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E-raamat: Theories of Choice: The Social Science and the Law of Decision Making

Edited by (Chair for Civil Law, German, European and International Private Law, Humboldt University of Berlin), Edited by (Chair for Law and Ethics of the Digital Society, European University Viadrina)
  • Formaat: 320 pages
  • Ilmumisaeg: 14-Jan-2021
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • Keel: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780192608277
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  • Formaat: 320 pages
  • Ilmumisaeg: 14-Jan-2021
  • Kirjastus: Oxford University Press
  • Keel: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780192608277

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Choice is a key concept of our time. It is a foundational mechanism for every legal order in societies that are, politically, constituted as democracies and, economically, built on the market mechanism. Thus, choice can be understood as an atomic structure that grounds core societal processes. In recent years, however, the debate over the right way to theorize choice - for example, as a rational or a behavioral type of decision making - has intensified.

This collection provides an in-depth discussion of the promises and perils of specific types of theories of choice. It shows how the selection of a specific theory of choice can make a difference for concrete legal questions, in particular in the regulation of the digital economy or in choosing between market, firm, or network. In its first part, the volume provides an accessible overview of the current debates about rational versus behavioral approaches to theories of choice. The remainder of the book structures the vast landscape of theories of choice along with three main types: individual, collective, and organizational decision making.

As theories of choice proliferate and become ever more sophisticated, however, the process of choosing an adequate theory of choice becomes increasingly intricate. This volume addresses this selection problem for the various legal arenas in which individual, organizational, and collective decisions matter. By drawing on economic, technological, political, and legal points of view, the volume shows which theories of choice are at the disposal of the legally relevant decision-maker, and how they can be operationalized for the solution of concrete legal problems.

The editors acknowledge the kind support of the Fritz Thyssen Foundation for an exploratory conference on the subject of the book.

Arvustused

This collection provides an in-depth discussion of the promises and perils of specific types of theories of choice. Moreover, it shows how the selection of a specific theory of choice can make a difference for concrete legal questions, particularly in the regulation of the digital economy or choosing between market, firm, or network. * Lucia A. Reisch and Friederike C. Doebbe, Journal of Consumer Policy * This is a wide-ranging and hugely well-informed study of choice and its relationship with law and legal studies. The inclusion of responses to practical issues such as investor voting behaviour and networks of commercial contracts demonstrates a concerted attempt to link theory to practice. Any legal text that attempts interdisciplinary research (of sorts) with quantum physics is worth a look. * Tom Proverbs-Garbett, Law Society Gazette * Choice is a foundational mechanism for every legal order in societies that are, politically, constituted as democracies and, economically, built on the market mechanism...The book provides an in-depth discussion of the promises and perils of specific types of theories of choice. * Journal of Consumer Policy * The book provides an in-depth discussion of the promises and perils of specific types of theories of choice. It shows how the selection of a specific theory of choice can make a difference for concrete legal questions, in the regulation of the digital economy or in choosing between market, firm, or network. * Journal of Consumer Policy * The book provides an in-depth discussion of the promises and perils of specific types of theories of choice... the volume provides an accessible overview of the current debates about rational versus behavioural approaches to theories of choice. * Journal of Consumer Policy *

List of Contributors
xiii
Theories of Choice and the Law--An Introduction 1(18)
Stefan Grundmann
Philipp Hacker
I The Problem of Selecting Appropriate Theories of Choice
2(6)
II The Hidden Assumptions of Theories of Choice
8(2)
III A Pluralism of Methods and Legal Theory
10(3)
IV The Four Parts of the Book
13(6)
PART I FOUNDATIONS
1 The Proper Scope of Behavioural Law and Economics
19(18)
Christoph Engel
I Epistemics and the Law
19(3)
II Behavioural Law and Economics
22(2)
III The Prisoner's Dilemma as a Tool for Legal Analysis
24(7)
IV The Proper Scope of Behavioural Law and Economics
31(6)
2 Rational Choice and its Limits for the Solution of Social and Legal Problems: Three Observations on Behavioural Law and Economics
37(18)
Simon Deakin
I Introduction
37(2)
II Models Should Be Realistic, but They Remain Models
39(5)
III The Rationality Axiom Should Be Regarded as Modified Rather than Refuted
44(6)
IV Behavioural Research Does Not Privilege `Libertarian Paternalism' over Alternative Policy Paradigms
50(3)
V Conclusion
53(2)
3 Game Theory and the Law: Incomplete Knowledge about the Knowledge of Other Players
55(18)
Marlies Ahlert
I Aims of the Argument
55(3)
II (Neo-)classical Non-cooperative Game Theory
58(2)
A Basic Assumptions Concerning `Rational' Preferences
58(1)
B Basic Assumptions Concerning Theories of Rationality in Equilibrium
59(1)
III Bounded Rationality in Non-cooperative Games
60(6)
A Perspective of the Behavioural Economist
61(3)
B Perspective of the Decision Maker
64(1)
C Perspective of the Advisor
65(1)
IV The Apple Qualcomm Dispute
66(3)
V Consequences
69(4)
PART II INDIVIDUAL CHOICE AND THE LAW
4 Most People Like Nudges--and Why that Matters
73(14)
Lucia A. Reisch
Cass R. Sunstein
Micha Kaiser
I Overview
73(3)
II Our Study
76(3)
III Results
79(6)
A Types of Nudges along Level of Intrusion and Country Cluster
79(4)
B Multilevel Regression
83(2)
IV Implications
85(2)
5 Regulating under Uncertainty about Rationality: From Decision Theory to Machine Learning and Complexity Theory
87(28)
Philipp Hacker
I Uncertainty and Regulation: The Case of Bounded Rationality
88(1)
II Knightean Uncertainty: Decision Theory
89(9)
A The Source of Uncertainty: Lack of Studies; Limited Internal and External Validity
89(1)
B Regulatory Implications: Decision Making under Uncertainty
90(1)
C Example: Price Discrimination
91(1)
1 Effects of price discrimination given rational actors
92(2)
2 Effects of price discrimination given boundedly rational actors
94(2)
3 Deciding on price discrimination law under uncertainty
96(2)
III Approximating Degrees of Rationality: Big Data Analytics
98(5)
A The Source of Approximation: Big Data and Machine Learning
99(1)
B Regulatory Implications
100(1)
1 Aggregate level: cost-benefit analysis and social welfare functions
100(1)
2 Individual level: personalised law
101(1)
C Example: Usurious Lending
102(1)
IV Unpredictable States of the World: Complexity Theory
103(8)
A The Source of Unpredictability: Complexity
104(1)
B Regulatory Implications: Accommodating and Reducing Uncertainty
105(2)
C Example: Smart Contracts and the Governance of Blockchains
107(4)
V The Normative Core of Uncertainty Approaches to the Law
111(1)
VI Conclusion: Cycles of Uncertainty and the Law
112(3)
6 Did You Say `Theories of Choice'? On the Limited and Variable Appetite for Theories in Consumer Law
115(24)
Anne-Lise Sibony
I Introduction: Reasons to Lower Ambitions
115(5)
II Legislation: Is There a Theory of Choice? The Example of EU Consumer Protection
120(9)
A EU Consumer Policy: Information-based Theory of Choicecanbe Sticky
121(4)
B Does the Legislator Need a Theory of Choice?
125(4)
III Legal Scholarship: The Space for Theories of Choice
129(5)
A Opening the Space for Theories of Choice
129(2)
B Shaping the Discussion of Theories of Choice: Deep and Narrow or Wide and Shallow?
131(3)
IV Conclusion
134(5)
PART III COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND THE LAW
7 Itinera Europea: Four Scenarios and Their Plausibility
139(16)
Adrienne Heritier
I Introduction
139(2)
II Scenario One: A European Federal State
141(3)
III Scenario Two: A Differentiated, Flexible Union
144(2)
IV Scenario Three: Covert Integration
146(2)
V Scenario Four: Disintegration/Dissolution
148(1)
VI Conclusion: `Fluctuat nec mergitur'
149(6)
8 The Social Welfare Function: A New Tool for Regulatory Policy Analysis
155(24)
Matthew D. Adler
I The SWF Framework
157(4)
II The SWF as a Tool for Regulatory Policy Analysis
161(4)
III SWF versus CBA
165(4)
IV A Simulation Model
169(8)
V Conclusion
177(2)
9 Collective Intelligence: Crowd Wisdom versus Herding
179(30)
Andreas Engert
I Introduction
179(3)
II Statistics of Collective Intelligence
182(8)
A Condorcet Jury Theorem
182(2)
B Individual Judgment as Basis
184(2)
C Statistical Determinants of Collective Intelligence
186(1)
1 Bias
186(1)
2 Variance
187(1)
D Are Groups Wiser Than Individuals?
188(2)
III Generation of Collective Intelligence
190(12)
A Surveying
190(3)
B Prediction Markets
193(1)
1 Design
193(2)
2 Limitations
195(3)
C Deliberation
198(1)
1 Information suppression (`herding')
199(2)
2 Information discovery
201(1)
IV Conclusion
202(7)
PART IV ORGANISATIONAL CHOICE AND THE LAW A. Firms
10 Decision Theory and Allocating Decision Making in the Firm
209(18)
Julian Velasco
I Delaware Corporate Law
211(11)
A Institutional Choice
211(3)
B Conflicts of Interest
214(2)
C Cost-Benefit Analysis
216(5)
D Conclusion
221(1)
II Beyond Delaware Corporate Law
222(3)
A Deciding on a Goal
222(1)
B Various Forms of Business Organisation
223(2)
C Benefit Corporations
225(1)
III Conclusion
225(2)
11 Institutional Investor Voting Behaviour: A Network Theory Perspective
227(38)
Luca Enriques
Alessandro Romano
I Introduction
228(4)
II Setting the Scene: Corporate Governance and Informed Voting
232(3)
III Explaining Voting by Institutional Investors: The Atomistic Approach
235(8)
IV How Connections Affect Institutional Investor Voting Dynamics
243(18)
A Inter-Institutional Connections
245(1)
B Formal Networks
246(1)
C Geographically Linked Networks
247(1)
D Employees' Personal Networks and Career Concerns
247(4)
E Intra-Clique Cooperation and Inter-Clique Competition: Co - Ownership Ties
251(4)
F Can Cooperation Emerge and Be Sustained?
255(1)
1 Formal networks
255(3)
2 Information sharing
258(3)
V Conclusion
261(4)
B Institutions, Networks, and Courts
12 Conflict of Interest and Decision Making
265(18)
Genevieve Helleringer
I Relevance of Decision Making to Analyse Conflicts of Interest
269(6)
A Impaired Judgment Making as a Key Feature of Conflict of Interest
269(1)
1 Denning COI: insights from analytical philosophy
269(3)
2 Further distinctions among conflicts of interest
272(1)
B Bounded Rationality and Conflicted Behaviours
273(1)
1 Rationalisation
274(1)
2 Invulnerability
274(1)
II Ethical Decision-Making in Conflict of Interest Situations
275(6)
A The Inadequacy of Existing Policies
275(1)
1 Standards of behaviour
275(1)
2 Procedural requirements
276(1)
B Building a Norm-Rich Decision-Making Culture
277(1)
1 The role of norms in decision-making
278(2)
2 Promoting ethical decision-making
280(1)
III Conclusion
281(2)
13 Decision Making in Chains and Networks of Contracts
283(26)
Stefan Grundtnann
I Phenotypes of Long-term/Network Organisational Contracts
284(4)
A Long-term Relationships and Network--A Variety of Arrangements and Core Characteristics
284(3)
B Social Sciences Explanations of Long-term/Network Organisational Contracts
287(1)
II Decision Theories Related to Long-term/Network Contracts
288(12)
A Introduction to Decision Theories for Organisational Contracts--A Pluralist Stance
288(4)
B Decision Making under Uncertainty
292(2)
C Informational Cascades, Wisdom of Collective Learning, or Apathy?
294(2)
D The Role of Game Theory--Including Repeated Games and Mutual Aspiration Theory
296(2)
E A House of Mutual Trust and Generous Reciprocity
298(2)
III Legal Implications of Decision Theories for Long-term/Network Organisational Contracts?
300(8)
A Disgorgement of Windfall Profits?
301(2)
B Protection of Common Value?
303(2)
C The Need of Direct Duties and Claims--namely, Information?
305(2)
D Caveats
307(1)
IV Conclusion
308(1)
14 The Power of Sequence: A Quantum Perspective on Legal Decision Making
309(18)
Christopher Brett Jaeger
Jennifer S. Trueblood
I What is Quantum Decision Making?
311(4)
II Why Use Quantum Probability Theory?
315(1)
III When Can Quantum Decision Making Most Usefully Inform Law?
316(2)
IV How Can Quantum Decision Making Inform Law? Examples with Juror Judgments
318(7)
V Conclusion
325(2)
Index 327
Dr. Stefan Grundmann, LL.M. (Berkeley), is a Professor of Transnational Law and Theory at the European University Institute (Florence) and Professor of Private and Business Law at Humboldt University Berlin. His major publications in several languages include overall treatises on European Company Law, European Contract Law, Banking and Capital Market Law, New Private Law Theory, and a host of articles in these areas, including transnational and interdisciplinary governance issues. He is editor-in-chief of the European Review of Contract Law, the Ius Communitatis series of textbooks, and president of the Society of European Contract Law (SECOLA), of the European Law School (Berlin/London/Paris/Rome/Amsterdam), and of the Theory section of the German Association of Comparative Law.



Dr. Philipp Hacker, LL.M. (Yale) is a Professor of Law and Ethics of the Digital Society at the European New School of Digital Studies, located at European University Viadrina, and a Research Fellow at the Centre for Law, Economics and Society and at the Centre for Blockchain Technologies, both at University College London. Previous positions included an AXA Postdoctoral Fellowship at Humboldt University Berlin, a Max Weber Fellowship at the European University Institute and an A.SK Fellowship at the WZB Berlin Social Science Center. His research focuses on behavioral law and economics as well as the interplay between emerging technologies and the law.