |
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30 | (1) |
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Test Overlap and Streamlining |
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30 | (1) |
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Changing Your Prioritizations |
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31 | (1) |
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31 | (1) |
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32 | (1) |
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32 | (1) |
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Discovery of Software Vulnerabilities |
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33 | (2) |
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33 | (1) |
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34 | (1) |
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Deliberate Search Efforts |
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34 | (1) |
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Assume Attackers Know Everything You Do |
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35 | (3) |
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Source Code Compromise Is Common |
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35 | (1) |
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Tools Are Readily Available |
|
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35 | (1) |
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36 | (1) |
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Vulnerabilities Are Quickly Exploited |
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37 | (1) |
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Social Engineering Works All Over |
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37 | (1) |
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38 | (3) |
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38 | (1) |
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39 | (1) |
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39 | (1) |
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40 | (1) |
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Exploiting Software Vulnerabilities |
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41 | (8) |
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41 | (1) |
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42 | (1) |
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42 | (1) |
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42 | (1) |
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Master Boot Record (MBR) Viruses |
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42 | (1) |
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43 | (1) |
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43 | (1) |
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43 | (1) |
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43 | (1) |
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43 | (1) |
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The Role of Social Engineering |
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44 | (1) |
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45 | (1) |
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46 | (1) |
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46 | (1) |
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47 | (1) |
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48 | (1) |
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|
48 | (1) |
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Common Security Hindering Phrases |
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49 | (3) |
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``That's not a user scenario.'' |
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|
49 | (1) |
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``It's hidden. The user can't even see it.'' |
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|
50 | (1) |
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``No one is interested in trying to hack this product.'' |
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50 | (1) |
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``Our developers have a security focus.'' |
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50 | (1) |
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``The UI prevents that.'' |
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51 | (1) |
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``It can't get to the back end.'' |
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|
51 | (1) |
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``I got an error when I tested it. That means it's secure.'' |
|
|
52 | (1) |
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Software Development Life Cycle Versus Security-Testing Life Cycle |
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|
52 | (9) |
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The Generally Accepted Software Development Life Cycle |
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52 | (1) |
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53 | (1) |
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53 | (1) |
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54 | (1) |
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55 | (1) |
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56 | (1) |
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56 | (1) |
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The Trustworthy Computing Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) |
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56 | (1) |
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57 | (1) |
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57 | (1) |
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57 | (1) |
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57 | (1) |
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58 | (1) |
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58 | (1) |
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59 | (1) |
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|
59 | (1) |
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60 | (1) |
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|
60 | (1) |
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Extreme Programming and Security Testing |
|
|
60 | (1) |
|
Black-Box Versus White-Box Security Testing |
|
|
61 | (1) |
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Many Attacks Require Little Coding |
|
|
61 | (1) |
|
Security Testing Is a Part of All Testing Efforts |
|
|
62 | (1) |
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The Differences Between Black Box and White Box Security Testing |
|
|
62 | (1) |
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|
62 | (3) |
|
Reliance Solely on Outside Protection Is False Security |
|
|
63 | (1) |
|
Your Application Must Defend Itself |
|
|
63 | (1) |
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Don't Let Your Application Be the Achilles' Heel |
|
|
63 | (1) |
|
Mitigation of Damages Must Be Considered |
|
|
64 | (1) |
|
There Is No Perfect Security |
|
|
65 | (1) |
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The Role of Security Testing |
|
|
65 | (2) |
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|
65 | (1) |
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What Program Managers Want |
|
|
66 | (1) |
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|
66 | (1) |
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67 | (1) |
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Effectively Presenting Security Issues |
|
|
67 | (5) |
|
Carefully Evaluate All Factors |
|
|
68 | (1) |
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|
68 | (1) |
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|
68 | (1) |
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|
68 | (1) |
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Trickle-Down Effect to Dependents |
|
|
68 | (1) |
|
Trickle-Up Effect to Dependencies |
|
|
68 | (1) |
|
|
68 | (1) |
|
|
69 | (1) |
|
|
69 | (1) |
|
Pick Your Battles but Continue the War |
|
|
69 | (1) |
|
Make Bug Reports Accurate |
|
|
69 | (1) |
|
Include Appropriate Information |
|
|
70 | (1) |
|
If You Don't Agree with the Decision |
|
|
70 | (1) |
|
Don't Fight Every Decision |
|
|
71 | (1) |
|
Foster a Security-Conscious Environment |
|
|
71 | (1) |
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|
71 | (1) |
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|
71 | (1) |
|
Advertise Success and Failure |
|
|
71 | (1) |
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|
72 | (1) |
|
Threat Modeling and Risk Assessment Processes |
|
|
73 | (34) |
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|
75 | (2) |
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|
75 | (1) |
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|
75 | (1) |
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|
75 | (1) |
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|
75 | (1) |
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|
76 | (1) |
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|
76 | (1) |
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|
76 | (1) |
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|
76 | (1) |
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|
76 | (1) |
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|
76 | (1) |
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|
77 | (1) |
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|
77 | (1) |
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|
77 | (1) |
|
|
77 | (1) |
|
Initial Modeling of Threats |
|
|
77 | (9) |
|
Document Entry and Exit Points |
|
|
78 | (1) |
|
|
79 | (2) |
|
|
81 | (1) |
|
Document Use Cases and Use Scenarios |
|
|
81 | (1) |
|
Document External Dependencies |
|
|
82 | (1) |
|
Document External Security Notes |
|
|
83 | (1) |
|
Document Internal Security Notes |
|
|
83 | (1) |
|
|
83 | (1) |
|
|
84 | (1) |
|
|
84 | (1) |
|
|
85 | (1) |
|
Analyze Threats to Determine Vulnerabilities |
|
|
85 | (1) |
|
Prioritize Vulnerabilities |
|
|
86 | (1) |
|
|
86 | (1) |
|
|
86 | (1) |
|
Pitfalls of Threat Modeling |
|
|
86 | (8) |
|
Blindness to Interactions with Downstream Dependents |
|
|
87 | (1) |
|
Threat Model Tunnel Vision |
|
|
87 | (1) |
|
Failing to Track Dependency Changes |
|
|
88 | (1) |
|
All Copies of Data Aren't Addressed as Assets |
|
|
88 | (1) |
|
|
89 | (1) |
|
|
89 | (1) |
|
|
89 | (1) |
|
Copies of Production Data Outside Production |
|
|
90 | (1) |
|
|
90 | (1) |
|
Who Has Access or Control |
|
|
91 | (1) |
|
Physical Disks or Devices |
|
|
91 | (1) |
|
Security Becomes Single Layered --- No Defense in Depth |
|
|
92 | (1) |
|
Vulnerabilities with Lower Priorities Are Ignored |
|
|
93 | (1) |
|
Modeling Becomes a Time Sink |
|
|
93 | (1) |
|
Forgetting Physical Access |
|
|
93 | (1) |
|
|
94 | (1) |
|
|
94 | (2) |
|
|
96 | (1) |
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|
96 | (2) |
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|
97 | (1) |
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|
97 | (1) |
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|
97 | (1) |
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|
97 | (1) |
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|
98 | (1) |
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|
98 | (1) |
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|
98 | (1) |
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|
98 | (1) |
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|
99 | (1) |
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|
99 | (1) |
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|
99 | (1) |
|
|
99 | (1) |
|
|
99 | (4) |
|
Insider Threat Study Items of Note |
|
|
100 | (1) |
|
|
100 | (1) |
|
Attacker Behavioral Aspects |
|
|
100 | (1) |
|
Access Path Control Aspects |
|
|
101 | (1) |
|
Attacker Technical Aspects |
|
|
102 | (1) |
|
|
103 | (1) |
|
|
103 | (2) |
|
Phase 1 --- Build Asset-Based Threat Profiles |
|
|
104 | (1) |
|
Phase 2 --- Identify Infrastructure Vulnerabilities |
|
|
104 | (1) |
|
Phase 3 --- Develop Security Strategy and Plans |
|
|
105 | (1) |
|
|
105 | (2) |
|
|
107 | (8) |
|
|
107 | (3) |
|
|
110 | (1) |
|
|
111 | (1) |
|
|
111 | (1) |
|
Personas Are Customers, Not Consumers or Attackers |
|
|
111 | (1) |
|
|
111 | (1) |
|
|
112 | (2) |
|
|
114 | (1) |
|
|
115 | (18) |
|
|
115 | (1) |
|
Start Drafting Your Test Documents |
|
|
116 | (1) |
|
|
116 | (1) |
|
Test Case Outline/Test Case Documentation |
|
|
116 | (1) |
|
|
117 | (2) |
|
Separate the System into Security Areas |
|
|
117 | (1) |
|
|
117 | (1) |
|
|
118 | (1) |
|
|
118 | (1) |
|
Interactions/Interoperability |
|
|
119 | (1) |
|
|
119 | (4) |
|
Look at Existing Product Bugs and Known Security Issues |
|
|
120 | (1) |
|
|
120 | (1) |
|
|
121 | (1) |
|
Systems You Interface or Interact With |
|
|
121 | (1) |
|
Review System Specifications |
|
|
122 | (1) |
|
Begin as Early as Possible |
|
|
122 | (1) |
|
Always Question Security Concerns |
|
|
122 | (1) |
|
Review Existing Test Plans and Cases |
|
|
122 | (1) |
|
Review Existing Test Automation |
|
|
123 | (1) |
|
|
123 | (2) |
|
|
124 | (1) |
|
|
124 | (1) |
|
Other Known Vulnerabilities |
|
|
124 | (1) |
|
|
124 | (1) |
|
|
125 | (1) |
|
Use Threat Modeling/Risk Assessment Charts |
|
|
125 | (1) |
|
Use Personal Experience Data |
|
|
126 | (1) |
|
Talk to the Developers for Special Concerns |
|
|
126 | (1) |
|
Develop a Test Plan of Attack |
|
|
126 | (2) |
|
Using ``Normal'' or ``By Design'' Test Methods |
|
|
127 | (1) |
|
|
127 | (1) |
|
|
127 | (1) |
|
Don't Forget Validation Tools |
|
|
127 | (1) |
|
|
127 | (1) |
|
Untestable Code Is Unshippable Code |
|
|
128 | (1) |
|
|
128 | (2) |
|
Time to Develop or Learn Tools |
|
|
129 | (1) |
|
|
129 | (1) |
|
Time to Investigate Issues |
|
|
129 | (1) |
|
Time to Rerun All Security Tests on Release Candidate |
|
|
130 | (1) |
|
Review the Plan and Test Cases |
|
|
130 | (1) |
|
Review with Other Disciplines |
|
|
130 | (1) |
|
Review with Other Testers |
|
|
130 | (1) |
|
Share the Plan with Others |
|
|
130 | (1) |
|
|
131 | (1) |
|
|
131 | (2) |
|
Sample Security Considerations |
|
|
133 | (14) |
|
|
133 | (5) |
|
|
133 | (1) |
|
Too Many Features Enabled on Install |
|
|
134 | (1) |
|
More Risky Abilities Enabled by Default |
|
|
134 | (1) |
|
High Permissions Required to Install but Not to Run |
|
|
134 | (1) |
|
Hard-Coded Install Locations |
|
|
134 | (1) |
|
|
134 | (1) |
|
User Authenticated Only at Certain Points |
|
|
135 | (1) |
|
Access Control Rules Not Enforced Consistently |
|
|
135 | (1) |
|
|
135 | (1) |
|
Input Contents Assumed Trustworthy |
|
|
135 | (1) |
|
Input Formats Assumed Trustworthy |
|
|
135 | (1) |
|
Input Sources Assumed Trustworthy |
|
|
135 | (1) |
|
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135 | (1) |
|
|
136 | (1) |
|
Validations Are Processed in Wrong Order |
|
|
136 | (1) |
|
Cryptographic Considerations |
|
|
136 | (1) |
|
Cryptography Not Being Used |
|
|
136 | (1) |
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|
136 | (1) |
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|
136 | (1) |
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|
136 | (1) |
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|
136 | (1) |
|
Hidden Files and Locations |
|
|
137 | (1) |
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|
137 | (1) |
|
|
137 | (1) |
|
Access to Temporary Files |
|
|
137 | (1) |
|
Access to Crash Dump Files or Reports |
|
|
137 | (1) |
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|
137 | (1) |
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|
137 | (1) |
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|
137 | (1) |
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|
138 | (1) |
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|
138 | (2) |
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|
138 | (1) |
|
Processes Run at High Privilege |
|
|
138 | (1) |
|
|
138 | (1) |
|
Setup Information Saved to Hard-Coded Location |
|
|
138 | (1) |
|
State Information Saved to Hard-Coded Location |
|
|
138 | (1) |
|
Repair/Restore Information Saved to Hard-Coded Location |
|
|
139 | (1) |
|
Output Interceptable before Final Destination |
|
|
139 | (1) |
|
|
139 | (1) |
|
Defaults to Less-Secure Versions |
|
|
139 | (1) |
|
|
139 | (1) |
|
Cached Information Not Safeguarded |
|
|
139 | (1) |
|
Information Revealed Unnecessarily |
|
|
139 | (1) |
|
Registry Keys Easily Accessible |
|
|
140 | (1) |
|
|
140 | (2) |
|
|
140 | (1) |
|
Processes Run at High Privilege |
|
|
140 | (1) |
|
Default Accounts Used to Run Processes |
|
|
140 | (1) |
|
|
140 | (1) |
|
Data Submission Formats Are Trusted |
|
|
140 | (1) |
|
No Validation of Data/Request Source |
|
|
140 | (1) |
|
|
141 | (1) |
|
Specific Language Details Relied On |
|
|
141 | (1) |
|
|
141 | (1) |
|
Session Cookies Are Weak or Easily Reused |
|
|
141 | (1) |
|
|
141 | (1) |
|
Specialized Considerations |
|
|
141 | (1) |
|
Safeguards on Perimeters Solely Relied On (Proxies, Etc.) |
|
|
141 | (1) |
|
Insufficient Safeguards on API Abilities |
|
|
141 | (1) |
|
Web Applications/Web Services/Distributed Applications |
|
|
142 | (5) |
|
|
142 | (1) |
|
Local Processes Run at High Privilege |
|
|
142 | (1) |
|
Server Processes Run at High Privilege |
|
|
142 | (1) |
|
Default Accounts Used to Execute (Admin, Dbo, Sa) |
|
|
142 | (1) |
|
|
142 | (1) |
|
Custom Packet Format Relied On |
|
|
142 | (1) |
|
Data Not Encoded Before Action |
|
|
143 | (1) |
|
Hidden Form Fields Not Validated |
|
|
143 | (1) |
|
|
143 | (1) |
|
|
143 | (1) |
|
|
143 | (1) |
|
|
143 | (1) |
|
Rogue Clients Not Detected |
|
|
143 | (1) |
|
Server Verifies Only Client, Not Data (Client Hijacking) |
|
|
144 | (1) |
|
No Antirepudiation Validation |
|
|
144 | (1) |
|
|
144 | (1) |
|
Rogue Servers Not Detected |
|
|
144 | (1) |
|
Client Verifies Only Server Identity, Not Data (Server Hijacking) |
|
|
144 | (1) |
|
No Antirepudiation Validation |
|
|
144 | (1) |
|
Remote Administration Available |
|
|
144 | (1) |
|
Specialized Considerations |
|
|
144 | (1) |
|
Safeguards on Perimeter Only |
|
|
145 | (1) |
|
Encryption Keys Stored in Source Code |
|
|
145 | (1) |
|
HTML Comments Remain in Shipped Forms |
|
|
145 | (2) |
|
Vulnerability Case Study: Brute Force Browsing |
|
|
147 | (6) |
|
|
147 | (1) |
|
|
147 | (2) |
|
|
148 | (1) |
|
|
148 | (1) |
|
Non-URL Forceful Browsing |
|
|
149 | (1) |
|
|
149 | (1) |
|
|
149 | (1) |
|
|
149 | (1) |
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|
150 | (1) |
|
|
150 | (3) |
|
|
150 | (1) |
|
|
151 | (2) |
|
Vulnerability Case Study: Buffer Overruns |
|
|
153 | (12) |
|
|
153 | (1) |
|
|
153 | (4) |
|
|
154 | (1) |
|
|
155 | (2) |
|
|
157 | (1) |
|
|
158 | (2) |
|
|
158 | (1) |
|
Stack Buffer Overrun/Stack Smashing |
|
|
158 | (1) |
|
Heap Buffer Overrun/Heap Smashing |
|
|
159 | (1) |
|
|
160 | (2) |
|
Find and Document All Entry Points into the Product You Are Testing |
|
|
160 | (1) |
|
Create an Attack That Targets Each Variable at Each Entry Point |
|
|
160 | (1) |
|
Pass the Attack Data to Each Entry Point |
|
|
161 | (1) |
|
Look for Any Crashes or Unexpected Behavior |
|
|
161 | (1) |
|
|
161 | (1) |
|
|
162 | (1) |
|
|
162 | (3) |
|
Vulnerability Case Study: Cookie Tampering |
|
|
165 | (8) |
|
|
165 | (1) |
|
|
165 | (3) |
|
|
165 | (1) |
|
|
166 | (1) |
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|
166 | (1) |
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|
167 | (1) |
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|
167 | (1) |
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|
167 | (1) |
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|
168 | (1) |
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|
168 | (1) |
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|
169 | (1) |
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|
169 | (1) |
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|
169 | (1) |
|
|
169 | (1) |
|
|
170 | (1) |
|
|
170 | (3) |
|
|
170 | (1) |
|
Analyze the Gathered Cookies |
|
|
170 | (1) |
|
|
171 | (1) |
|
|
171 | (1) |
|
|
172 | (1) |
|
|
172 | (1) |
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Vulnerability Case Study: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) |
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173 | (10) |
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173 | (1) |
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173 | (3) |
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Nonpersistent or Reflected |
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174 | (1) |
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175 | (1) |
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175 | (1) |
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176 | (1) |
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Nonpersistent or Reflected Exploit |
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176 | (1) |
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Persistent or Stored Exploit |
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176 | (1) |
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177 | (1) |
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177 | (2) |
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177 | (1) |
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177 | (1) |
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178 | (1) |
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179 | (1) |
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179 | (3) |
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Question All Filtering and Encoding |
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180 | (1) |
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180 | (1) |
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180 | (1) |
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181 | (1) |
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Returned Code Examination |
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181 | (1) |
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181 | (1) |
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182 | (1) |
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182 | (1) |
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182 | (1) |
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Vulnerability Case Study: Denial of Service/Distributed Denial of Service |
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183 | (10) |
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183 | (1) |
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183 | (3) |
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184 | (1) |
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184 | (1) |
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184 | (1) |
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185 | (1) |
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185 | (1) |
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185 | (1) |
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Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) |
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186 | (1) |
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186 | (1) |
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186 | (1) |
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186 | (1) |
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187 | (1) |
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187 | (1) |
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187 | (1) |
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187 | (2) |
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187 | (1) |
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Gibson Research Corporation DDoS Attack |
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188 | (1) |
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189 | (1) |
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189 | (1) |
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189 | (1) |
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189 | (1) |
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190 | (1) |
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Think Outside the Typical DoS Box |
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190 | (1) |
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190 | (1) |
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190 | (3) |
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Vulnerability Case Study: Format String Vulnerabilities |
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193 | (8) |
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193 | (1) |
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193 | (3) |
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196 | (1) |
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196 | (2) |
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196 | (1) |
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197 | (1) |
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197 | (1) |
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197 | (1) |
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198 | (1) |
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198 | (1) |
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198 | (1) |
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199 | (1) |
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199 | (1) |
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199 | (1) |
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199 | (1) |
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Rough Auditing Tool for Security (RATS) |
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199 | (1) |
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199 | (1) |
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200 | (1) |
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200 | (1) |
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Vulnerability Case Study: Integer Overflows and Underflows |
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201 | (6) |
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201 | (1) |
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201 | (2) |
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203 | (1) |
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204 | (1) |
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205 | (1) |
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205 | (1) |
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206 | (1) |
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206 | (1) |
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Vulnerability Case Study: Man-in-the-Middle Attacks |
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207 | (4) |
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207 | (1) |
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207 | (2) |
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209 | (1) |
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209 | (1) |
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210 | (1) |
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210 | (1) |
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Vulnerability Case Study: Password Cracking |
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211 | (6) |
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211 | (1) |
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211 | (3) |
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212 | (1) |
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Weak Passwords/Password Guessing |
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212 | (1) |
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Insecure Password Storage |
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212 | (1) |
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Insecure Password Transmission |
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213 | (1) |
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213 | (1) |
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213 | (1) |
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214 | (1) |
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214 | (1) |
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214 | (1) |
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Insecure Password Storage |
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214 | (1) |
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Insecure Password Transmission |
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214 | (1) |
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Dictionary-Based Password Attacks |
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214 | (1) |
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215 | (1) |
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215 | (1) |
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215 | (1) |
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Insecure Password Storage |
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215 | (1) |
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Insecure Password Transmission |
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215 | (1) |
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215 | (1) |
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Insecure Password Storage |
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215 | (1) |
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Insecure Password Transmission |
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216 | (1) |
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216 | (1) |
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216 | (1) |
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Vulnerability Case Study: Session Hijacking |
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217 | (4) |
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217 | (1) |
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217 | (2) |
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219 | (1) |
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219 | (1) |
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219 | (1) |
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220 | (1) |
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Vulnerability Case Study: Spoofing Attacks |
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221 | (4) |
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221 | (1) |
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221 | (2) |
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222 | (1) |
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222 | (1) |
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222 | (1) |
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223 | (1) |
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223 | (1) |
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223 | (1) |
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223 | (2) |
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Vulnerability Case Study: SQL Injection |
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225 | (8) |
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225 | (1) |
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225 | (2) |
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227 | (2) |
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Look for a Possible Vulnerability |
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227 | (1) |
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227 | (1) |
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All Errors Are Not Created Equal |
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227 | (1) |
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228 | (1) |
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229 | (1) |
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229 | (2) |
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229 | (1) |
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229 | (2) |
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231 | (2) |
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233 | (8) |
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233 | (1) |
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234 | (4) |
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Prioritize and Choose Targets |
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234 | (1) |
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235 | (1) |
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235 | (1) |
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235 | (1) |
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236 | (1) |
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236 | (1) |
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236 | (1) |
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236 | (1) |
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Build Tools and Test Harnesses |
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236 | (1) |
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237 | (1) |
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237 | (1) |
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237 | (1) |
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238 | (1) |
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238 | (1) |
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238 | (1) |
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238 | (1) |
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2000: Windows NT and Windows 2000 |
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238 | (1) |
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239 | (2) |
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241 | (8) |
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241 | (2) |
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242 | (1) |
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242 | (1) |
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242 | (1) |
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242 | (1) |
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243 | (2) |
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243 | (1) |
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243 | (1) |
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244 | (1) |
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Symmetric (Single-Key) Cipher |
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244 | (1) |
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244 | (1) |
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245 | (1) |
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245 | (1) |
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245 | (1) |
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246 | (1) |
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246 | (1) |
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246 | (1) |
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246 | (1) |
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Crypto Is Not Always Secure |
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246 | (2) |
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246 | (1) |
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247 | (1) |
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247 | (1) |
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247 | (1) |
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247 | (1) |
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248 | (1) |
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249 | (6) |
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249 | (1) |
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250 | (1) |
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250 | (1) |
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250 | (1) |
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251 | (2) |
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251 | (1) |
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Stateful Packet Inspection |
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251 | (1) |
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252 | (1) |
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Network Address Translation (NAT) |
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252 | (1) |
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Drawbacks to Using Firewalls |
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253 | (2) |
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Background: OSI Network Model |
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255 | (6) |
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Application Layer (Layer 7) |
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256 | (1) |
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Presentation Layer (Layer 6) |
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256 | (1) |
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256 | (1) |
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Transport Layer (Layer 4) |
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257 | (1) |
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257 | (1) |
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Data Link Layer (Layer 2) |
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258 | (1) |
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258 | (3) |
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Background: Proxy Servers |
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261 | (6) |
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261 | (3) |
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261 | (1) |
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262 | (1) |
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262 | (1) |
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262 | (1) |
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263 | (1) |
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263 | (1) |
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264 | (1) |
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264 | (1) |
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265 | (2) |
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Background: TCP/IP and Other Networking Protocols |
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267 | (8) |
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267 | (2) |
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268 | (1) |
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268 | (1) |
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Common TCP Application Port Numbers |
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269 | (1) |
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269 | (4) |
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270 | (1) |
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270 | (1) |
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271 | (1) |
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272 | (1) |
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272 | (1) |
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272 | (1) |
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272 | (1) |
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273 | (1) |
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273 | (1) |
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273 | (1) |
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274 | (1) |
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274 | (1) |
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274 | (1) |
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Background: Test Case Outlining (TCO) |
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275 | (12) |
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275 | (1) |
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What Is (and Is Not) a TCO |
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276 | (1) |
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276 | (1) |
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Steps in Test Case Outlining |
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277 | (7) |
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Research the Item to Be Tested |
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277 | (1) |
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Determine Starting TCO Format |
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278 | (1) |
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278 | (1) |
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279 | (1) |
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Write Atomic/Predictive Statements of Behavior |
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280 | (1) |
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Use Equivalency Classes if Possible |
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281 | (2) |
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283 | (1) |
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284 | (1) |
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284 | (1) |
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285 | (2) |
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Additional Sources of Information |
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287 | (2) |
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287 | (1) |
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Recommended Web Sites and Mailing Lists |
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|
287 | (2) |
Index |
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289 | |