This book presents a comprehensive analysis of tax consequences in an oligopolistic market. It provides the reader with a systematic and precise way of understanding the research content of tax incidence. A major feature of the book is its analysis of tax incidence from both domestic and international oligopolies. Then, by examining various oligopoly models, it approaches the essence of domestic and multilateral tax issues. Starting with the general theory of commodity tax incidence in an oligopoly, the topics addressed in this book include tax reform, environmental regulation, and policy coordination in international oligopolies. In addition to the usual oligopoly model, managerial oligopoly, the public pricing problem for firms in an oligopoly, and mixed oligopoly are dealt with. By presenting individual issues and explaining the relevance of each topic, this book is highly recommended for readers interested in policymaking and the global market in relation to the interdisciplinary developments of public economics, regional economics, and international economics. This book is also valuable as an advanced textbook on applied economics.
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1 Commodity Tax Incidence in an Oligopolistic Market |
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1 | (12) |
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1 | (1) |
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2 | (1) |
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1.3 Tax Incidence in an Oligopolistic Market with a Fixed Number of Firms |
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3 | (3) |
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1.4 Tax Incidence with Free-Entry Equilibrium |
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6 | (3) |
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9 | (1) |
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10 | (3) |
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11 | (2) |
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2 Comparative Analysis of Specific and Ad Valorem Commodity Taxes: Welfare Analysis of Tax Rate Combination and Optimal Commodity Taxes |
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13 | (10) |
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13 | (1) |
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14 | (1) |
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2.3 Pareto-Improving Tax Rate Reform (PIT) |
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15 | (4) |
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2.4 Optimal Tax Rate Combination in Free-Entry Equilibrium |
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19 | (2) |
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21 | (2) |
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22 | (1) |
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3 Commodity Tax Incidence in a Labor-Managed Firm Oligopoly |
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23 | (10) |
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23 | (1) |
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24 | (2) |
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3.3 Incidence of Commodity Taxes: The Case of a Fixed Number of Firms |
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26 | (2) |
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3.4 Free-Entry Equilibrium |
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28 | (2) |
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3.5 Comparison Between Specific Tax and Ad Valorem Tax |
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30 | (1) |
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31 | (2) |
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32 | (1) |
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4 Managerial Incentives and Principal-Agent Type Oligopoly: Shifting of the Tax Burden |
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33 | (14) |
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33 | (2) |
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35 | (3) |
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4.3 Comparison of Shifting Effects Between Profit Tax and Commodity Tax |
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38 | (3) |
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4.4 Numerical Example of the Tax Burden |
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41 | (2) |
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43 | (4) |
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43 | (1) |
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44 | (3) |
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5 Public Pricing and Oligopolistic Market |
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47 | (12) |
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47 | (1) |
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48 | (4) |
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5.3 Replication of Diamond-Mirrlees World |
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52 | (1) |
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5.4 Public Pricing in an Oligopolistic Market |
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53 | (2) |
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55 | (1) |
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56 | (3) |
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57 | (1) |
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58 | (1) |
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6 Comparative Analysis of Environmental Regulation and Environmental Tax |
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59 | (16) |
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59 | (2) |
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61 | (4) |
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6.3 Welfare Comparison of Emission Tax and Relative Emission Standard |
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65 | (2) |
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6.4 Welfare Comparison Between Emission Tax and Relative Emission Standard Under Free-Entry Equilibrium |
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67 | (4) |
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71 | (2) |
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73 | (2) |
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74 | (1) |
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7 Commodity Tax in an International Oligopoly |
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75 | (12) |
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75 | (1) |
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76 | (3) |
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79 | (5) |
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84 | (3) |
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85 | (2) |
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8 Commodity Tax Harmonization and Global Tariff Reduction with Differentiated International Oligopoly |
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87 | (12) |
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87 | (1) |
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88 | (2) |
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8.3 Domestic Tariff and Commodity Tax Reforms |
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90 | (3) |
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8.4 Global Tariff Reduction |
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93 | (1) |
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8.5 Commodity Tax Harmonization |
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94 | (2) |
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96 | (3) |
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97 | (2) |
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9 Partial Policy Coordination and Strategic Response in International Oligopoly |
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99 | (28) |
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99 | (2) |
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101 | (3) |
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9.3 Non-cooperative Policy Equilibrium |
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104 | (3) |
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9.4 Partial Coordination Starting from the Policy Equilibrium |
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107 | (10) |
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9.4.1 Welfare Effects of Partial Coordination |
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107 | (1) |
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9.4.2 Partial Coordination of Tariffs |
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108 | (1) |
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9.4.3 Partial Coordination of Commodity Taxes |
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109 | (4) |
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9.4.4 Partial Coordination of Production Subsidies |
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113 | (4) |
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117 | (10) |
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118 | (1) |
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Comparative Statics Results |
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118 | (1) |
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Derivation of the Non-cooperative Policy Equilibrium |
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119 | (2) |
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Consumption at the Non-cooperative Policy Equilibrium |
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121 | (1) |
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Properties of Non-cooperative Policy Equilibrium |
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122 | (2) |
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Reaction to the Partial Coordination |
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124 | (1) |
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124 | (3) |
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10 Privatization Neutrality Theorem in an International Mixed Oligopoly |
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127 | |
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127 | (1) |
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10.2 Analytical Background |
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128 | (2) |
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130 | (4) |
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10.4 Privatization of the Fully State-Owned Firm |
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134 | (2) |
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10.5 Neutrality Theorem Under Partial Privatization |
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136 | (2) |
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10.6 Neutrality Theorem on Managerial Incentives |
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138 | (3) |
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141 | |
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141 | |
Minoru Kunizaki is a Professor of Economics, Faculty of Economics, Aichi University, Japan. He graduated from the Faculty of Economics, Momoyama-Gakuin University and completed a masters degree from the Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University of Commerce. He was a Visiting Professor at the University of Sydney and the University of Catania. He is a member of the International Institute of Public Finance, the Japan Institute of Public Finance, the Japanese Society of International Economics, and the Japan Section of the Regional Science Association.
Kazuyuki Nakamura is a Professor at the School of Economics, University of Toyama, Japan. He graduated from the Faculty of Economics, Kansai University and completed a masters degree from the Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University of Commerce. He is a member of the Japan Institute of Public Finance, the Japanese Society of International Economics, and the Japan Section ofthe Regional Science Association.
Naoki Kakita is a professor at the School of Economics, University of Toyama, Japan. He graduated from Nagasaki Prefectural University and completed a masters degree from the Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University of Commerce, Japan. He is a member of the Japanese Society of International Economics and the Japanese Economic Association.