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E-raamat: Truth and Norms: Normative Alethic Pluralism and Evaluative Disagreements

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Truth and Norms: Normative Alethic Pluralism and Evaluative Disagreements engages three philosophical topics and the relationships among them. Filippo Ferrari first contributes to the debate on the nature and normative significance of disagreement, especially in relation to evaluative judgements such as judgements about basic taste, refined aesthetics, and moral matters. Second, he addresses the issue of epistemic normativity, focusing in particular on the normative function(s) that truth exerts on judgements. Third, he contributes to the debate on truthmore specifically, which account of the nature of truth best accommodates the norms relating judgements and truth. This book develops and defends a novel pluralistic picture of the normativity of truth: normative alethic pluralism (NAM). At the core of NAM is the idea that truth exerts different normative functions in relation to different areas of inquiry. Ferrari argues that this picture of the normativity of truth offers the best explanation of the variable normative significance that disagreement exhibits in relation to different subject mattersfrom a rather shallow normative impact in the case of disagreement about taste, to a normatively more substantive significance in relation to moral judgements. Last, Ferrari defends the view that NAM does not require a commitment to truth pluralism, since it is fully compatible with a somewhat refined version of minimalism about truth.
List of Captions
vii
Acknowledgements ix
Introduction xiii
1 Alethic Minimalism
1(22)
2 Truth and the Semantics of Evaluative Judgements
23(32)
3 Disagreement and its Normative Significance
55(22)
4 A Comparative Analysis of Disagreement in (some) Evaluative Domains
77(20)
5 Dimensions of the Normativity of Truth
97(28)
6 Pluralism, Minimalism, and mNAP
125(24)
7 Alethic Minimalism and Normative Extrinsicism
149(20)
Conclusions 169(4)
Bibliography 173(14)
Index 187(4)
About the Author 191
Filipo Ferrari is the principal investigator of the project Abductive Methodology in the Philosophy of Logic, funded by the STARS Grants programme of the University of Padua, and a research associate within the project Inductive Metaphysics funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft.