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E-raamat: Vehicle Safety Communications: Protocols, Security, and Privacy

(Telcordia Technologies, USA),
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Owing to their safety applications, cooperative vehicle systems, which use sensors and wireless technologies to reduce traffic accidents, continue to be the focus of heavy research and development efforts around the world. Written by industry professionals, this book provides a systematic description of cooperative vehicle systems, discussing key technical issues in such systems, the latest advances in enabling technologies, and cutting-edge research trends. Coverage includes important technologies suchas 5.9 GHz Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC), on-board equipment (OBE), and roadside equipment (RSE)-- Provides an up-to-date, in-depth look at current crucial issues in the research community, automotive industry, and government agencies around the world-- Provides an up-to-date, in-depth look at the current research, design, and implementation of cooperative vehicle safety communication protocols and technologyImproving traffic safety has been a top concern for transportation agencies around the world and the focus of heavy research and development efforts sponsored by both governments and private industries. Cooperative vehicle systems which use sensors and wireless technologies to reduce traffic accidents can play a major role in making the worlds roads safer.Vehicle Safety Communications: Protocols, Security, and Privacy describes fundamental issues in cooperative vehicle safety and recent advances in technologies for enabling cooperative vehicle safety. It gives an overview of traditional vehicle safety issues, the evolution of vehicle safety technologies, and the need for cooperative systems where vehicles work together to reduce the number of crashes or mitigate damage when crashes become unavoidable.Authored by two top industry professionals, the book:Summarizes the history and current status of 5.9 GHz Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) technology and standardization, discussing key issues in applying DSRC to support cooperative vehicle safetyFeatures an in-depth overview of on-board equipment (OBE) and roadside equipment (RSE) by describing sample designs to illustrate the key issues and potential solutionsTakes on security and privacy protection requirements and challenges, including how to design privacy-preserving digital certificate management systems and how to evict misbehaving vehiclesIncludes coverage of vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communications like intersection collision avoidance applications and vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications like extended electronic brake lights and intersection movement assistVehicle Safety Communications is ideal for anyone working in the areas of or studying cooperative vehicle safety and vehicle communications.
Foreword xv
Ralf G. Herrtwich
Foreword xvii
Flavio Bonomi
Foreword xix
Adam Drobot
Preface xxi
Acknowledgments xxv
1 Traffic Safety
1(9)
1.1 Traffic Safety Facts
1(4)
1.1.1 Fatalities
2(1)
1.1.2 Leading Causes of Crashes
3(2)
1.1.3 Current Trends
5(1)
1.2 European Union
5(2)
1.3 Japan
7(1)
1.4 Developing Countries
7(3)
References
8(2)
2 Automotive Safety Evolution
10(10)
2.1 Passive Safety
10(2)
2.1.1 Safety Cage and the Birth of Passive Safety
10(1)
2.1.2 Seat Belts
11(1)
2.1.3 Air Bags
11(1)
2.2 Active Safety
12(2)
2.2.1 Antilock Braking System
12(1)
2.2.2 Electronic Stability Control
13(1)
2.2.3 Brake Assist
13(1)
2.3 Advanced Driver Assistance Systems
14(3)
2.3.1 Adaptive Cruise Control
15(1)
2.3.2 Blind Spot Assist
16(1)
2.3.3 Attention Assist
16(1)
2.3.4 Precrash Systems
16(1)
2.4 Cooperative Safety
17(3)
References
18(2)
3 Vehicle Architectures
20(12)
3.1 Electronic Control Units
20(1)
3.2 Vehicle Sensors
21(1)
3.2.1 Radars
21(1)
3.2.2 Cameras
21(1)
3.3 Onboard Communication Networks
22(3)
3.3.1 Controller Area Network
23(1)
3.3.2 Local Interconnect Network
23(1)
3.3.3 FlexRay
24(1)
3.3.4 Media Oriented Systems Transport
24(1)
3.3.5 Onboard Diagnostics
24(1)
3.4 Vehicle Data
25(1)
3.5 Vehicle Data Security
26(1)
3.6 Vehicle Positioning
27(5)
3.6.1 Global Positioning System
27(2)
3.6.2 Galileo
29(1)
3.6.3 Global Navigation Satellite System
29(1)
3.6.4 Positioning Accuracy
30(1)
References
30(2)
4 Connected Vehicles
32(12)
4.1 Connected Vehicle Applications
32(2)
4.1.1 Hard Safety Applications
32(1)
4.1.2 Soft Safety Applications
33(1)
4.1.3 Mobility and Convenience Applications
33(1)
4.2 Uniqueness in Consumer Vehicle Networks
34(2)
4.3 Vehicle Communication Modes
36(3)
4.3.1 Vehicle-to-Vehicle Local Broadcast
36(1)
4.3.2 V2V Multihop Message Dissemination
37(1)
4.3.3 Infrastructure-to-Vehicle Local Broadcast
38(1)
4.3.4 Vehicle-to-Infrastructure Bidirectional Communications
39(1)
4.4 Wireless Communications Technology for Vehicles
39(5)
References
42(2)
5 Dedicated Short-Range Communications
44(8)
5.1 The 5.9 GHz Spectrum
44(2)
5.1.1 DSRC Frequency Band Usage
45(1)
5.1.2 DSRC Channels
45(1)
5.1.3 DSRC Operations
46(1)
5.2 DSRC in the European Union
46(1)
5.3 DSRC in Japan
47(1)
5.4 DSRC Standards
48(4)
5.4.1 Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments
48(1)
5.4.2 Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments Protocol Stack
48(2)
5.4.3 International Harmonization
50(1)
References
50(2)
6 WAVE Physical Layer
52(12)
6.1 Physical Layer Operations
52(3)
6.1.1 Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing
52(1)
6.1.2 Modulation and Coding Rates
53(1)
6.1.3 Frame Reception
54(1)
6.2 PHY Amendments
55(2)
6.2.1 Channel Width
56(1)
6.2.2 Spectrum Masks
56(1)
6.2.3 Improved Receiver Performance
57(1)
6.3 PHY Layer Modeling
57(7)
6.3.1 Network Simulator Architecture
58(1)
6.3.2 RF Model
59(2)
6.3.3 Wireless PHY
61(1)
References
62(2)
7 WAVE Media Access Control Layer
64(11)
7.1 Media Access Control Layer Operations
64(2)
7.1.1 Carrier Sensing Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance
64(1)
7.1.2 Hidden Terminal Effects
65(1)
7.1.3 Basic Service Set
66(1)
7.2 MAC Layer Amendments
66(1)
7.3 MAC Layer Modeling
67(5)
7.3.1 Transmission
68(1)
7.3.2 Reception
68(1)
7.3.3 Channel State Manager
68(1)
7.3.4 Back-Off Manager
69(1)
7.3.5 Transmission Coordination
70(1)
7.3.6 Reception Coordination
71(1)
7.4 Overhauled ns-2 Implementation
72(3)
References
74(1)
8 DSRC Data Rates
75(18)
8.1 Introduction
75(1)
8.2 Communication Density
76(9)
8.2.1 Simulation Study
77(1)
8.2.2 Broadcast Reception Rates
78(3)
8.2.3 Channel Access Delay
81(2)
8.2.4 Frames Reception Failures
83(2)
8.3 Optimal Data Rate
85(8)
8.3.1 Modulation and Coding Rates
85(1)
8.3.2 Simulation Study
86(1)
8.3.3 Simulation Matrix
87(1)
8.3.4 Simulation Results
88(3)
References
91(2)
9 WAVE Upper Layers
93(13)
9.1 Introduction
93(1)
9.2 DSRC Multichannel Operations
94(3)
9.2.1 Time Synchronization
94(1)
9.2.2 Synchronization Intervals
95(1)
9.2.3 Guard Intervals
96(1)
9.2.4 Channel Switching
96(1)
9.2.5 Channel Switching State Machine
96(1)
9.3 Protocol Evaluation
97(6)
9.3.1 Simulation Study
98(1)
9.3.2 Simulation Scenarios
99(1)
9.3.3 Simulation Results
99(3)
9.3.4 Protocol Enhancements
102(1)
9.4 WAVE Short Message Protocol
103(3)
References
104(2)
10 Vehicle-to-infrastructure Safety Applications
106(20)
10.1 Intersection Crashes
106(1)
10.2 Cooperative Intersection Collision Avoidance System for Violations
107(11)
10.2.1 CICAS-V Design
107(3)
10.2.2 CICAS-V Development
110(6)
10.2.3 CICAS-V Testing
116(2)
10.3 Integrated Safety Demonstration
118(8)
10.3.1 Demonstration Concept
118(2)
10.3.2 Hardware Components
120(1)
10.3.3 Demo Design
121(3)
References
124(2)
11 Vehicle-to-Vehicle Safety Applications
126(15)
11.1 Cooperation among Vehicles
126(1)
11.2 V2V Safety Applications
127(1)
11.3 V2V Safety Applications Design
128(7)
11.3.1 Basic Safety Messages
129(1)
11.3.2 Minimum Performance Requirements
129(2)
11.3.3 Target Classification
131(1)
11.3.4 Vehicle Representation
132(1)
11.3.5 Sample Applications
133(2)
11.4 System Implementation
135(3)
11.4.1 Onboard Unit Hardware Components
135(1)
11.4.2 OBU Software Architecture
135(2)
11.4.3 Driver-Vehicle Interface
137(1)
11.5 System Testing
138(3)
11.5.1 Communications Coverage and Antenna Considerations
138(1)
11.5.2 Positioning
139(1)
References
140(1)
12 DSRC Scalability
141(10)
12.1 Introduction
141(1)
12.2 DSRC Data Traffic
142(3)
12.2.1 DSRC Safety Messages
142(1)
12.2.2 Transmission Parameters
143(1)
12.2.3 Channel Load Assessment
144(1)
12.3 Congestion Control Algorithms
145(3)
12.3.1 Desired Properties
145(1)
12.3.2 Transmission Power Adjustment
146(1)
12.3.3 Message Rate Adjustment
147(1)
12.3.4 Simulation Study
148(1)
12.4 Conclusions
148(3)
References
149(2)
13 Security and Privacy Threats and Requirements
151(16)
13.1 Introduction
151(1)
13.2 Adversaries
151(1)
13.3 Security Threats
152(3)
13.3.1 Send False Safety Messages Using Valid Security Credentials
152(1)
13.3.2 Falsely Accuse Innocent Vehicles
153(1)
13.3.3 Impersonate Vehicles or Other Network Entities
153(1)
13.3.4 Denial-of-Service Attacks Specific to Consumer Vehicle Networks
154(1)
13.3.5 Compromise OBU Software or Firmware
155(1)
13.4 Privacy Threats
155(4)
13.4.1 Privacy in a Vehicle Network
155(1)
13.4.2 Privacy Threats in Consumer Vehicle Networks
156(2)
13.4.3 How Driver Privacy can be Breached Today
158(1)
13.5 Basic Security Capabilities
159(2)
13.5.1 Authentication
159(1)
13.5.2 Misbehavior Detection and Revocation
160(1)
13.5.3 Data Integrity
160(1)
13.5.4 Data Confidentiality
160(1)
13.6 Privacy Protections Capabilities
161(1)
13.7 Design and Performance Considerations
161(6)
13.7.1 Scalability
162(1)
13.7.2 Balancing Competing Requirements
162(1)
13.7.3 Minimal Side Effects
163(1)
13.7.4 Quantifiable Levels of Security and Privacy
163(1)
13.7.5 Adaptability
163(1)
13.7.6 Security and Privacy Protection for V2V Broadcast
163(1)
13.7.7 Security and Privacy Protection for Communications with Security Servers
164(1)
References
165(2)
14 Cryptographic Mechanisms
167(42)
14.1 Introduction
167(1)
14.2 Categories of Cryptographic Mechanisms
167(5)
14.2.1 Cryptographic Hash Functions
168(1)
14.2.2 Symmetric Key Algorithms
169(1)
14.2.3 Public Key (Asymmetric Key) Algorithms
170(2)
14.3 Digital Signature Algorithms
172(24)
14.3.1 The RSA Algorithm
172(6)
14.3.2 The DSA Algorithm
178(6)
14.3.3 The ECDSA Algorithm
184(10)
14.3.4 ECDSA for Vehicle Safety Communications
194(2)
14.4 Message Authentication and Message Integrity Verification
196(4)
14.4.1 Authentication and Integrity Verification Using Hash Functions
197(1)
14.4.2 Authentication and Integrity Verification Using Digital Signatures
198(2)
14.5 Diffie-Hellman Key Establishment Protocol
200(2)
14.5.1 The Original Diffie-Hellman Key Establishment Protocol
200(1)
14.5.2 Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Key Establishment Protocol
201(1)
14.6 Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES)
202(7)
14.6.1 The Basic Idea
202(1)
14.6.2 Scheme Setup
202(1)
14.6.3 Encrypt a Message
202(2)
14.6.4 Decrypt a Message
204(1)
14.6.5 Performance
204(2)
References
206(3)
15 Public Key Infrastructure for Vehicle Networks
209(28)
15.1 Introduction
209(1)
15.2 Public Key Certificates
210(1)
15.3 Message Authentication with Certificates
211(1)
15.4 Certificate Revocation List
212(1)
15.5 A Baseline Reference Vehicular PKI Model
213(2)
15.6 Configure Initial Security Parameters and Assign Initial Certificates
215(2)
15.6.1 Vehicles Create Their Private and Public Keys
216(1)
15.6.2 Certificate Authority Creates Private and Public Keys for Vehicles
217(1)
15.7 Acquire New Keys and Certificates
217(3)
15.8 Distribute Certificates to Vehicles for Signature Verifications
220(2)
15.9 Detect Misused Certificates and Misbehaving Vehicles
222(4)
15.9.1 Local Misbehavior Detection
223(1)
15.9.2 Global Misbehavior Detection
224(1)
15.9.3 Misbehavior Reporting
224(2)
15.10 Ways for Vehicles to Acquire CRLs
226(2)
15.11 How Often CRLs should be Distributed to Vehicles?
228(2)
15.12 PKI Hierarchy
230(3)
15.12.1 Certificate Chaining to Enable Hierarchical CAs
231(1)
15.12.2 Hierarchical CA Architecture Example
231(2)
15.13 Privacy-Preserving Vehicular PKI
233(4)
15.13.1 Quantitative Measurements of Vehicle Anonymity
234(1)
15.13.2 Quantitative Measurement of Message Unlinkability
234(1)
References
235(2)
16 Privacy Protection with Shared Certificates
237(23)
16.1 Shared Certificates
237(1)
16.2 The Combinatorial Certificate Scheme
237(2)
16.3 Certificate Revocation Collateral Damage
239(3)
16.4 Certified Intervals
242(2)
16.4.1 The Concept of Certified Interval
242(1)
16.4.2 Certified Interval Produced by the Original Combinatorial Certificate Scheme
242(2)
16.5 Reduce Collateral Damage and Improve Certified Interval
244(9)
16.5.1 Reduce Collateral Damage Caused by a Single Misused Certificate
245(3)
16.5.2 Vehicles Become Statistically Distinguishable When Misusing Multiple Certificates
248(2)
16.5.3 The Dynamic Reward Algorithm
250(3)
16.6 Privacy in Low Vehicle Density Areas
253(7)
16.6.1 The Problem
253(3)
16.6.2 The Blend-In Algorithm to Improve Privacy
256(3)
References
259(1)
17 Privacy Protection with Short-Lived Unique Certificates
260(14)
17.1 Short-Lived Unique Certificates
260(1)
17.2 The Basic Short-Lived Certificate Scheme
261(2)
17.3 The Problem of Large CRL
263(1)
17.4 Anonymously Linked Certificates to Reduce CRL Size
264(4)
17.4.1 Certificate Tags
264(1)
17.4.2 CRL Processing by Vehicles
265(2)
17.4.3 Backward Unlinkability
267(1)
17.5 Reduce CRL Search Time
268(1)
17.6 Unlinked Short-Lived Certificates
269(1)
17.7 Reduce the Volume of Certificate Request and Response Messages
270(1)
17.8 Determine the Number of Certificates for Each Vehicle
270(4)
References
273(1)
18 Privacy Protection with Group Signatures
274(21)
18.1 Group Signatures
274(1)
18.2 Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge
275(2)
18.3 The ACJT Group Signature Scheme and its Extensions
277(9)
18.3.1 The ACJT Group Signature Scheme
277(5)
18.3.2 The Challenge of Group Membership Revocation
282(1)
18.3.3 ACJT Extensions to Support Membership Revocation
283(3)
18.4 The CG Group Signature Scheme with Revocation
286(2)
18.5 The Short Group Signatures Scheme
288(4)
18.5.1 The Short Group Signatures Scheme
288(3)
18.5.2 Membership Revocation
291(1)
18.6 Group Signature Schemes with Verifier-Local Revocation
292(3)
References
293(2)
19 Privacy Protection against Certificate Authorities
295(20)
19.1 Introduction
295(1)
19.2 Basic Idea
295(2)
19.3 Baseline Split CA Architecture, Protocol, and Message Processing
297(4)
19.4 Split CA Architecture for Shared Certificates
301(1)
19.5 Split CA Architecture for Unlinked Short-Lived Certificates
302(6)
19.5.1 Acquire One Unlinked Certificate at a Time
302(2)
19.5.2 Assign Batches of Unlinked Short-Lived Certificates
304(2)
19.5.3 Revoke Batches of Unlinked Certificates
306(1)
19.5.4 Request for Decryption Keys for Certificate Batches
307(1)
19.6 Split CA Architecture for Anonymously Linked Short-Lived Certificates
308(7)
19.6.1 Assign One Anonymously Linked Short-Lived Certificate at a Time
308(3)
19.6.2 Assign Batches of Anonymously Linked Short-Lived Certificates
311(1)
19.6.3 Revoke Batches of Anonymously Linked Short-Lived Certificates
312(1)
19.6.4 Request for Decryption Keys for Certificate Batches
313(1)
References
314(1)
20 Comparison of Privacy-Preserving Certificate Management Schemes
315(8)
20.1 Introduction
315(1)
20.2 Comparison of Main Characteristics
316(4)
20.3 Misbehavior Detection
320(1)
20.4 Abilities to Prevent Privacy Abuse by CA and MDS Operators
321(1)
20.5 Summary
322(1)
21 IEEE 1609.2 Security Services
323(24)
21.1 Introduction
323(1)
21.2 The IEEE 1609.2 Standard
323(2)
21.3 Certificates and Certificate Authority Hierarchy
325(2)
21.4 Formats for Public Key, Signature, Certificate, and CRL
327(6)
21.4.1 Public Key Formats
327(1)
21.4.2 Signature Formats
328(1)
21.4.3 Certificate Format
329(3)
21.4.4 CRL Format
332(1)
21.5 Message Formats and Processing for Generating Encrypted Messages
333(2)
21.6 Sending Messages
335(1)
21.7 Request Certificates from the CA
336(7)
21.8 Request and Processing CRL
343(1)
21.9 What the Current IEEE 1609.2 Standard Does Not Cover
344(3)
21.9.1 No Support for Anonymous Message Authentication
344(1)
21.9.2 Separate Vehicle-CA Communication Protocols Are Required
344(2)
21.9.3 Interactions and Interfaces between CA Entities Not Addressed
346(1)
References
346(1)
22 4G for Vehicle Safety Communications
347(11)
22.1 Introduction
347(1)
22.2 Long-Term Revolution (LTE)
347(6)
22.3 LTE for Vehicle Safety Communications
353(5)
22.3.1 Issues to Be Addressed
353(1)
22.3.2 LTE for V2I Safety Communications
353(3)
22.3.3 LTE for V2V Safety Communications
356(1)
22.3.4 LTE Broadcast and Multicast Services
357(1)
References 358(2)
Glossary 360(7)
Index 367
LUCA DELGROSSI, PhD, is Director of Driver Assistance and Chassis Systems U.S. at Mercedes-Benz Research & Development North America, Inc., Chairman of the Board of Directors at the VII Consortium, and coeditor of the IEEE Communications Magazine Automotive Networking Series.

TAO ZHANG, PhD, is Chief Scientist for Smart Connected Vehicles at Cisco Systems. He is a Fellow of the IEEE and the coauthor of IP-Based Next-Generation Wireless Networks.