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E-raamat: Collusion, Local Governments and Development in China: A Reflection on the China Model

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  • Ilmumisaeg: 22-Aug-2017
  • Kirjastus: Springer Verlag, Singapore
  • Keel: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9789811050596
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  • Formaat: PDF+DRM
  • Ilmumisaeg: 22-Aug-2017
  • Kirjastus: Springer Verlag, Singapore
  • Keel: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9789811050596

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By analyzing the interactions between China’s central government and its local governments and enterprises, this book constructs an analytical framework of government-enterprise collusion, analyzing the impact of collusion within the China model on Chinese society. Against the background of decentralization and under information asymmetry, this text argues that Chinese local governments connive at enterprises’ adoption of a low-cost ‘bad’ mode of production — a ‘stimulus’ for quick growth at the cost of safer working conditions — so as to obtain fiscal or political capital for further promotion. Through an examination of coalmine mortality rate, environmental pollution, food safety and house pricing, the book argues that collusion is the intrinsic drive of the China model. It consider how against a backdrop of political centralization and economic decentralization, collusion exacerbates corruption and impacts both on the country’s social development and on its foreign direct investment. Offering an analysis of future prospects for the China model, it puts forward key policy proposals to improve domestic institutional construction through reform.
Part I An Anatomy of the China Model from the Perspective of Collusion
1 Introduction
3(20)
1.1 The China Model
3(5)
1.2 Cost of Economic Growth
8(2)
1.3 Main Arguments
10(6)
1.4 Key Concepts
16(3)
1.5 The Structure of This Book
19(4)
Notes
20(2)
References
22(1)
2 Government-Firm Collusion: A New Analytical Framework
23(32)
2.1 Three PX Projects
23(3)
2.1.1 Dalian XP Project: Relocation and Expansion
24(1)
2.1.2 Xiamen's PX Project: Relocation
25(1)
2.1.3 Ningbo's PX Project: Abortion
26(1)
2.2 The China Model Driven by Government-Firm Collusion
26(4)
2.3 Government-Firm Collusion Model
30(4)
2.3.1 Game Players
30(1)
2.3.2 Information Structure
31(1)
2.3.3 Utility Function
32(1)
2.3.4 Time Line
33(1)
2.4 The Optimal Equilibrium Collusion and Collusion-Proof Contract
34(8)
2.4.1 Equilibrium Collusion
34(1)
2.4.2 Collusion-Proof Contract
35(4)
2.4.3 Allowing Collusion Versus Deterring Collusion
39(1)
2.4.4 The Role of Compensation
40(2)
2.5 A Case Study
42(2)
2.6 Extended Discussions
44(2)
2.6.1 The Local Government's Lack of Long-Term Expectation
44(1)
2.6.2 Imposition of Exorbitant Taxation on the Firm
44(1)
2.6.3 Ineffectiveness of Supervision of the Mass Media
45(1)
2.6.4 Lack of Credibility of Punishment
45(1)
2.7 Summary
46(9)
Notes
47(3)
References
50(5)
3 Collusion and Coalmine Accidents
55(22)
3.1 High Frequency of Coalmine Accidents
55(4)
3.2 The Evolution of China's Coalmine Safety Supervision System
59(1)
3.3 Testing Approaches to Government-Firm Collusion
60(3)
3.4 Results of Econometric Analysis
63(6)
3.4.1 Sources of Data
63(1)
3.4.2 Data Description
64(1)
3.4.3 Main Results
65(4)
3.5 Robustness Test
69(3)
3.5.1 More Control Variables
69(2)
3.5.2 A More Rigorous Test
71(1)
3.6 Summary
72(5)
Notes
72(2)
References
74(3)
4 Collusion and House Prices
77(30)
4.1 An Overview of Exorbitant House Prices in China
77(4)
4.2 Three Different Views About Exorbitant HousePrices
81(3)
4.3 The Institutional Background of Housing Market Control
84(3)
4.3.1 Fiscal Decentralization Between the Central Government and Local Governments
84(1)
4.3.2 Housing and Land Reform
85(2)
4.4 High House Prices Driven up by Collusion
87(7)
4.5 Results of Econometric Tests
94(7)
4.5.1 Model Specification
94(2)
4.5.2 Data Description
96(1)
4.5.3 An Analysis of Regression Results of Housing Variables
96(3)
4.5.4 Robustness Test
99(2)
4.6 Summary
101(6)
Notes
101(2)
References
103(4)
5 Pollution, Illegal Land Use, and Other Major Social Problems
107(18)
5.1 Environment Pollution
107(3)
5.1.1 An Overview of Pollution in China
107(2)
5.1.2 Collusion and Pollution
109(1)
5.2 Illegal Use of Land
110(3)
5.3 Local Negative Externalities
113(2)
5.4 Smuggling
115(2)
5.5 Food Safety
117(1)
5.6 Other Major Problems
118(1)
5.7 Summary
119(6)
Notes
120(1)
References
121(4)
Part II The Impact of Collusion and Institutional Environment
6 The Impact of Collusion on Corporate Behaviors and Political Performance Assessment
125(30)
6.1 Collusion Hindering Technological Innovation
126(10)
6.1.1 The Facts of Technological Innovation in Chinese Enterprises
126(1)
6.1.2 Collusion Hindering Innovative Motivation
126(6)
6.1.3 Collusion and Corporate Development and Research: An Empirical Analysis
132(4)
6.2 Collusion Distorting Total Factor Productivity
136(6)
6.2.1 Collusion and Productivity: A Theoretical Analysis
136(2)
6.2.2 Collusion and Productivity: Evidence
138(4)
6.3 Collusion and Enterprises' FDI
142(5)
6.3.1 An Overview China's FDI Trend
142(2)
6.3.2 Obstruction of Overseas Acquisition and Merger
144(1)
6.3.3 Double-Edged Sword Effect of Collusion
145(2)
6.4 Summary
147(8)
Notes
148(2)
References
150(5)
7 The Impact of Collusion on Government Behaviors
155(12)
7.1 The Relationship Between Collusion and Corruption
155(4)
7.1.1 Collusion and Corruption: A Theoretical Analysis
155(3)
7.1.2 Collusion and Corruption: An Empirical Analysis
158(1)
7.2 Collusion Aggravating Government Soft Budget Constraints
159(4)
7.2.1 Soft Budget Constraints
159(2)
7.2.2 A Case Study: A Tragedy of Photovoltaic Industry
161(2)
7.3 Summary
163(4)
Notes
164(1)
References
165(2)
8 The Impact of Collusion on Social Development
167(22)
8.1 Harm to Supervision by Public Opinion
167(8)
8.1.1 Supervision by Public Opinion and Collusion: Theory and Evidence
167(4)
8.1.2 Collusion Obstructing Supervision by Public Opinion
171(4)
8.2 Collusion and Income Distribution
175(4)
8.2.1 Collusion Affecting Channels of Income Distribution Gap
175(2)
8.2.2 Collusion, Extensive Mode of Growth and Labor Income Shares (LIS)
177(2)
8.3 Collusion Hindering the Development of Social Organizations
179(3)
8.3.1 The Value of Non-governmental Organization
179(1)
8.3.2 Collusion: A Hindrance to Nongovernmental Organizations
180(2)
8.4 Collusion Increasing Cost of Reform
182(3)
8.4.1 Reasons for Early Reforms
182(1)
8.4.2 Obstructions of Further Reforms
183(2)
8.5 Summary
185(4)
Notes
185(2)
References
187(2)
9 Institutional Environment of Collusion
189(14)
9.1 Centralization, Decentralization and Collusion
189(6)
9.1.1 Different Combinations of Political and Economic Systems
189(2)
9.1.2 Political Centralization: An Inevitable Contributor to Collusion
191(4)
9.2 Cyclical Collusion
195(3)
9.3 Policy Traps and Discretionary Power
198(1)
9.4 Regional Competition and Collusion
199(1)
9.5 Summary
200(3)
Notes
201(1)
References
202(1)
10 Reform Prospects of the China Model
203(26)
10.1 Demographic Dividend, Extensive Mode of Growth and Collusion
203(14)
10.1.1 The China Model: Polyhedral Equilibrium
204(3)
10.1.2 Unsustainability of Extensive Growth Model Driven by Demographic Dividend
207(3)
10.1.3 A Theoretical Analysis: Transaction Cost Neutralizing Demographic Dividend
210(3)
10.1.4 Way Out: Improving Institutional Quality Through Reforms
213(4)
10.2 Out of Whipping Top Equilibrium: From Collusion to Cooperation
217(6)
10.2.1 Trap of Whipping Top Equilibrium
217(3)
10.2.2 From Collusion to Cooperation
220(3)
10.3 Drawbacks of This Book and Future Research Topics
223(6)
Notes
226(1)
References
227(2)
Appendices 229(12)
Further Reading 241(4)
Index 245
Dr Huihua Nie is a Professor at Renmin University, China and a postdoctoral fellow of Oliver Hart at Harvard University. His major research provinces are contract theory and institutional economics. He has contributed to China Social Sciences, the Review of Economics & Statistics and the Journal of Comparative Economics. Dr Haifeng Li is an Associate Professor at the Sichuan International Studies University, China and was a visiting fellow of Language Teaching Program as a second language at Edinburgh University, UK. He has contributed to the Chinese Translators Journal and Foreign Languages and Literature and written two translation textbooks. 

Ping Chen is a Lecturer at College of Foreign Languages of Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications, China.