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Do we really know the things we think we know? Are any of our beliefs reasonable? Scepticism gives a pessimistic reply to these important epistemological questions - we don't know anything; none of our beliefs are reasonable. But can such a seemingly paradoxical claim be more than an intellectual curiousity? And if it is, can it be refuted? Ruth Weintraub answers yes to both these questions.
The sceptical challenge is a formidable one, and should be confronted, not dismissed. The theoretical and practical difficulties it presents - in that the sceptical life cannot be lived, and the doctrine seems self-defeating - are in fact superficial, according to Ruth Weintraub. Her study looks at the sceptical arguments of Descartes, Hume and the ancient Greek sceptic, Sextus Empiricus. The author argues that by drawing on philosophy, rather than science, the sceptical challenge can be answered.
The Sceptical Challenge is a bold and original response to scepticism; it represents a new way of looking at the field for philosophers of epistemology.
Acknowledgements x(1)
Abbreviations xi(2)
Introduction xiii
1 KNOWLEDGE, JUSTIFICATION AND TRUTH
1(17)
Introduction
1(1)
The concept of epistemic justification
1(3)
The circle of belief
4(1)
Why does justification matter?
5(4)
Knowledge without justification
9(2)
Knowledge:beyond truth and justification
11(2)
Does knowledge-scepticism matter?
13(3)
Conclusion
16(2)
2 THE SCEPTICAL LIFE
18(13)
Radical scepticism
18(2)
The agnostic life
20(2)
Is it possible to suspend belief?
22(1)
The logical defence of agnosticism
23(3)
The ethical defence of agnosticism
26(1)
The implementation of the sceptical doctrine
27(2)
The sceptical doctrine and the practical difficulties
29(2)
3 THE CHALLENGE
31(11)
Two types of scepticism
31(4)
The sceptical doctrine and its justification
35(4)
Further solutions
39(1)
A way out of the predicament
40(2)
4 THE RESPONSE
42(11)
Our objective
42(1)
Our strategy
43(4)
Naturalized epistemology?
47(3)
Modest epistemology
50(3)
5 DESCARTES'SCEPTICAL CHALLENGE
53(13)
Introduction
53(1)
The Cartesian Circle
53(1)
The source of the circularity:one diagnosis
54(1)
Descartes is not an antecedent sceptic
55(5)
A non-circular response to consequent scepticism
60(1)
Doing without the principle of clarity and distinctness?
61(2)
Beginning with the principle of clarity and distinctness?
63(1)
An alternative diagnosis of the circle
64(2)
6 INDUCTIVE SCEPTICISM
66(11)
Introduction
66(1)
Whose problem is it anyway?
66(1)
The first premise
67(1)
The second premise
68(1)
The third premise
69(3)
The fourth and fifth premises
72(2)
The argument newly couched
74(3)
7 SCEPTICISM AND THE STRUCTURE OF JUSTIFICATION
77(11)
Introduction
77(2)
Terminology
79(1)
Argument aganist terminating chains of justification
80(3)
An argument against infinite justification chains
83(1)
A second argument against infinite justification chains
84(1)
Arguments against circular justification chains
84(1)
Is groundless justification trivial?
85(1)
Is terminating justification trivial?
86(1)
Triviality: a red herring
86(2)
8 INDUCTIVE SCEPTICISM REVISITED
88(10)
Introduction
88(1)
What justification are we seeking?
88(3)
Can induction's reliability be shown deductively?
91(2)
Must induction be non-empirically justified?
93(1)
The apriorist urge
94(1)
Can induction be justified empirically?
95(1)
The justification of induction
96(2)
9 TRANSCENDENT SCEPTICISM AND INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION
98(11)
Introduction
98(1)
Is the unobservable epistemically inaccessible?
99(2)
Van Frassen's argument
101(1)
Hume's argument
102(2)
Russell's first argument
104(1)
Russell's second argument
105(2)
Moderate scepticism?
107(2)
10 THE DEMON ARGUMENT REVISITED
109(13)
Introduction
109(1)
Denying the second premise
109(3)
Denying the first premise
112(1)
Williams' objection
113(1)
Inferring the world from appearances
114(3)
Alston's objection
117(2)
Further objections rebutted
119(1)
Transcendental arguments
120(2)
11 THE DREAM ARGUMENT REVISITED
122(7)
Introduction
122(1)
Rejecting the first prmise
123(3)
Sextus' dream argument
126(2)
Conclusion
128
Notes 129(2)
Bibliography 131(5)
Index 136


Ruth Weintraub