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Part I An Anatomy of the China Model from the Perspective of Collusion |
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3 | (20) |
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3 | (5) |
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1.2 Cost of Economic Growth |
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8 | (2) |
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10 | (6) |
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16 | (3) |
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1.5 The Structure of This Book |
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19 | (4) |
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20 | (2) |
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22 | (1) |
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2 Government-Firm Collusion: A New Analytical Framework |
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23 | (32) |
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23 | (3) |
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2.1.1 Dalian XP Project: Relocation and Expansion |
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24 | (1) |
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2.1.2 Xiamen's PX Project: Relocation |
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25 | (1) |
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2.1.3 Ningbo's PX Project: Abortion |
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26 | (1) |
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2.2 The China Model Driven by Government-Firm Collusion |
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26 | (4) |
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2.3 Government-Firm Collusion Model |
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30 | (4) |
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30 | (1) |
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2.3.2 Information Structure |
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31 | (1) |
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32 | (1) |
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33 | (1) |
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2.4 The Optimal Equilibrium Collusion and Collusion-Proof Contract |
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34 | (8) |
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2.4.1 Equilibrium Collusion |
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34 | (1) |
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2.4.2 Collusion-Proof Contract |
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35 | (4) |
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2.4.3 Allowing Collusion Versus Deterring Collusion |
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39 | (1) |
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2.4.4 The Role of Compensation |
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40 | (2) |
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42 | (2) |
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44 | (2) |
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2.6.1 The Local Government's Lack of Long-Term Expectation |
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44 | (1) |
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2.6.2 Imposition of Exorbitant Taxation on the Firm |
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44 | (1) |
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2.6.3 Ineffectiveness of Supervision of the Mass Media |
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45 | (1) |
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2.6.4 Lack of Credibility of Punishment |
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45 | (1) |
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46 | (9) |
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47 | (3) |
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50 | (5) |
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3 Collusion and Coalmine Accidents |
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55 | (22) |
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3.1 High Frequency of Coalmine Accidents |
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55 | (4) |
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3.2 The Evolution of China's Coalmine Safety Supervision System |
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59 | (1) |
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3.3 Testing Approaches to Government-Firm Collusion |
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60 | (3) |
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3.4 Results of Econometric Analysis |
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63 | (6) |
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63 | (1) |
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64 | (1) |
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65 | (4) |
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69 | (3) |
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3.5.1 More Control Variables |
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69 | (2) |
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3.5.2 A More Rigorous Test |
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71 | (1) |
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72 | (5) |
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72 | (2) |
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74 | (3) |
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4 Collusion and House Prices |
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77 | (30) |
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4.1 An Overview of Exorbitant House Prices in China |
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77 | (4) |
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4.2 Three Different Views About Exorbitant HousePrices |
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81 | (3) |
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4.3 The Institutional Background of Housing Market Control |
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84 | (3) |
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4.3.1 Fiscal Decentralization Between the Central Government and Local Governments |
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84 | (1) |
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4.3.2 Housing and Land Reform |
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85 | (2) |
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4.4 High House Prices Driven up by Collusion |
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87 | (7) |
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4.5 Results of Econometric Tests |
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94 | (7) |
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4.5.1 Model Specification |
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94 | (2) |
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96 | (1) |
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4.5.3 An Analysis of Regression Results of Housing Variables |
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96 | (3) |
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99 | (2) |
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101 | (6) |
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101 | (2) |
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103 | (4) |
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5 Pollution, Illegal Land Use, and Other Major Social Problems |
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107 | (18) |
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5.1 Environment Pollution |
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107 | (3) |
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5.1.1 An Overview of Pollution in China |
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107 | (2) |
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5.1.2 Collusion and Pollution |
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109 | (1) |
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110 | (3) |
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5.3 Local Negative Externalities |
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113 | (2) |
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115 | (2) |
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117 | (1) |
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118 | (1) |
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119 | (6) |
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120 | (1) |
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121 | (4) |
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Part II The Impact of Collusion and Institutional Environment |
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6 The Impact of Collusion on Corporate Behaviors and Political Performance Assessment |
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125 | (30) |
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6.1 Collusion Hindering Technological Innovation |
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126 | (10) |
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6.1.1 The Facts of Technological Innovation in Chinese Enterprises |
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126 | (1) |
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6.1.2 Collusion Hindering Innovative Motivation |
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126 | (6) |
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6.1.3 Collusion and Corporate Development and Research: An Empirical Analysis |
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132 | (4) |
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6.2 Collusion Distorting Total Factor Productivity |
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136 | (6) |
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6.2.1 Collusion and Productivity: A Theoretical Analysis |
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136 | (2) |
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6.2.2 Collusion and Productivity: Evidence |
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138 | (4) |
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6.3 Collusion and Enterprises' FDI |
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142 | (5) |
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6.3.1 An Overview China's FDI Trend |
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142 | (2) |
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6.3.2 Obstruction of Overseas Acquisition and Merger |
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144 | (1) |
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6.3.3 Double-Edged Sword Effect of Collusion |
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145 | (2) |
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147 | (8) |
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148 | (2) |
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150 | (5) |
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7 The Impact of Collusion on Government Behaviors |
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155 | (12) |
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7.1 The Relationship Between Collusion and Corruption |
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155 | (4) |
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7.1.1 Collusion and Corruption: A Theoretical Analysis |
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155 | (3) |
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7.1.2 Collusion and Corruption: An Empirical Analysis |
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158 | (1) |
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7.2 Collusion Aggravating Government Soft Budget Constraints |
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159 | (4) |
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7.2.1 Soft Budget Constraints |
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159 | (2) |
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7.2.2 A Case Study: A Tragedy of Photovoltaic Industry |
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161 | (2) |
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163 | (4) |
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164 | (1) |
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165 | (2) |
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8 The Impact of Collusion on Social Development |
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167 | (22) |
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8.1 Harm to Supervision by Public Opinion |
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167 | (8) |
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8.1.1 Supervision by Public Opinion and Collusion: Theory and Evidence |
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167 | (4) |
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8.1.2 Collusion Obstructing Supervision by Public Opinion |
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171 | (4) |
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8.2 Collusion and Income Distribution |
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175 | (4) |
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8.2.1 Collusion Affecting Channels of Income Distribution Gap |
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175 | (2) |
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8.2.2 Collusion, Extensive Mode of Growth and Labor Income Shares (LIS) |
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177 | (2) |
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8.3 Collusion Hindering the Development of Social Organizations |
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179 | (3) |
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8.3.1 The Value of Non-governmental Organization |
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179 | (1) |
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8.3.2 Collusion: A Hindrance to Nongovernmental Organizations |
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180 | (2) |
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8.4 Collusion Increasing Cost of Reform |
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182 | (3) |
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8.4.1 Reasons for Early Reforms |
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182 | (1) |
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8.4.2 Obstructions of Further Reforms |
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183 | (2) |
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185 | (4) |
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185 | (2) |
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187 | (2) |
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9 Institutional Environment of Collusion |
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189 | (14) |
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9.1 Centralization, Decentralization and Collusion |
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189 | (6) |
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9.1.1 Different Combinations of Political and Economic Systems |
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189 | (2) |
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9.1.2 Political Centralization: An Inevitable Contributor to Collusion |
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191 | (4) |
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195 | (3) |
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9.3 Policy Traps and Discretionary Power |
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198 | (1) |
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9.4 Regional Competition and Collusion |
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199 | (1) |
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200 | (3) |
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201 | (1) |
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202 | (1) |
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10 Reform Prospects of the China Model |
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203 | (26) |
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10.1 Demographic Dividend, Extensive Mode of Growth and Collusion |
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203 | (14) |
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10.1.1 The China Model: Polyhedral Equilibrium |
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204 | (3) |
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10.1.2 Unsustainability of Extensive Growth Model Driven by Demographic Dividend |
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207 | (3) |
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10.1.3 A Theoretical Analysis: Transaction Cost Neutralizing Demographic Dividend |
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210 | (3) |
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10.1.4 Way Out: Improving Institutional Quality Through Reforms |
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213 | (4) |
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10.2 Out of Whipping Top Equilibrium: From Collusion to Cooperation |
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217 | (6) |
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10.2.1 Trap of Whipping Top Equilibrium |
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217 | (3) |
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10.2.2 From Collusion to Cooperation |
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220 | (3) |
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10.3 Drawbacks of This Book and Future Research Topics |
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223 | (6) |
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226 | (1) |
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227 | (2) |
Appendices |
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229 | (12) |
Further Reading |
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241 | (4) |
Index |
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245 | |