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xiii | |
Theories of Choice and the Law--An Introduction |
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1 | (18) |
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I The Problem of Selecting Appropriate Theories of Choice |
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2 | (6) |
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II The Hidden Assumptions of Theories of Choice |
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8 | (2) |
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III A Pluralism of Methods and Legal Theory |
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10 | (3) |
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IV The Four Parts of the Book |
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13 | (6) |
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1 The Proper Scope of Behavioural Law and Economics |
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19 | (18) |
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19 | (3) |
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II Behavioural Law and Economics |
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22 | (2) |
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III The Prisoner's Dilemma as a Tool for Legal Analysis |
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24 | (7) |
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IV The Proper Scope of Behavioural Law and Economics |
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31 | (6) |
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2 Rational Choice and its Limits for the Solution of Social and Legal Problems: Three Observations on Behavioural Law and Economics |
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37 | (18) |
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37 | (2) |
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II Models Should Be Realistic, but They Remain Models |
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39 | (5) |
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III The Rationality Axiom Should Be Regarded as Modified Rather than Refuted |
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44 | (6) |
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IV Behavioural Research Does Not Privilege `Libertarian Paternalism' over Alternative Policy Paradigms |
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50 | (3) |
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53 | (2) |
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3 Game Theory and the Law: Incomplete Knowledge about the Knowledge of Other Players |
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55 | (18) |
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55 | (3) |
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II (Neo-)classical Non-cooperative Game Theory |
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58 | (2) |
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A Basic Assumptions Concerning `Rational' Preferences |
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58 | (1) |
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B Basic Assumptions Concerning Theories of Rationality in Equilibrium |
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59 | (1) |
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III Bounded Rationality in Non-cooperative Games |
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60 | (6) |
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A Perspective of the Behavioural Economist |
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61 | (3) |
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B Perspective of the Decision Maker |
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64 | (1) |
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C Perspective of the Advisor |
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65 | (1) |
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IV The Apple Qualcomm Dispute |
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66 | (3) |
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69 | (4) |
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PART II INDIVIDUAL CHOICE AND THE LAW |
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4 Most People Like Nudges--and Why that Matters |
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73 | (14) |
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73 | (3) |
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76 | (3) |
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79 | (6) |
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A Types of Nudges along Level of Intrusion and Country Cluster |
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79 | (4) |
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83 | (2) |
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85 | (2) |
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5 Regulating under Uncertainty about Rationality: From Decision Theory to Machine Learning and Complexity Theory |
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87 | (28) |
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I Uncertainty and Regulation: The Case of Bounded Rationality |
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88 | (1) |
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II Knightean Uncertainty: Decision Theory |
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89 | (9) |
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A The Source of Uncertainty: Lack of Studies; Limited Internal and External Validity |
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89 | (1) |
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B Regulatory Implications: Decision Making under Uncertainty |
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90 | (1) |
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C Example: Price Discrimination |
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91 | (1) |
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1 Effects of price discrimination given rational actors |
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92 | (2) |
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2 Effects of price discrimination given boundedly rational actors |
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94 | (2) |
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3 Deciding on price discrimination law under uncertainty |
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96 | (2) |
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III Approximating Degrees of Rationality: Big Data Analytics |
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98 | (5) |
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A The Source of Approximation: Big Data and Machine Learning |
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99 | (1) |
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B Regulatory Implications |
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100 | (1) |
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1 Aggregate level: cost-benefit analysis and social welfare functions |
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100 | (1) |
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2 Individual level: personalised law |
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101 | (1) |
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C Example: Usurious Lending |
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102 | (1) |
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IV Unpredictable States of the World: Complexity Theory |
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103 | (8) |
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A The Source of Unpredictability: Complexity |
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104 | (1) |
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B Regulatory Implications: Accommodating and Reducing Uncertainty |
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105 | (2) |
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C Example: Smart Contracts and the Governance of Blockchains |
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107 | (4) |
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V The Normative Core of Uncertainty Approaches to the Law |
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111 | (1) |
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VI Conclusion: Cycles of Uncertainty and the Law |
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112 | (3) |
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6 Did You Say `Theories of Choice'? On the Limited and Variable Appetite for Theories in Consumer Law |
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115 | (24) |
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I Introduction: Reasons to Lower Ambitions |
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115 | (5) |
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II Legislation: Is There a Theory of Choice? The Example of EU Consumer Protection |
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120 | (9) |
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A EU Consumer Policy: Information-based Theory of Choicecanbe Sticky |
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121 | (4) |
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B Does the Legislator Need a Theory of Choice? |
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125 | (4) |
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III Legal Scholarship: The Space for Theories of Choice |
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129 | (5) |
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A Opening the Space for Theories of Choice |
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129 | (2) |
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B Shaping the Discussion of Theories of Choice: Deep and Narrow or Wide and Shallow? |
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131 | (3) |
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134 | (5) |
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PART III COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND THE LAW |
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7 Itinera Europea: Four Scenarios and Their Plausibility |
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139 | (16) |
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139 | (2) |
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II Scenario One: A European Federal State |
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141 | (3) |
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III Scenario Two: A Differentiated, Flexible Union |
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144 | (2) |
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IV Scenario Three: Covert Integration |
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146 | (2) |
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V Scenario Four: Disintegration/Dissolution |
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148 | (1) |
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VI Conclusion: `Fluctuat nec mergitur' |
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149 | (6) |
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8 The Social Welfare Function: A New Tool for Regulatory Policy Analysis |
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155 | (24) |
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157 | (4) |
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II The SWF as a Tool for Regulatory Policy Analysis |
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161 | (4) |
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165 | (4) |
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169 | (8) |
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177 | (2) |
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9 Collective Intelligence: Crowd Wisdom versus Herding |
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179 | (30) |
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179 | (3) |
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II Statistics of Collective Intelligence |
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182 | (8) |
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182 | (2) |
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B Individual Judgment as Basis |
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184 | (2) |
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C Statistical Determinants of Collective Intelligence |
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186 | (1) |
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186 | (1) |
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187 | (1) |
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D Are Groups Wiser Than Individuals? |
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188 | (2) |
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III Generation of Collective Intelligence |
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190 | (12) |
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190 | (3) |
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193 | (1) |
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193 | (2) |
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195 | (3) |
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198 | (1) |
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1 Information suppression (`herding') |
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199 | (2) |
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201 | (1) |
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202 | (7) |
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PART IV ORGANISATIONAL CHOICE AND THE LAW A. Firms |
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10 Decision Theory and Allocating Decision Making in the Firm |
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209 | (18) |
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211 | (11) |
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211 | (3) |
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214 | (2) |
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216 | (5) |
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221 | (1) |
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II Beyond Delaware Corporate Law |
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222 | (3) |
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222 | (1) |
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B Various Forms of Business Organisation |
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223 | (2) |
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225 | (1) |
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225 | (2) |
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11 Institutional Investor Voting Behaviour: A Network Theory Perspective |
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227 | (38) |
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228 | (4) |
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II Setting the Scene: Corporate Governance and Informed Voting |
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232 | (3) |
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III Explaining Voting by Institutional Investors: The Atomistic Approach |
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235 | (8) |
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IV How Connections Affect Institutional Investor Voting Dynamics |
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243 | (18) |
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A Inter-Institutional Connections |
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245 | (1) |
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246 | (1) |
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C Geographically Linked Networks |
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247 | (1) |
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D Employees' Personal Networks and Career Concerns |
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247 | (4) |
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E Intra-Clique Cooperation and Inter-Clique Competition: Co - Ownership Ties |
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251 | (4) |
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F Can Cooperation Emerge and Be Sustained? |
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255 | (1) |
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255 | (3) |
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258 | (3) |
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261 | (4) |
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B Institutions, Networks, and Courts |
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12 Conflict of Interest and Decision Making |
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265 | (18) |
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I Relevance of Decision Making to Analyse Conflicts of Interest |
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269 | (6) |
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A Impaired Judgment Making as a Key Feature of Conflict of Interest |
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269 | (1) |
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1 Denning COI: insights from analytical philosophy |
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269 | (3) |
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2 Further distinctions among conflicts of interest |
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272 | (1) |
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B Bounded Rationality and Conflicted Behaviours |
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273 | (1) |
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274 | (1) |
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274 | (1) |
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II Ethical Decision-Making in Conflict of Interest Situations |
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275 | (6) |
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A The Inadequacy of Existing Policies |
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275 | (1) |
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275 | (1) |
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2 Procedural requirements |
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276 | (1) |
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B Building a Norm-Rich Decision-Making Culture |
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277 | (1) |
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1 The role of norms in decision-making |
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278 | (2) |
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2 Promoting ethical decision-making |
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280 | (1) |
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281 | (2) |
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13 Decision Making in Chains and Networks of Contracts |
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283 | (26) |
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I Phenotypes of Long-term/Network Organisational Contracts |
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284 | (4) |
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A Long-term Relationships and Network--A Variety of Arrangements and Core Characteristics |
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284 | (3) |
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B Social Sciences Explanations of Long-term/Network Organisational Contracts |
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287 | (1) |
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II Decision Theories Related to Long-term/Network Contracts |
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288 | (12) |
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A Introduction to Decision Theories for Organisational Contracts--A Pluralist Stance |
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288 | (4) |
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B Decision Making under Uncertainty |
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292 | (2) |
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C Informational Cascades, Wisdom of Collective Learning, or Apathy? |
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294 | (2) |
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D The Role of Game Theory--Including Repeated Games and Mutual Aspiration Theory |
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296 | (2) |
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E A House of Mutual Trust and Generous Reciprocity |
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298 | (2) |
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III Legal Implications of Decision Theories for Long-term/Network Organisational Contracts? |
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300 | (8) |
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A Disgorgement of Windfall Profits? |
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301 | (2) |
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B Protection of Common Value? |
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303 | (2) |
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C The Need of Direct Duties and Claims--namely, Information? |
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305 | (2) |
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307 | (1) |
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308 | (1) |
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14 The Power of Sequence: A Quantum Perspective on Legal Decision Making |
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309 | (18) |
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I What is Quantum Decision Making? |
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311 | (4) |
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II Why Use Quantum Probability Theory? |
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315 | (1) |
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III When Can Quantum Decision Making Most Usefully Inform Law? |
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316 | (2) |
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IV How Can Quantum Decision Making Inform Law? Examples with Juror Judgments |
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318 | (7) |
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325 | (2) |
Index |
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