Acknowledgements |
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x | (1) |
Abbreviations |
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xi | (2) |
Introduction |
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xiii | |
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1 KNOWLEDGE, JUSTIFICATION AND TRUTH |
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1 | (17) |
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1 | (1) |
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The concept of epistemic justification |
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1 | (3) |
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4 | (1) |
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Why does justification matter? |
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5 | (4) |
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Knowledge without justification |
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9 | (2) |
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Knowledge:beyond truth and justification |
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11 | (2) |
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Does knowledge-scepticism matter? |
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13 | (3) |
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16 | (2) |
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18 | (13) |
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18 | (2) |
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20 | (2) |
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Is it possible to suspend belief? |
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22 | (1) |
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The logical defence of agnosticism |
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23 | (3) |
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The ethical defence of agnosticism |
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26 | (1) |
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The implementation of the sceptical doctrine |
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27 | (2) |
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The sceptical doctrine and the practical difficulties |
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29 | (2) |
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31 | (11) |
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31 | (4) |
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The sceptical doctrine and its justification |
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35 | (4) |
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39 | (1) |
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A way out of the predicament |
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40 | (2) |
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42 | (11) |
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42 | (1) |
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43 | (4) |
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Naturalized epistemology? |
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47 | (3) |
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50 | (3) |
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5 DESCARTES'SCEPTICAL CHALLENGE |
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53 | (13) |
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53 | (1) |
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53 | (1) |
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The source of the circularity:one diagnosis |
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54 | (1) |
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Descartes is not an antecedent sceptic |
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55 | (5) |
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A non-circular response to consequent scepticism |
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60 | (1) |
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Doing without the principle of clarity and distinctness? |
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61 | (2) |
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Beginning with the principle of clarity and distinctness? |
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63 | (1) |
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An alternative diagnosis of the circle |
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64 | (2) |
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66 | (11) |
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66 | (1) |
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Whose problem is it anyway? |
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66 | (1) |
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67 | (1) |
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68 | (1) |
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69 | (3) |
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The fourth and fifth premises |
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72 | (2) |
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The argument newly couched |
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74 | (3) |
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7 SCEPTICISM AND THE STRUCTURE OF JUSTIFICATION |
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77 | (11) |
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77 | (2) |
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79 | (1) |
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Argument aganist terminating chains of justification |
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80 | (3) |
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An argument against infinite justification chains |
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83 | (1) |
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A second argument against infinite justification chains |
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84 | (1) |
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Arguments against circular justification chains |
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84 | (1) |
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Is groundless justification trivial? |
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85 | (1) |
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Is terminating justification trivial? |
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86 | (1) |
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Triviality: a red herring |
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86 | (2) |
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8 INDUCTIVE SCEPTICISM REVISITED |
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88 | (10) |
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88 | (1) |
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What justification are we seeking? |
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88 | (3) |
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Can induction's reliability be shown deductively? |
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91 | (2) |
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Must induction be non-empirically justified? |
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93 | (1) |
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94 | (1) |
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Can induction be justified empirically? |
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95 | (1) |
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The justification of induction |
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96 | (2) |
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9 TRANSCENDENT SCEPTICISM AND INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION |
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98 | (11) |
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98 | (1) |
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Is the unobservable epistemically inaccessible? |
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99 | (2) |
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101 | (1) |
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102 | (2) |
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104 | (1) |
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Russell's second argument |
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105 | (2) |
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107 | (2) |
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10 THE DEMON ARGUMENT REVISITED |
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109 | (13) |
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109 | (1) |
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Denying the second premise |
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109 | (3) |
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Denying the first premise |
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112 | (1) |
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113 | (1) |
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Inferring the world from appearances |
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114 | (3) |
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117 | (2) |
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Further objections rebutted |
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119 | (1) |
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120 | (2) |
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11 THE DREAM ARGUMENT REVISITED |
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122 | (7) |
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122 | (1) |
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Rejecting the first prmise |
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123 | (3) |
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126 | (2) |
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128 | |
Notes |
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129 | (2) |
Bibliography |
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131 | (5) |
Index |
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136 | |