E-raamat: Unity through Particularism: How Electoral Reforms Influence Parties and Legislative Behavior

'Lucia Motolinia thinks through what motivates legislators, what motivates parties, and how these motivations map onto political behavior more thoroughly and systematically than any previous scholarship. Then, having shifted our expectations, she tests her ideas against hard evidence from Mexican politics. This is exemplary scholarship.' John M. Carey, Wentworth Professor in the Social Sciences, Dartmouth College 'In this masterful study Lucia Motolinia shows how, paradoxically, electoral reforms that give representatives an incentive to cultivate a personal vote can coexist with continued strong party unity.  With an abundance of data and a thoughtful research design this study has broad implications for our understanding of electoral politics in Mexico and beyond.' David Stasavage, Dean for the Social Sciences and Julius Silver Professor, New York University 'Investigating the real-world 'experiment' of the removal of the one-term limit in Mexico, and applying a range of advanced data analysis methods, Lucia Motolinia shows how re-election can incentivise politicians to deliver particularistic rather than policy goods. This is a foundational finding, as it challenges standard assumptions in political science. A must-read for scholars and democratic designers alike.' Simon Hix, Stein Rokkan Chair in Comparative Politics, European University Institute